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This dissertation explores Japanese imperial history in East Asia and focuses on a group of 
“cross-boundary people”—Taiwanese sekimin (Taiwanese who registered as Japanese subjects) 
and Japanese—who went to the treaty port of Shantou in southern China during the period 
between 1895 and 1937. The starting time point (i.e., 1895) corresponds to the signing of the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan acquired Taiwan as a colony and informal privileges in 
Chinese treaty ports. The ending time point (i.e., 1937) corresponds to the decline that Shantou’s 
Japanese community experienced owing to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on 
July 7, 1937. By examining the official documents of the Taiwan General Government, 
commercial reports of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and major newspapers and travel 
writings published in colonial Taiwan, I explore the connections among the Japanese homeland 
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(the metropole), the Japanese formal empire in Taiwan, and the Japanese informal empire in 
Shantou in terms of commercial activities, human resources, and networks of words.  
Concerning commercial activities, I argue that Shantou was an important market for both 
Japanese and Taiwanese goods, and that the commercial network comprising the Japanese 
metropole, colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou treaty port was significant for Japanese imperial 
formation in East Asia. Moreover, by analyzing the Japan-China co-invested Dadong Ice-making 
Company in Shantou, I explore the complicated competitive and cooperative relationships 
among three notably different ethnic groups there: Taiwanese sekimin, local Chinese, and 
Japanese in Shantou. By examining the Japan-founded educational institution known as —the 
Tōē School in Shantou, I clarify two important points: (1) the Taiwan General Government 
established a network of human resources for the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the 
Shantou treaty port; and (2) this particular school’s Japanese and Taiwanese teachers produced 
writings published in major Taiwanese periodicals, signifying a network of “words” between an 
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Chapter 1: Introduction: Empire, Migration and Local Society  
 
1.1 Prelude 
In 2008, a movie called Cape No. 7 directed by the young Taiwanese director Te-Sheng Wei 
ёƴ͉ became a blockbuster in Taiwan. Even without a strong promotional campaign, Cape 
No. 7 became the second highest grossing film in Taiwan’s cinematic history, only behind 
1997’s Titanic directed by James Cameron. At the start of Cape No. 7, a Japanese teacher in 
1940s southern Taiwan falls in love with a Taiwanese girl whose Japanese name is Tomoko. 
After the surrender of Japan in 1945, the Japanese teacher is forced to return to his Japanese 
homeland. While aboard the repatriating Japanese boat Takasagomaru on his trip back, he 
composes seven letters expressing his love for Tomoko. He encloses the letter in an envelope 
addressed to “Cape No. 7,” the girl’s home address in southern Taiwan. As the years go by, the 
Japanese teacher and Tomoko, the former residing in Japan and the latter in Taiwan, enter into 
their respective marriages. The passage of a half-century brings with it change: the Japanese 
teacher has passed away, and his daughter finds the love letters and send them to Taiwan. 
However, the address “Cape No. 7” was an address used only during the Japanese colonial 
period in Taiwan, and the mailman has no idea where he should deliver the article of mail. After 
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a complicated process involving appearances by many other figures, Tomoko, now an old 
grandmother, receives the love letters. The film end with a scene in which the elderly Tomoko 
tenderly touches letters and recalls her time with the Japanese teacher over a half-century earlier.  
After the film’s blockbuster success in Taiwan, many scholars and critics explored why the 
film had been so popular there. A widely applauded theory was that the film had aroused 
complex Taiwanese emotions toward Japan, which had colonized the island for fifty years prior 
to the succeeding governance of Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang. In some ways, the movie 
reflected the complicated and entangled histories of Taiwan, Japan, and China in the twentieth 
century. The Japanese teacher in Cape No. 7 is undoubtedly a cross-boundary person who has 
crossed not only the geographical boundary between his Japanese homeland and colonial Taiwan, 
but alsoby falling in love with Tomokothe ethnic boundary separating the colonizing 
Japanese from the colonized Taiwanese. The Japanese empire’s expansion in East Asia between 
the late nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War created a situation where many 
migrating Japanese, Taiwanese, and Koreans, and others became cross-boundary people, like the 
Japanese teacher in Cape No. 7. My dissertation focuses on a specific population of these 
cross-boundary people, that is, Taiwanese and Japanese who migrated to a treaty port named 
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Shantou in southern China during the early to mid-twentieth century. From the experiences and 
stories of these migrants, I explore the connections among the Japanese homeland, colonial 
Taiwan, and southern China during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan.  
 
1.2 Migration: The Cross-boundary People  
Japanese Migration 
Concerning the issue of Asian migration, Adam McKeown analyzes the complicated 
relationship between Asian migration and the establishment of modern sovereignty, challenging 
the conventional Euro-central concept of globalization.1 His research has inspired me to think 
about the complicated relationships of migration under the Japanese empire. In the field of 
Japanese imperial studies, some scholars have applied the approach of “migration” to studies on 
the Japanese empire, that is, by examining “Japanese” (including Koreans and Taiwanese) 
people’s interactions with local places, researchers can strengthen studies on the Japanese empire. 
Most previous studies in this field explored migration of people from the Japanese homeland to a 
diverse set of acquisitions: Japan’s formal colonies of Taiwan and Korea, Japan’s puppet state of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Adam McKeown, Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2008. 
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Manchukuo, Japan’s informal imperial conquests in China (namely Chinese treaty ports), and 
areas in Southeast Asia.  
Concerning Japanese immigrants in northeast Asia, Erik Esselstrom explores the activities 
of Japanese police officers whom Japan’s Foreign Ministry assigned to Manchuria and Korea, 
and he argues that these officers’ migration played an active role in facilitating Japanese imperial 
expansion in northeast Asia.2 Joshua Fogel examines the Japanese communities in Harbin 
between 1898 and 1930, and notes three important points: (1) most Japanese immigrants in the 
area were from Kyushu, searching for better opportunities; (2) by the 1910s, the Japanese 
communities of Harbin had produced local social, educational, economic, and religious 
institutions functioning to support the Japanese people there; and (3) Japanese communities, 
while establishing many self-supporting institutions, underwent a certain level of ethnic 
integration and assimilation. Many Japanese learned Russian, wore Western-style clothing, and 
frequently interacted with both indigenous and foreign communities. Japanese communities’ 
integration into Harbin’s local communities was much deeper than the corresponding integration 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Erik Esselstrom, Crossing Empire’s Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia. 
Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009.  
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of the Jewish communities.3 Barbara Brooks discussed the migration of millions of Japanese 
“proletarian colonizers” (including farmers, workers, and prostitutes) to Korea and Manchurian 
during the Japanese imperial period. Concerning their social and economic status, these 
proletarian colonizers were not significantly different from local residents. Moreover, the 
Japanese government encouraged Japanese women residing in colonies to marry local men 
(chiefly Koreans and Russians), and praised Japanese prostitutes as vanguards of the Japanese 
empire. Brooks argued that gender functioned as an instrument in the Japanese empire’s 
penetration of and expansion throughout various colonial acquisitions.4 
Mark Peattie’s research compares Japanese immigrants with British immigrants in Shanghai, 
Hankou, Tianjin, Amoy (Xiamen), and Fuzhou, and identifies four important points: (1) most 
Japanese immigrants came from Kyushu and western Japan; (2) the formation of Japanese 
immigrants in China was similar to the corresponding formation in the main colonies of Taiwan 
and Korea, with the formations covering all social classes, from high-ranking officials to the 
bourgeoisie (like small shopkeepers) to the lower classes (like common laborers and prostitutes), 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Joshua Fogel, “The Japanese and the Jews: A Comparative Analysis of Their Communities in Harbin, 1898−1930,” 
in Robert Bickers & Christian Henriot, eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism’s New Communities in East Asia, 
1842−1953. New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 88−108.   
4 Barbara J. Brooks, “Reading the Japanese Colonial Archive: Gender and Bourgeois Civility in Korea and 
Manchuria before 1932” in Barbara Molony and Kathleen Uno, eds., Gendering Modern Japanese History. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2005, pp. 295325. 
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and for the most part, Japanese immigrants had a modest lifestyle, in contrast to the luxurious 
lifestyles of, for example, the British taipan; (3) Japanese communities were self-sufficient and 
isolated; and (4) Japanese immigrants made a greater effort than did their British counterparts to 
accommodate the Chinese community and Japanese had fewer problems in matters of 
accommodation. In addition, Peattie points out that the Japanese government was the only 
“treaty port”-based foreign power that officially supported China-related research institutions.5 
Research conducted by Christian Henriot examines the Japanese communities in Shanghai 
between 1875 and 1945. He argues that commercial opportunities were the primary force that 
attracted Japanese to Shanghai both before and after 1937 (the outbreak of the Second 
Sino-Japanese War). The Japanese residents here were made up of many small shopkeepers and 
employees. They concentrated in certain quarters, resulting in a kind of urban isolation and were 
the most regulated and organized of Shanghai’s foreign communities. Because of their isolation, 
Japanese were rarely in touch with local Chinese and had a strong sense of Japanese identity.6  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 Mark Peattie, “Japanese Treaty Port Settlements in China, 1895−1937,” in Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark 
Peattie, eds., The Japanese Informal Empire in China, 1895−1937. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989, pp. 
166−209. 
6 Christian Henriot, “Little Japan in Shanghai: An Insulated Community, 1875−1945,” in Robert Bickers & 
Christian Henriot, eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism’ s New Communities in East Asia, 1842−1953. New York: 
Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 146−169. 
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Concerning Japanese immigrants in southeast Asia, Mark Peattie explores the Japanese 
immigrants in Micronesia. His research tells of many Japanese businessmen who operated in 
Micronesia and who included the pioneer and patriot Koben Mori ɄŢƝ and the “sugar king” 
Haruji Matsue Ȯɳȏə. Readers also learn about both the Micronesia policies adopted by 
different Japanese political regimes and everyday Micronesian life as experienced by Japanese 
immigrants, including Okinawan and Korean immigrants.7 Hiromitsu Iwamoto examines 
Japanese who stayed in New Guinea between the 1890s and 1949, including the businessman 
Isokichi Komine ŢŹ˹ê, who later became a famous planter in both German and Australian 
New Guinea. However, Japanese in New Guinea faced severe challenges after Australia formally 
regarded Japan as an enemy in 1942.8  
 
Taiwanese Sekimin Migration 
Taiwan had been under Japanese colonization for fifty years, from the signing of the Treaty 
of Shimonoseki in 1895 to the end of the Second World War in 1945. Many scholars conducted 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Mark R. Peattie. Nan’yo: The Rise and Fall of the Japanese in Micronesia, 1885−1945. Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1988. 
8 Hiromitsu Iwamoto, Nanshin: Japanese settlers in Papua and New Guinea, 1890−1949. Canberra: Journal of 
Pacific History, Australian National University, 1999.  
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studies exploring the history of Taiwan under Japanese colonial period.9 Leo Ching’s ͬńч 
research analyzes Taiwanese literature during the Japanese colonial period and argues that the 
formation of Taiwanese identity was part of a triangular relationship involving Japanese 
colonialism and Chinese nationalism. The neo-nationalism or proto-nationalism of Taiwanese 
was shaped under Japanese colonial rule.10 Faye Yuan Kleeman examines the concept of “the 
south” from the perspective of literature and the portrait of the South Pacific and Taiwanese 
aborigines in both political novels and popular media, emphasizing how these texts reflect the 
symbolic meaning and impact of “the south” in the Japanese colonial context.11 Research edited 
by David Der-wei Wang ʾƴŀ and Ping-hui Liao Ƙʥǃ examines colonial Taiwan’s 
literature and, in particular, discusses how the Japanese colonial government developed a 
mechanism of governance by means of connections between power and knowledge.12 
Concerning the kōminka ˨ɭÊ (Japanization) movement in Taiwan, Wan-Yao Chou ñŁ̔ 
suggests that wartime pressures demanded the mobilization of all colonial sources and manpower. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 For example, Harry Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895-1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in 
Murry A. Rubinstein, ed., Taiwan: A New History, pp. 201-60. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1999. 
10 Leo T. S. Ching, Becoming “Japanese”: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. 
11 Faye Yuan Kleeman, Under an Imperial Sun: Japanese Colonial Literature of Taiwan and the South. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, 2003.  
12 Ping-hui Liao and David Der-wei Wang eds., Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895−1945: History, 
Culture, Memory. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.   
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The kōminka movement served as a means of mobilization. The Japanese authorities wanted to 
turn Koreans and Taiwanese into loyal imperial subjects by, for example, building Japanese 
shrines, instituting oaths to the Japanese state, and assigning Japanese names to non-Japanese.13 
Sociologist Ming-Chang Lo щȌɡ demonstrates the mutual relationships between the 
professional identity and the ethnic identity of Taiwanese doctors under the Japanese colonial 
empire, and she argues that Taiwanese doctors’ attitudes toward the colonizers grew more 
positive as the doctors increasingly perceived themselves less and less as national physicians (a 
perception common in the 1920s) and more and more as medical modernists (a perception 
common during the kōminka period , 1937-1945).14 
Concerning the issue of migration, in addition to examining people from the Japanese 
homeland, some scholars have focused on the migration of Taiwanese sekimin. The term 
‘Taiwanese sekimin’ ͗ʟ΀ɭ is a Japanese one indicating “Taiwanese who registered as 
Japanese citizens.” The term commonly appeared in official Japanese documents during the 
Japanese colonial period (1895−1945), when many Taiwanese sekimin sojourned specifically to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 Wan-Yao Chou, “The Kōminka Movement in Taiwan and Korea: Comparisons and Interpretations,” in Peter 
Duus, Ramon H. Myers, and Mark R. Peattie eds., The Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931−1945. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1996, pp. 40−68.  
14 Ming-cheng Lo, Doctors within Borders: Profession, Ethnicity, and Modernity in Colonial Taiwan. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 2002.  
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southern China. There, they undertook a variety of occupations: for example, some were 
businessmen in search of new opportunities; others were teachers assigned by the Taiwan 
General Government to teach at Japanese-funded schools in China. Moreover, some Taiwanese 
sekimin travelled for personal reasons, like sight-seeing or reunions of family and friends. In this 
sense, research on Taiwanese sekimin’s migrations in China has enriched studies on the broader 
topic of the Japanese empire. 
Concerning previous studies on Taiwanese sekimin, Japanese scholar Takashi Nakamura 
KȬņƷ has put out perhaps the most important research in this area, beginning with several 
papers in the 1980s. Some of his research addresses the Taiwan General Government’s 
management of certain southern Chinese sites, encompassing the Japanese management of 
hospitals, schools, the press, and the like. Moreover, he focuses on the activities of Taiwanese 
sekimin in Fuzhou and Xiamen, but the research seldom addresses sekimin in Guangdong 
Province’s Shantou area.15 Masami Kondō Ϧ΂ɡƁ analyzes schools, hospitals, and the press, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 Takashi Nakamura, Taiwan sekimin wo meguru sho mon dai͗ʏ̡ɭ3+2εúр (On issues related to 
Taiwanese sekimin), Tōnan ajia kenkyū ȭÓ585˴̑, vol. 18: 3 (December 1980), pp. 66−89; “Fukushū no 
Taiwan sekimin” ̄ż$͗ʟ̡ɭ (Taiwanese sekimin in Fuzhou), Nanpō bunka ÓǿǻÊ, vol. 10 (October 
1983), pp. 160−172; “Kamon no Taiwan sekimin to san dai sei” ƗИ$͗ʏ̡ɭ!BĬĽ (Taiwanese sekimin in 
Xiamen and the three big family names), Nanpō bunka ÓǿǻÊ, vol. 12 (November 1985), pp. 115−137; “Kamon 
oyobi fukushū hakuai kai iinn no sei ritsu: Taiwan sōtokufu no bunka kōsaku” ƗИÞ'̄żÕǇnÌТ$ǐ̕
—͗ʟ̺˱Ɠ$ǻÊžw (The establishment of Xiamen and Fuzhou hakuai hospitals: The cultural work of the 
Taiwan General Government), Nanpō bunka ÓǿǻÊ, vol. 15, (November 1988), pp. 1−57; “Swatō hakuai kai iin 
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the so-called three cultural facilities of the Taiwan General Government during the Taishō period 
(1912−1926) and argues that the expenses of the Taiwan General Government’s ventures in 
southern China and southeastern Asia occupied a significant proportion of the Taiwan General 
Government’s overall expenses.16  
Among Taiwanese scholars, Hua-huang Liang ɀͲˊ stands out as one of the earliest 
scholars to pay attention to the sekimin issue. He demonstrates the Japanese colonial 
government’s discriminatory treatment of Taiwanese by examining the government’s passport 
policy for Taiwanese traveling to China. For example, when Taiwanese sekimin would board a 
ship leaving Taiwan for China, they had to hand over their passports to law-enforcement officers 
who would collect all the passports and submit them to the Japanese consulate in China. The 
consulate would keep the passports belonging to the Taiwanese sekimin until their return to 
Taiwan. However, Japanese immigrants who were passengers aboard a ship bound from the 
Japanese homeland to China did not have to hand over their passports to Japanese authorities.17 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
no sei ritsu” ɲпÕǇnÌТ$ǐ̕ (The establishment of Shantou’s hakuai hospital), Tenri daigaku gakuhō ĭ
˃Ĭňňğ, vol. 162 (October 1989), pp. 15−28; “Ka nan ni okeru Taiwan sekimin” ͲÓ#2͗ʏ̡ɭ 
(Taiwanese sekimin in southern China), Nanpō bunka ÓǿǻÊ, vol. 17, (November 1990), pp. 127−150; vol. 18, 
(November 1991), pp. 247−280. 
16 Masami Kondō, Sōryoku sen to Taiwan: nihon shokumin chi hōgai no kenkyū ̶¸Ǔ!äʏѣȅȪɆɭĒŸĤ
$˴̑ (Total War and Taiwan: Research on the Collapse of the Japanese Colonies). Tokyo: Tōsui shobō ¬ɰȞ
ǘ, 1996. 
17 Torajirō Inoue [CƒWϽ, “Xiamen de Taiwan jimin went” ƗИ˦͗ʟ̡ɭúр (The issue of Taiwanese 
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In this sense, Japan’s passport-control policies for Taiwanese subjects differed substantively 
from those for Japanese subjects.18 Hsueh-chi Hsu ΤгĿ explores the activities of Taiwanese 
sekimin in Manchukuo, whichshe argueswas a haven for Taiwanese pursuing new 
opportunities. She focuses on a group of Taiwanese students who, after attending medical 
schools in Manchukuo, practiced their respective professions there. Some of these medical 
specialists even served as the last emperor Puyi’s private doctors and went into exile with the 
emperor.19 Shu-ming Chung АʈǶ approaches the issue of Taiwanese sekimin from the 
perspective of commercial history. She argues that sekimin excelled in the ice-making business 
and the cold-refreshment business in Xiamen, and that these entrepreneurs actively participated 
in the establishment of public utilities, like water and electricity.20  
Some scholars have addressed the social history of Taiwanese sekimin, arguing that “hei 
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sekimin in Amoy) (1926) in Mintai Guanxi Dangan Ziliao М͗Н|ɕȾϐǽ (Archive of the relationship 
between Fujian and Taiwan). Fujian: Lujiang chuban she, 1993, pp. 1528.  
18 Hua-huang Liang, “Ri ju shi dai tai min fu hua zhi lu juan zhi du” ȅǱȓg͗ɭϕͲPȂ½´Ɣ (The 
passport system for China-bound Taiwanese during the Japanese colonial period) in Taiwan Fengwu ͗ʟтʴ, vol. 
39: 3 (1989), pp. 1−50. 
19 Hsueh-chi Hsu, “Ri zhi shi qi Taiwan ren de hai wai huo dong: zai Manzhou de Taiwan yi sheng” 
$
" (The overseas movement of Taiwanese during the Japanese colonial period: 
the Taiwanese doctors in “Manchuria”), Taiwan shi yan jiu !	, Vol. 11: 2 (2004), pp. 1−75. Hsu explores 
Taiwanese sekimin in Beijing during the period between 1937 and 1947: please see “1937 nian zhi 1947 nian zai 
Beijing de Taiwan ren” 1937 1947
 (Taiwanese in Beijing, 1937−1947), in Zhang geng ren 
wen she hui xue bao #, Vol. 1:1 (2008), pp. 33−84. 
20 Shu-ming Chung, “Ri zhi shi qi Taiwan ren zai Xiamen de huo dong ji qi xiang guan wen ti” ȅɸȓȦ͗ʟađ
ƗИ˦ʀÀÞ£˭Нúр (The activities and related issues of Taiwanese in Xiamen during the Japanese colonial 
period) in Zou xiang jin dai ϔíϦg. Taipei: Dong hua shu ju, 2004, pp. 399−452. 
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bang ji min” ќƉ΀ɭ (the sekimin gangs), whose members engaged in drug trafficking, 
prostitution, and other illegal activities were an offshoot of Japan’s southern strategy. The 
Taiwan General Government turned a blind eye to sekimin’s illegal actives because Japanese 
officials regarded the activities of sekimin gangs as a way to enlarge Japanese influence in 
China.21 Some Japanese scholars have focused on Taiwanese sekimin’s ethnic and national 
backgrounds and have attempted to identify relationships between sekimin and imperial Japan.22   
Most American scholarship has not touched on the issue of Taiwanese sekimin, but recently 
some American scholars have opened up the possibility of further exploration in this area. 
Barbara Brooks argued that colonial citizenship, which spanned multiple imperial fields, serves 
as a way for historians to explore the issue of identity in the Japanese empire. Meanwhile, 
imperial Japan’s policies concerning ethnicity and nationality demonstrate the different positions 
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21 Zai-sheng Lin ȯ§ˌ, “Lin zai-sheng xian sheng fang wen ji lu: ri zhi shi qi Taiwan lang ren zai xia men zhi 
dong tai” ȯ§ˌˌ΢úΡЍ—ȅɸȓȦ͗ʟʃađƗИPÀǉ (An interview with Zai-sheng Lin: The 
movement of Taiwanese rōnin in Amoy during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan), recorded by Feng-kwei Pien 
ÖђĴ, Taiepi wenxian ͗Ëǻʼ, no. 144 (2003), pp. 227−244; Xue-shin Wang ʾŉǾ, Rir ben dui hua nan jin 
zheng ce yu Taiwan hei bang ji min zhi yan jiu ȅȪŠͲÓϮǳ̞͗͘ʟќƉ̡ɭP˵̑, 1895−1945 (Research 
on Japan’s Southern Strategy in Southern China and the Taiwanese Sekimin Gang, 1895−1945). Nantou: Guo shi 
guan Taiwan wen xian guan, 2009. 
22 Jun Kurihara ȸÚ̪, “Taiwan sekimin to kokuseki mondai” ͗ʟ̡ɭ*ċ̡úр (Taiwanese sekimin and 
the issue of nationality), Taiwan wen xian shi liao zheng li yan jiu xue shu yan tao hui lun wen ji ͗ʟǻʼåǽ
ǹ˃˴̑ŉ΋˴ΠȡγǻЭ. Nanto: Taiwan sheng wen xian wei yuan hui, 2000, pp. 451476; Akira Matsuura Ȯ
ʂ̗, Feng-kwei Pien ÖђĴ, “Zhong guo hua nan di qu Taiwan ji min zhi te xing ji qi wen ti” KċͲÓĒÍ͗
ʟ̡ɭPʵƾÞ£úр (The characteristics and related issues of Taiwanese sekimin in southern China), in Taipei 
wen xian ͗Ëǻʼ, no. 133 (2000), pp. 211251. 
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of colonized peoples (e.g., Taiwanese and Koreans) within the empire.23  
Research by Man-hong Lin ȯʔ̩ is a combination of overseas Chinese history and 
commerce studies. She takes the sekimin Chunyang Guo Ͽȏ̊ in Indonesia as an example 
and argues that overseas Chinese merchants adopted multiple nationalities, including the 
Japanese nationality, to reduce commercial risks and to seek out economic benefits. Actually, by 
means of deliberate falsification, many Chinese in Fujian Province acquired sekimin status in 
order to enjoy extraterritorial privileges.24 Kenichi Gotō Ư΂T?, who is famous for 
conducting research about the relationship between imperial Japan and Indonesia, relates the life 
history of Taiwanese sekimin in southeastern Asia. He uses the sekimin Dai Ke ȵï to depict 
sekimin who diligently reclaimed wasteland in Java but whom local Javanese governments not 
only regarded as citizen of an enemy country after the outbreak of the Great East Asian War but 
indeed subjected to property confiscations and internment in concentration camps.25  
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23 Barbara Brooks, “Japanese Colonial Citizenship in Treaty Port China: The Locations of Koreans and Taiwanese 
in the Imperial Order” in Robert Bickers & Christian Henriot eds., New Frontiers: Imperialism’s New Communities 
in East Asia, 1842−1953. New York: Manchester University Press, 2000, pp. 109−124. 
24 Man-hong Lin, “Overseas Chinese Merchants and Multiple Nationality: A Means for Reducing Commercial Risk, 
1895−1935,” in Modern Asian Studies 35: 4 (2001), pp. 985−1009. 
25 Kenichi Gotō, Kindai nihon to tōnan ajia: nanshin no shōgeki to isan ϦgȅȪ!ȭÓ595ÓϮ$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!ϸˎ (Modern Japan and Southeastern Asia: the effect and the heritage of the southern award). Tokyo: 
Iwanami shoten, 1995. 
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Moreover, Lori Watt and Tessa Morris-Suzuki explore the issue of migration in postwar 
Japan. Watt’s scholarship addresses Japan’s policy of hikiage ƟǬ (repatriation) and 
deportation in the postwar period under the instruction of the Allied Powers. The former policy 
concerned the repatriation of Japanese from all of Japan’s former colonies to the Japanese 
homeland whereas the latter concerned the dispersal of Japan-based ex-colonial peoples (e.g., 
Taiwanese and Koreans) from the Japanese homeland back to their region of origin. Watt argues 
that both repatriation and deportation significantly shaped the reconfiguration of postwar Japan.26 
Morris-Suzuki explores the story of mikkōsha ŕ͛͆ (stowaways), most of whom were 
Koreans who entered Japan between 1946 and the 1970s for economic reasons. She attempts to 
fill in the “blank space” (1945−1980) in Japanese immigration history and argues that the 
numbers of illegal immigrants, in reality, were much higher than the Japanese official statistics 
showed. In some cases, would-be immigrants who were not lucky enough to get a residence 
permit were confined in detention camps and suffered dehumanizing treatment.27 
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26 Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2009. 
27 Tessa-Morris Suzuki, “Invisible Immigrants: Undocumented Migration and Border Controls in Early Postwar 
Japan,” Journal of Japanese Studies 32: 1 (2006), pp. 119−153; “Defining the Boundaries of the Cold War Nation: 
1950s Japan and the Other Within,” Japanese Studies 26: 3 (2006), pp. 303−316. 
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In conclusion, the abovementioned scholars have explored Japanese imperial history and 
post-war Japanese history in reference to migration and migrants. The scholars’ findings help 
clarify the Japanese empire’s diverse makeup and have inspired me to analyze the relationship 
among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou treaty port, with a specific 
focus on both the Japanese and Taiwanese immigrants. 
 
1.3 The Significance of Local Chinese Society 
A local society is a group of interacting people sharing an urban or rural environment. Recent 
studies on the matter have stressed the agency of local societies and the interactions between 
local societies (small) and the state (large).  
According to Max Weber’s research, China never developed “urban community” or “urban 
autonomy.” Cities in imperial China were static, merely centers of bureaucracy. By contrast, 
Western European cities represented freedom, equality, rationality, and capitalism.28 In the 
1970s, William Skinner first challenged Weber’s argument and provided macro-region theory, 
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28 Max Weber, The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism, translated and edited by Han H. Gerth. Glencoe: 
Free Press, 1951; The City, translated and edited by Don Martindale and Gertrud Neuwirth. New York: Free Press; 
London: Collier-Macmillan, 1958. 
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core-periphery theory, and central-place theory in studying Chinese cities.29 Later, many 
scholars of Chinese history applied Skinner’s theories to various strands of research. For 
example, William Rowe’s research about Hankow suggests that early modern China developed a 
national market, at the center of which was Hankow, possessing modernity, urban autonomy, and 
urban community akin to the character of nineteenth-century Paris.30 Adopting Skinner’s 
theories, Mary Rankin in her research on nineteenth-century-Zhejiang argues that the gap 
between core and periphery in Skinner’s theory is more significant than the traditional 
urban-rural dichotomy in Weber’s theory, and that the growth of the “public sphere”31 enabled 
Zhejiang elites to play a more active role in social and political life.32  
Richard Lufrano examines the late imperial Chinese world from the perspective of merchants 
and commerce. He challenges Western scholarship’s traditional conclusion that Confucian 
thought has been a major obstacle to Chinese economic development. From his examination of 
merchant manuals (e.g., travel guides, practical instructions, and moral instructions) published in 
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29 William Skinner ed.,The City in Late Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977. 
30 William Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796−1889. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1984; Hankow: Conflict and Community in a Chinese City, 1796−1895. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1989.   
31 Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois 
Society, translated by Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989. 
32 Mary Backus Rankin, Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 18651911. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986. 
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the late Ming to the mid-Qing period, he argues that merchants absorbed many Confucian values 
(e.g., self-discipline and frugality) and emphasized self-cultivation, reciprocity, and 
rationalism.33 
Examining local society in 1920s Beijing, David Strand’s study argues that a public sphere 
there occupied a space between the state and society. Citizens (including laborers) discussed 
political issues in temples, tea houses, bathhouses, theaters, brothels, and many other public 
places.34 Richard Belsky’s research concerns the influence that both hui guan ȡф 
(native-place lodges) and sojourners in Beijing had on the city’s urban ecology in the early 
twentieth century. On the one hand, the sojourners made use of hui guan to communicate with 
other countrymen in Beijing and to influence the imperial bureaucracy; on the other hand, the 
state used hui guan to balance different local powers and to maintain the security and operations 
of the imperial bureaucracy.35 Ruth Rogaski’s research on Tianjin explores how wei sheng ΍ˌ 
(hygiene) became representative of Chinese modernity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Tianjin experienced the presence of foreign powers on its soils after the 1850s, and during the 
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33 Richard Lufrano, Honorable Merchants: Commerce and Self-Cultivation in Late Imperial China. Honolulu: 
University of Hawai’i Press, 1997. 
34 David Strand, Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s. Berkeley: University of California Press, 
1989. 
35 Richard Belsky, Localities at the Center: Native Place, Space, and Power in Late Imperial Beijing. Cambridge: 
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1930s and 40s, it was controlled by Japanese. Her study essentially opens a window through 
which we can understand the complexity of a Chinese treaty port’s local society.36 
Concerning local society in Chinese cities, many scholars have focused on Shanghai because 
of its status as the “key to modern China”37; in other words, knowledge of Shanghai can shed 
considerable light on not only China but also China’s encounters with modernity, which were 
rooted in urban settings. Diverse scholars have conducted research on Republican Shanghai from 
different angles: (1) Christian Henriot’s and Frederic Wakeman’s work concerning the 
relationship between Shanghai and state-influenced social control;38 (2) Bryna Goodman’s and 
others’ examinations of the immigrants in Shanghai and their identities;39 (3) research by 
Hanchao Lu ˫ʕϗ examining Shanghai residents’ everyday life;40 (4) Shanghai’s urban life 
and cultural industry, especially the printing culture, as seen from the perspectives of Leo Ou-fan 
Lee ȫɠɁ and Christopher Reed;41 (5) Emily Honig’s and Elizabeth Perry’s discussions 
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University of California Press, 2004. 
37 Rhoads Murphey, Shanghai: Key to Modern China. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. 
38 Christian Henriot, Shanghai, 1927−1937: Municipal Power, Locality, and Modernization. Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1993. Frederic Wakeman, Policing Shanghai, 1927−1937. Berkeley: University of California 
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about workers in Shanghai;42 (6) Christian Henriot’s and Gail Hershatters’ findings concerning 
prostitution in Shanghai;43 (7) Frederic Wakeman’s treatment of terrorism and crime in 
Shanghai;44 and (8) Shanghai’s economic sentiments, researched by Wen-hsin Yeh ͶǻƵ.45  
If we turn our eyes to the study of local society in southern China during this period, we can 
see that Hua nan xue pai ͲÓŉʁ (the Hua nan school of thought) contributed greatly to this 
field. The school consists of scholars from the Chinese University of Hong Kong, Sun Yat-sen 
University in Guangzhou, and Xiamen University. Having inherited anthropologist Maurice 
Freedman’s theoretical concept of linage in southern China, the scholars emphasize an approach 
steeped in historical anthropology, paying particular attention to religion, village-level lineage in 
southern China, and interactions between the state system and local society. 
David W. Faure examines the relationship between state and society, and he argues that 
under the Ming dynasty, with the institutionalization of lineage (i.e., ritual and group ownership 
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of property), southern China melded into imperial China.46 Helen Siu ;ђи and Zhiwei Liu 
·Ʒ argue that cultural identity in the Pearl River Delta of southern China has never been 
fixed and has continually adapted itself to diverse interactions between local society and state. 
They explore the ethnic identity of both the Danjia ˚œ, a minority in Chinese society, and the 
Han, and argue that ethnic identity has fluctuated, often in relation to language and lineage.47 
Research  conducted by Chun-sheng Chen Фȏ͌ centers on the Guangdong area, 
emphasizing religious belief and lineage in local Chaozhou society.48 Mei-bao Cheng ̍́Ŝ 
explores the formation of the so-called Guangdong culture and the transformation of the 
Guangdong language in different places.49 Zhen-man Zheng ЃВʔ has collected a great 
amount of information pertaining to genealogies in Fuzhou villages, and explores how 
institutionalized lineage has functioned in local society.50 Scholarship by a research partner of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 David W. Faure, Emperor and Ancestor: State and Lineage in South China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
2007. 
47 Helen F. Siu and Zhiwei Liu, “Lineage, Market, Pirate, and Dan: Ethnicity in the Pearl River Delta of South 
China,” in Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen Siu, and Donald S. Sutton eds., Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, 
and Frontier in Early Modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006, pp. 285−310. 
48 Chun-sheng Chen, Zhi xu yu xin yang: ming qing chaozhou min jian xin yang yu xiang cun she hui de bian qian 
̋Ə͘jѣȌʋʙżɭКj͘ЂȬ˼ȡ˦πϷ (Order and belief: changes in local religion and rural society 
in Ming Qing Chaozhou). Beijing: sheng huo, du shu, xin zhi san lian chu ban she, 2006. 
49 Mei-bao Cheng, Di yu wen hua yu guo jia ren tong: wan qing yi lai “Guangdong wen hua” guan de xing cheng 
ĒęǻÊ͘ċœΫëѣȔʋiyƚȭǻÊΜ˦Ƨǐ (Regional culture and national identity: evolving 
perspectives of “Guangdong culture” since the late Qing era). Beijing: sheng huo, du shu, xin zhi san lian chu ban 
she, 2006. 
50 Zhen-man Zheng, Ming qing Fjian jia zu zu zhi yu she hui bian qian Ȍʋ̄Ɯœȃ̮̼͘˼ȡπϷ Family 
institutions and social change in Fujian during the Ming Qing periodBeijing: zhong guo ren min da xue chu ban 
she 2009. 
! 22!
Zhen-man Zheng, Michael Szonyi integrates new sources (e.g., stone inscriptions) and 
genealogies from Fuzhou villages, and argues that the lineage (and the compiling of genealogies) 
was actually a strategic practice characterized by flexibility and negotiation.51 Chi Cheung Choi 
ͺƷ˾ addresses the Chaoshan area’s commercial activities and pays particular attention to 
influence exerted by Chaoshan businessmen over kinship in order to explore business in southern 
China, East Asia, and Southeast Asia.52 In addition to the abovementioned scholars, the local 
governments of Chaozhou and Shantou developed offices responsible for recording local history 
and collecting related materials, thereby helping to reconstruct the Chaoshan area’s past from 
local perspectives.  
Some scholars have explored local history from the angle of Christianity. Research 
overseen by Joseph Tse-Hei Lee ȫɍʮ concerns the role of Christianity in the Chaoshan area. 
His work examines the missionary efforts of both American Baptists and English Presbyterians 
in Chaozhou villages during the period between 1860 and 1900, with an emphasis on 
missionaries’ creation of Christian villages in local Chinese society and the power relationships 
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between Christian and non-Christian villagers.53 
Michael Szonyi’ study of Quemoy ЉИ draws out the significance of local society during 
the Cold War of the 1950s. Quemoy is a small island currently belonging to Taiwan and located 
in the Taiwan Straits. The location of Quemoy made the island suitable as a buffer between 
Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomintang in Taiwan and Mao Tse-tung’s Chinese Communist Party in 
China. Szonyi explores how the Cold War transformed the local society and the lives of the 
residents on this small island.54  
The abovementioned research about local Chinese society (cities and villages) inspired me to 
examine Japanese communities in the Shantou treaty port. 
Although people are used to regarding Shantou (Swatow) and Chaozhou as a single region and 
frequently refer to it as the “Chaoshan” area, the two places differ from each other in many 
significant ways. One of the most significant of these lies in Chaozhou’s status as a historical 
city, where lineage was well institutionalized by the nineteenth century; by contrast, Shantou was 
traditionally a fishing village and its rapid modernization was in large part a response to the 
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Second Opium War. In 1860, Shantou was formally opened as a treaty port.55 In this sense, most 
residents in Shantou were immigrants from other places, and the specific manifestations of 
institutionalized lineage (e.g., ancestral shrines) were much weaker than those in Chaozhou.  
Geographically, Shantou has consisted of three parts: Shantou Town was an old urban area 
hosting prosperous commercial activities; Qilu ŷ˷ was east of Shantou Town and, after the 
designation of Shantou as a treaty port, became the site of Western consulates, foreign 
companies, wharfs, warehouses, churches, schools, and hospitals; Queshi ˺˳ (or Kakuseki 
Ν˳ in Japanese)an island opposite Qilu was basically an English settlement.  
After Shantou opened as a treaty port, Western powers entered it one by one, and among the 
newcomers were British, American, German, Russian, Dutch, and Belgians. Japan entered 
Shantou after the First Sino-Japanese War in 1895, thirty years later than the Western powers. 
The Western and Japanese powers established consulates, companies, schools, hospitals, and 
churches in Shantou, and thus, the city became one of China’s international metropolises. It is 
interesting to note that, regarding government levies on traded goods, both the Chinese 
government’s customs agency (chang guan, ƈН) and foreign governments’ customs agency 
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(yang guan, ɽН) co-existed in Shantou. The Qing government established Shantou’s Chinese 
customs agency (Chaozhou shin guan, ʙżǾН) in 1853; in 1860, the Sino-British Tianjin 
Treaty opened up the possibility of foreign customs agency (Chao hai guan, ʙʅН) in the port 
city. Ma yu dao łźŴ, a small island near Shantou was the site of these agencies’ customs 
buildings. In the mid-1860s, the customs agencies relocated their operations to Shantou city itself. 
The co-existence of both Chinese and foreign customs in Shantou was brought to an end by the 
Boxer Protocol of 1901, which demanded that the Qing government renounce the right of 
Chinese customs to operate on Chinese soil. From that time forward until 1949, foreign powers 
exercised exclusive control of customs in Shantou.   
During the period between the early 1900s and the 1930s, Shantou accommodated many 
foreigners and experienced commercial prosperity. The freight-handling capacity of Shantou 
ranked third in China, behind only Shanghai and Guangzhou, and served as a nexus for east 
Guangdong Province, southwest Fujian Province, and southeast Jiangxi Province. Moreover, 
Shantou was the hometown of many workers laboring in Southeast Asia, and served as a window 
of exchange with markets farther south in China via the South Seas. However, Shantou was not a 
place of political stability and had been a battlefield in the various Chinese civil wars waged by 
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competing warlords. Meanwhile, Shantou exhibited some of the most pronounced anti-foreign 
currents in Republican China (mainly anti-British and anti-Japanese). Different political powers, 
including the Guomindang, Soviet advisors, and Chinese communists were keen to mobilize 
anti-British and anti-Japanese protests. In this sense, when exploring the Japanese empire’s 
management of companies, schools, and hospitals, and the activities of both Japanese and 
Taiwanese sekimin in Shantou, one should rigorously account for Shantou’s local society, 







      
 
Fig. 1-1 Shantou Customs in the 1920s. 
 
[Illustration] The building on the right is Bell Tower, which was constructed in 1919 and finished in 1921. (Source: 
Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng at Chao shan li shi wen hua yan jiu zhong xin ʙɲɤåǻÊ˴̑KƵ Research Center of 
Chaozhou and Shantou History and Culture.)  
 
 
      
 
Fig. 1-2 Shantou Customs Museum. 
 
[Illustration] Shantou Customs (the Bell Tower) is a historical spot, which was preserved by the Shantou 
Government in 1994. Later, the building was renovated and opened to public as the Shantou Customs 
Museum in 2008. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.) 
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1.4 The Approaches and Arguments in My Dissertation 
My dissertation explores the Japanese imperial formation in East Asia by analyzing the 
commercial trade, educational activities, and social networks of both Japanese and Taiwanese 
sekimin communities in the Shantou treaty port during the period between 1895 and 1937.56 
Concerning the theoretical framework of my dissertation, I have drawn considerable 
inspiration from several important scholars. First, I was inspired by Peter Duus who 
conceptualized China as Japan’s “informal empire.” He argues that before the Manchurian 
Incident in 1931, Japanese imperialism in China was informal and that this informality was 
connected with the unequal treaty system. After the Manchurian Incident, with Japan’s 
strengthened military forces, Japanese control over China evolved into a formal system. Duus 
suggests that Japan was interested in China in terms of trade rather than territory and that, thus, 
Japan’s informal empire in China enabled Japan to acquire economic benefits while saving on 
the costs of formal colonization. Japan’s informal colonies in China accounted for more of 
Japan’s trade than did all of Japan’s other colonies combined.57 I think that this concept 
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rigorously illustrates Japanese management in Shantou because the importance of Shantou for 
the Japanese empire lay chiefly in commercial interests.  
Second, I was inspired by Ann Laura Stoler whose concept of “imperial formations” 
promotes historical research that pays significant attention to imperial actorsto “people on the 
fringes of empires as well as at their centers, to designated subjects as well as colonial 
administrators, to those with companion and countervailing motivations to empire, and to those 
who reside at the categorical edges of the imperial.”58 I think that the concept of imperial 
formations provides a persuasive theoretical framework for discussing the mobility and the 
networks of Taiwanese sekimin under imperialism because Taiwanese sekimin were people on 
the fringes of not only the empire but the colonized populations, as well. 
Concerning my application of research approaches to the topic of imperial Japan's extension 
in East Asia, I was influenced by Joshua Fogel, Mark Peattie, Christian Henroit, Takashi 
Nakamura, Hsueh-chi Hsu, Shu-min Zhong, and many others who explored “Japanese” 
(including Taiwanese) immigrants in China. On the one hand, I treat the Japanese and Taiwanese 
sekimin immigrants in Shantou as a window through which to perceive Japanese imperial 
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58 Ann Laura Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter C. Perdue eds., Imperial Formations. Santa Fe: School for 
Advanced Research Press; Oxford: James Currey, 2007, pp. 3−42. 
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formation in East Asia; and on the other hand, I pay attention to the significance of local Chinese 
society, and consider the political, economic, and social dimensions of Shantou.  
The majority of materials in this dissertation are Japanese sources, including commercial 
reports issued by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, newspapers published in colonial Taiwan 
(such as Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō), official reports of the Japanese consul in Shantou, official 
reports of Japanese teachers who taught in the Japanese-funded Tōē School in Shantou, and 
Taiwan General Government officers’ travelogues. I have used these records to represent the 
imperial gaze informing many Japanese peoples’ perceptions of Shantou and to represent 
Taiwanese people’s self-positioning in this curious contact zone of Shantou, where Japanese, 
Taiwanese, and local Chinese interacted. I have not used Shantou municipal archives or 
Anglo-American foreign-office reports on Japan in this dissertation because my key concerns 
have been (1) the management of Shantou by the Japanese empire—not by native or Western 
forces and (2) the perceptions of cross-boundary Japanese and Taiwanese in Shantou. However, I 
must admit that my heavy reliance on Japanese primary sources may have created some 
methodological problems because the Japanese government, whether in Tokyo or in Taipei, not 
only produced these records but often censored them as well. Anyone considering this research 
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should keep these unavoidable complexities and possible gaps in mind. 
Based on the abovementioned theoretical frameworks and approaches, my dissertation 
consists of four chapters, as will be discussed in the following section. 
Chapter Two: The Commercial Activities and Networks of Japanese Merchants and 
Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou 
In this chapter, I explore the commercial relations among the Japanese homeland, colonial 
Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou by examining Japanese commercial reports, such as 
Tsūshō kōhō Ϫùğ. The records show that Shantou was an important market for both 
Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. Shantou’s 
Taiwanese sekimin merchants and Shantou-based Japanese companies (e.g., the Mitsui Company, 
Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company) contributed significantly to the commercial 
network comprising the three abovementioned places. 
In studying this commercial network in East Asia, I drew inspiration from the “network 
mode” and “inter-port mode” concepts developed by Japanese scholar Takashi Hamashita  
ʜDɣƷ, who provided a new approach to exploring Asian history. His focus is not on a 
specific national history (which traditional Oriental studies have favored) but on the important 
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waterway connections among different ports and regions. For example, he argues that to analyze 
the connections among ports yields more details than would a traditional examination of the 
historical relationships among nations.59 In my case, examination of Japanese matches sold in 
Shantou clarify the relationships among the Japanese city of Kobe, the Taiwanese city of 
Keelung, British Hong Kong, and Shantou in southern China. 
Chapter Three: Competition and Cooperation: The Case of the Dadong Ice-making 
Company and Relations among Japan, China, and Taiwan 
In this chapter, I explore the cooperation and competition, conflict and compromise among 
Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese imperial 
consulate in Shantou by examining the Sino-Japan co-invested Dadong Company in Shantou. 
The Dadong Ice-making Company was initiated by Shin Huang, a Tainan-based Taiwanese 
member of the gentry and entrepreneur who collected funds from both his relatives in Tainan and 
Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou to establish the company. In response to Japan’s Sino−Japanese 
friendship, Shin Huang invited some Chinese to invest in the company, not just Taiwanese. 
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Among these Chinese investors, the chief councilor of Shantou City, Zi-bin Zheng, was the most 
important. Over its history, the Dadong Ice-making Company faced at least two major crises: the 
first one was brought on by the obstructionist actions of the Japanese consul in Shantou, and the 
second one took place in the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere of Shantou, where the Chinese 
businessman Zi-bing Zheng attempted to expel Taiwanese shareholders from the Dadong 
Ice-making Company. In the first crisis, Taiwanese shareholders cooperated with Chinese 
merchants to resist the Japanese consul’s oppression; and in the second crisis, Taiwanese 
shareholders cooperated with the Japanese authority in Shantou to expel the Chinese shareholder 
Zheng from the company. I will use the case of the Dadong Company to explain the history of 
these complexities in a Chinese treaty port, where ethnicity, nationality, identity, and commercial 
interests were prominent factors. 
Chapter Four: The Educational Network Encompassing the Japanese Homeland, Colonial 
Taiwan, and the Shantou Treaty Port—The Tōē School in Shantou 
In this chapter, I have focused on a Japanese-funded Tōē School in Shantou. I have 
explored two aspects of the Tōē School in Shantou: (1) the “network of human resources,” 
regarding which I will discuss some Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom the Taiwan General 
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Government assigned to the Tōē School in Shantou; and (2) the “network of words,” regarding 
which I will analyze teachers’ travel writings and reports published in colonial Taiwanese 
periodicals, including Taiwan kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏ (Taiwan Education). By analyzing their words, 
I will explore these teachers’ perceptions of the educational affairs in Shantou, and specifically 
the perceptions of European- and American-funded schools in the city. In sum, from both the 
network of human resources and the network of words in this particular setting, we will see how 
an educational network established itself among those from the Japanese homeland, colonial 
Taiwan, and the Chinese treaty port of Shantou.  
Chapter Five: The Image of Shantou in Japanese Writings (1910s−1930s)  
In this chapter, I examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 
1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. I find substantial evidence 
that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s 
strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’ 
movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. My paper in some degree responds to Karl Gerth’s 
research about the relationship between Chinese nationalism and the culture of consumption 
prevalent during the National Products Movement from 1900 to 1937. He argues that by 
! 35!
promoting the purchase of national products as opposed to foreign products, the movement 
offered people of all classes an opportunity to resist imperialism and express nationalist 
sentiments. Boycotts of foreign goods took place mainly during the period extending from 1905 
to the 1930s, and most of the boycotts during the movement targeted Japanese products. 
Boycotts contributed to the growth and proliferation of movement organizations.60 My study 




60 Karl Gerth, China Made: Consumer Culture and the Creation of the Nation. Cambridge: London: Harvard 
University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2003. 
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Chapter 2: The Commercial Activities and Networks of Japanese Merchants 
and Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou 
        
 
Fig. 2-1 The Chinese Treaty Ports. 
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[Illustration] Shantou, or Swatow, is in southern China, near Xiamen (Amoy), Tainan (on Taiwan Island), 
Kowloon (in Hong Kong), and Guangzhou (Canton).(Source: 
http://www.mappery.com/maps/China-Treaty-Ports-Map.jpg, modified by Lin-Yi Tseng) 
 
2.1 The Japanese Empire’s Interests in Shantou: Trade 
In the 1870s, Meiji Japan’s overarching national goal was fukoku kyōhei ŖċƤ¢ (wealthy 
nation and strong army). By the 1890s, a new slogan had risen in popularity: shōkō rikkoku ùž
̕ċ (build the nation through commerce and industry). Both of the slogans revealed that a 
developing economy was Meiji Japan’s priority. Some scholars have contended that economic 
interest best explains the expansion of the Japanese empire. According to Akira Iriye, the 
Japanese empire initially placed as much weight on economic matters (through trade and 
immigration to ensure Japan’s elevated status in the world) as on military and territorial matters 
(direct control over overseas resources). However, after the economic crisis in 1929, 
impediments to economic development compelled Japan to seek a military-territorial solution to 
domestic problems, and this strategic shift led to Japan’s occupation of Manchuria.61 The 
economic crisis in 1929 caused a decline in exports of Japanese silk and cotton cloth, 
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contributing to Japan’s inability to afford imports of coal, iron, and other natural resources. 
These circumstances provided Japanese militarists an excuse to occupy Manchuria, which was 
rich in such natural resources. Like Japan, Germany took a path to war that was deeply rooted in 
economic concerns: both the indemnity that Germany had to pay after the First World War and 
French occupation of German industrial centers prevented Germany from experiencing a robust 
post-war economic recovery. The economic crisis in 1929 justified for many Germans their 
country’s subsequent implementation of large-scale military expansion, which dramatically 
reduced domestic unemployment there and which made possible Germany’s military conquests 
of neighboring countries as a way to resolve domestic economic problems.  
Peter Duus proposed that before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, Japanese imperialism in 
China had been informal and that this informality had reflected the unequal treaty system. After 
the Manchurian Incident, with Japan’s strengthened military forces, Japanese control over China 
evolved into a formal system. Duus suggested that Japan’s interest in China had emphasized 
trade over territory and that, thus, Japan’s informal empire in China had enabled Japan to acquire 
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economic benefits while avoiding the various costs of formal colonization.62 In other words, 
these scholars suggested that Japanese imperialism, which initially manifested itself in the First 
Sino-Japanese War in 1894, was economic imperialism. Japan needed China’s resources and 
markets, and the Treaty of Shimonoseki made Japan’s penetration of China possible.  
In the early twentieth century, Shantou was an important commercial port-city of China.63 In 
1904, the value of Shantou’s trade reached 70 million yen (about 53 million Haikwan tael), 
which was twice the-value in Xiamen.64 In 1925, Shantou’s volume of trade reached 83 million 
Haikwan tael, the seventh-highest ranking amount of all the port cities in China. Among the port 
cities in southern China, Shantou trailed behind only Guangdong and boasted trade values much 
higher than Xiamen’s and Fuzhou’s. The great wealth of trade stemmed from the importation of 
foreign goods. The characteristics of trade in Shantou were such that the monetary value of the 
city’s imports was much greater than (sometimes double) the monetary value of the city’s 
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exports. The economic balance of Shantou was sustained by the significant remittances from 
Shantou’s overseas workers. Shantou was a chief source of overseas workers from China, and 
approximately 100,000 Shantou coolies went abroad yearly. For example, in 1926, 
approximately 160,000 Shantou coolies went abroad, and the main destinations were Siam, 
Singapore and Vietnam.65  
Another characteristic of trade in Shantou was that this city was the import and export hub 
for the region’s large hinterland, including the cities of Chaozhou, Chenghai, Chaoyang. And the 
larger the hinterland, the larger the markets. Compared with the relatively modest regional 
expanses in southern China’s treaty ports of Amoy and Fuzhou, Shantou’s vast expanse of 
territory and people gave this treaty port a competitive edge for amassing wealth. The great 
volume of imported foreign goods served not only Shantou’s local needs, but also consumers 
demand in many other Chinese cities and even in Southeastern Asia. Many foreign goods were 
imported through Shantou and then transported to cities inside Guangdong Province. From the 
perspective of Japan, Shantou symbolized an entrance for Japanese imports, which could then 
saturate Chinese markets while making inroads in Southeast Asia, where many Shanou coolies 
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worked and resided. In this sense, Shantou was on the periphery of Japan’s informal empire in 
China and, yet, possessed great economic importance to the empire.  
Records indicate that by December 1898, a Japanese merchant was residing in Shantou.66 
Later, in the early 1910s, other Japanese merchants migrated to Shantou. For example, Sadami 
Hikosaka ƨОφ́ opened a photo shop in April 1902. Urai ʂ[ and Kawafuru Żâ first 
co-invested in the glass-making shop known as the Urakawa Company in October 1903. Manjirō 
Hiruta ·ˏʹəϽ opened the grocery store Kazukiyo óʋ Company in January 1904.67 
Evidence shows that Manjirō Hiruta opened the Taisei Ĭǐ Company, dealing in tobacco in 
1902.68 Tamesaburō Yanagita  opened the grocery and medicine store Tōkashō  
 Company in 1906.69 Concerning Taiwanese sekimin merchants in Shantou, Guang-qin 
Tzeng ȟƚɝ was probably one of the earliest. He opened the Ekian ˩ŋ Company, which 
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sold grocery items and provided private banking services as early as 1899.70 Later, a steady 
stream of sekimin came to Shantou for business and most of them dealt in the grocery business 
and private banking. By the end of 1903, Shantou was home to 18 Taiwanese sekimin and 12 
Japanese.71 Most of them were merchants and their families.  
A rapid increase in both Japanese and Taiwanese residents in Shantou took place after 1904, 
when the Japanese Sango Company (BZç)72 started overseeing the construction of the 
Chaoshan Railroad,73 and when the Taiwan General Government started assigning Japanese and 
Taiwanese technicians to Shantou. In order to serve the needs of these individuals and their 
families, Japanese restaurants, laundries, and accommodations started to open in Shantou, and 
thus, a primary Japanese community emerged there. Furthermore, it was in 1904 that Japan used 
the construction of the Chaoshan Railroad as a pretext to establish a branch office of the Xiamen 
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Japanese consulate in Shantou. Three years later, in 1907, Japan established the independent 
Shantou Consulate. The Chaoshan Railroad offered its first transport services in November 1906. 
The total length of the railroad was 39 km, comprising 8 stops: Anbu ͳĚ, Huamei Ͳ́, 
Caitang Ʃġ, Quechao ѕŽ, Fuyang ʄɽ, Fengxi ɉʒ, and Chaozhou ʙż. In 1908, the 
line extended to Yixi ǅʒ, and the total length of the railroad reached 42 km. The time it would 
take to get from the first departure point to the last stop was 80 minutes. Early in the railroad’s 
operations, all the stationmasters, trainmasters, and technicians were Japanese and Taiwanese.74 
Later, Chinese took over the positions. In sum, we could say that the construction and operation 
of the Chaoshan Railroad provided Japan an opportunity to expand its influence in Shantou, 
where a Japanese community formed in the late 1900s.  
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Fig. 2-2 Shantou Station, 1906.  
(Source: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a6/SwatowStation-1906.jpg) 
  
      
Fig. 2-3 Opening Day for the Chaoshan Railway, November 1906. 
(Sources: http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Swatow-Rly-Opening1.jpg) 
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With the formation of this community in Shantou, the commercial relationship between 
Japan and Shantou grew closer. In the mid-1910s, Japanese trade occupied 70% of Shantou’s 
foreign trade, and Japanese goods were the most important foreign goods in Shantou’s market. In 
the trading circuit between the Japanese homeland and Shantou, Hong Kong was an important 
intermediary. Many Chinese merchants who resided in Kobe and Yokohama exported Japanese 
goods to Shantou through Hong Kong. Aware of this trading circuit, Masasuke Kishi όƷǳ`, 
the manager of the Taiwan Bank’s branch office in Shantou, suggested that a strictly statistical 
analysis of the volume of Japan−Shantou trade or of Taiwan−Shantou trade might lead one to 
underestimate the real volume of trade between Japan or its colonies and Shantou chiefly 
because most Japanese goods entered Shantou through Hong Kong, thus distorting the origins 
and the destinations of the traded goods. Kishi suggested that according to the reports of the 
Japanese merchants who had traveled throughout Shantou and observed Shantou’s grocery 
markets, 70% to 80% of their grocery-related goods had been from Japan. All of these statistics 
suggest that under both Shantou’s anti-Japanese atmosphere and the British competition, the 
trade between Japan and Shantou was significant and Shantou was a powerful market consuming 
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Japanese products.75 The majority of Japanese goods came to Shantou mainly through Hong 
Kong, but some of the Japanese goods went through Taiwan. For example, in 1917, insufficient 
tonnage and growing transportation charges promoted an influx of Japanese goods to Shantou 
through Taiwan, instead of through Hong Kong or Shanghai. The increase in Japanese goods 
through Taiwan prompted sekimin merchants to open stores in Shantou. In 1917, there were 
eleven Taiwanese sekimin stores in Shantou, and three more stores were preparing to open.76  
What were the main Japanese goods imported to Shantou? Of great importance were 
Taiwanese molasses77 and alcohol. Shantou imported alcohol from three places, Taiwan, Java, 
and Germany. In Taiwan, the two major exporters of molasses and alcohol to Shantou were 
Taiwan Seitō Kaisha (the Taiwan Sugar-Making Company) and Kagi Seishū Kaishua (the Jia-yi 
Wine-Making Company). Shantou merchants mixed Taiwanese alcohol with water to make 
Shantou wine, and exported it to Southeastern Asia for consumption by overseas Chinese. 
Shantou merchants mixed sorghum liquor from Tianjin with Taiwanese alcohol for purchase by 
Shantou consumers. The stores selling Taiwanese molasses and alcohol in Shantou were the 
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Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run Sanrin Company, and four Chinese-run 
companies: the Guan Te-fa ƴˣ Company , the Zhou Yuan-cheng ñǐ Company, the 
Shun-tai мɼ Company and the Guang-ri ² Company. The owner of the Sanrin Company, 
Taiwanese sekimin Bing-rin Luo ̀ʥњ, understood the complicated customs of Chinese 
merchants in trading and thus earned trust both from Chinese and Japanese sides.78    
Japanese coal was an important good for Shantou. The yearly demand for coal in Shantou 
was around 100 thousand tons, including 70 thousand tons of coal dust and 30 thousand tons of 
coal chunks. The major sources of coal came from Kaiping ЙƊ in Guangdong Province, 
Wakamatsu ͤȮ in Kyūshū Japan, Keelung ĜЧ in Taiwan, and Hong Gai єĜ in Vietnam. 
In the mid-1910s, Shantou imported 20 thousand tons of coal from Wakamatsu. The main stores 
selling Wakamatsu coal in Shantou were the Japanese-run Mitsui Company and the English-run 
Bradley & Co. ƴΡ (Tey-kee). In the late 1910s, the extraction of coal in Keelung was a 
prosperous endeavour, and Shantou imported Keelung coal in place of Wakamatsu coal. In the 
mid-1920s, the coal used for lamps, waterways, railroads, and factories in Shantou were mainly 
from Keelung. The main stores selling Keelung coal in Shantou were the Taiwanese-run Sanrin 
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Company, the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Suzuki Company, and the English-run Bradley 
& Co.79 
Seafood in Shantou was comprised, for the most part, of Japanese products. In the mid-1910s, 
Japan exported a great volume of seafood (200 million haikwan tael) to Shantou both for local 
needs and for export to inner China and Siam. Five-sixth of the total volume of Japanese seafood 
arriving in Shantou went through Hong Kong and Shanghai, and one-sixth went through Keelung. 
One reason for this imbalance was that remittance through Shanghai and Hong Kong was 
advantageous to trade. Second, merchants in Hong Kong and Shanghai traded with Hokkaidō, 
which was a direct−and therefore relatively inexpensive−exporter of seafood. In this sense, the 
price of seafood in Shantou directly reflected prices in Hong Kong and Shanghai, rather than 
prices from Japanese sources. The main seafood items in demand were fish, dried shrimp, 
abalones, shark’s fins, shellfish, sea cucumbers, agars, mushrooms, and kelp. The main stores 
selling Japanese seafood in Shantou were the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run 
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79 Sōtarō Tanaka ˏKͮĮϽ, “Swatō sekitan juyō jōkyō” ɲп˳ʣжΖǁɹ (The demand of coal in Shantou), 
Taiwan Kōgyō kaihō ͗ʟЖɊȡğ, no. 35, pp. 20−23 (November 20, 1916); Kinosuke Fukutome ̄˖ýP», 
“Taiwan no sekitan kōgyō ni tsu i te” ͗ʟ$˳ʣЖɊ#Ť (Concerning Taiwan’s coal mining industry), part 
2, Taiwan Kōgyō kaihō ͗ʟЖɊȡğ, no. 71, pp. 1−34 (November 30, 1919). Kawamata Ż, “Swatō sekitan 
jukyō jōkyō” ɲп˳ʣж̱ǁɹ (The demand of coal in Shantou), Taiwan Kōgyō kaihō ͗ʟЖɊȡğ, no. 127, 
pp. 49−51 (January 30, 1926).  
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Sanrin Company, and the Taiwanese-run Mangen Company. 80  
In the latter half of the 1930s, Shantou was still an important market for Japanese seafood. 
Miyagami Kameshichi őCџA, a Japanese official at the Taiwan General Government’s 
Bureau of Colonization and Industry regarded Shantou as the best location for developing 
southern China’s seafood industry because Shantou had larger hinterlands than did Xiamen and 
Fuzhou, hence symbolizing a larger consumer market.81  
Japanese cotton cloth and cotton products were important products in China at that time. 
Shantou was the largest market for cotton cloth among all the treaty ports in southern China. And 
although Shantou imported most of its cotton cloth from India as well as from Japan, Indian 
cotton cloth and cotton products (like handkerchiefs, towels, and socks) constituted 20% of the 
imported cotton products in Shantou whereas Japanese products constituted 80% of the market. 
Japanese cotton cloth started arriving in bulk in Shantou mainly after 1896, the second year of 
Japanese colonization in Taiwan, and most of these products went through Hong Kong, with a 
much smaller volume of products going through Keelung. That is, the Chinese merchants in 
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80 Sōtarō Tanaka ˏKͮĮϽ, “Swatō ni okeru kaisan jōkyō” ɲп#Ȁ2ʅˍǁɹ (Seafood in Shantou), 
Taiwan suisan zasshi ͗ʟɰˍаΪ, no. 12, pp. 89−90 (December 15, 1916); “Swatō kaisan jōkyō” ɲпʅˍʷ
ɹ! (The seafood situation in Shantou), Taiwan suisan zasshi ͗ʟɰˍаΪ, no. 22, pp. 1−10 (October 15, 1917). 
81 Kameshichi Miyakami őCџA, “Nan shina no omoide (2)” Óǲϻ$Ǎ&« 2 (Memoirs from southern 
China, part 2), Taiwan suisan zasshi ͗ʟɰˍаΪ, no. 273, pp. 5−9 (October 10, 1937). 
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Shantou did not trade directly with Kobe and Osaka, but indirectly via the chief intermediary of 
Hong Kong. Japanese cotton cloth served not only Shantou’s local residents, but also the Hakka 
people residing in Jiaying Prefecture (āǎż), where these cotton materials were transformed 
into products for export to other Chinese ports and to Southeast Asia. The main stores selling 
Japanese cotton cloth in Shantou were the Taiwanese-run Rikyō ²Ƥ Company and four 
Japanese stores: the Mitsui Company, the Kōsaka ƌО Company, the Junatendō/ Yamaguchi 
мĭĝ/ŭá Company, and the Maeda ¶ˏ Company.82 
Concerning the match market in Shantou, the imported matches in Shantou were all Japanese 
products that arrived in the city through Hong Kong and Keelung. Compared with the cost of 
other goods there, the market price of matches seldom changed, being influenced by the market 
price back in the Japanese homeland. The main stores in Shantou selling Japanese matches were 
the Japanese-run Mitsui Company, the Taiwanese-run Sanrin Company, and the Taiwanese-run 
Mangen Company. Japanese medicine came to Shantou mainly through Hong Kong and 
constituted 50−60% of Shantou’s imported medicine. The main stores selling Japanese medicine 
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82 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku ĩÁˮϪùŧ, Tsūshō isan ϪùƦ̽ (Bulletin of commerce), no. 109, pp. 3−4 
(September 8, 1898); no. 127, p. 1 (March 18, 1898); Swatō ryōji hōkoku ɲпоVğð (Report of the Japanese 
consul in Shantou), “Swatō no jūyō nihon shōhin yunyū sūryō oyobi yunyū keiro” ɲп$ІΖȅȪùõϢǺЈ
ÞϢ̳Ϛ (The quantities and routes of important imported Japanese products in Shantou), Taiwan shōkō geppō 
͗ʟùžȢğ, no. 103, pp. 3−4 (November 25, 1917). 
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were concentrated on Yu-shan Street (͏üΌ), where one could find the Taiwanese-sekimin 
Yamato Ĭó Pharmacy and three Japanese stores: the Kōsaka Company, the Kōkandō ƚωĝ 
Company, and the Junatendō/ Yamaguchi Company. Another Japanese store dealing in 
medicinal products was the Nichiryū ȅў Company located on Yong-ping Road (ɱƊϚ).83  
In addition to the abovementioned goods, Japanese sugar made up 40% of Shantou’s foreign 
sugar market, and most Japanese sugar came to Shantou through Hong Kong and Keelung. 
Japanese glass made up 50% of this market in Shantou, and in particular, 80% of the port’s 
window glass came from Japan. Both Japanese glass and glass-containing products came to 
Shantou through Hong Kong. The English-run Bradley Company and the Japanese-run Kōkandō 
Company dealt in Japanese glass in Shantou. Imports of paper in Shantou were mainly from 
Japan and Germany. After the First World War, Japanese paper made up the whole of Shantou’s 
foreign-paper market, which—like so many of the city’s other markets—depended on the 
intermediary locations of Hong Kong and Keelung. Goods like umbrellas and stationery in 
Shantou were all Japanese imports. Japanese porcelain made up 60−70% of the market in 
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83 Swatō ryōji hōkoku ɲпоVğð! (Report of the Japanese consul in Shantou), “Swatō no jūyō nihon shōhin 
yunyū sūryō oyobi yunyū keiro” ɲп$ІΖȅȪùõϢǺЈÞϢ̳Ϛ! (The quantities and routes of 
important imported Japanese products in Shantou), Taiwan shōkō geppō ͗ʟùžȢğ, no. 103, pp. 4−5 
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commercial reports), no. 550, p. 110 (July 21, 1926).  
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Shantou. Japanese clothes and clothing accessories (e.g., hats, gloves, buttons) made up 50−60% 
of Shantou’s clothing market. Enamel products and toys in Shantou tended to be German imports, 
but Japanese goods substituted for German goods after the start of the First World War. Japanese 
clocks made up 60−70% of this market in Shantou owning to their competitive pricing: the 
products effectively underpriced American and British clocks that might otherwise have 
dominated the market. Japanese cosmetics made up 50−60% of this market in Shantou. All these 
Japanese imports, yet again, made their way to Shantou through Hong Kong and Keelung. 84  
    The abovementioned records strongly indicate that Shantou was an important market to 
Japan and that the Japanese goods entering Shantou came mainly by way of Hong Kong and 
Keelung. The records also provid evidence that Japanese products served not only Shantou’s 
local needs but also−by way of this city− those of other Chinese cities and of populations 
throughout Southeast Asia. 
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Ȣğ, no. 96, pp. 16−20 (April 25, 1917); Swatō ryōji hōkoku ɲпоVğð (Report of the Japanese consul in 
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2.2 Japanese Merchants in Shantou 
The first large-scale Japanese company to open its doors in Shantou was the Mitsui 
Company. In 1876, the Mitsui Company began doing business in the Japanese homeland and, 
twenty years later, in 1896, established branch offices in Taiwan. As a company supported by the 
Taiwan General Government, the Mitsui Company had became one of the largest enterprises in 
Taiwan, monopolizing the island’s trade in camphor, tea, coal, and opium. Serving as a 
component of the Taiwan General Government’s south-expansion policy, the Mitsui Company 
established branch offices in treaty ports in southern China, including the Amoy branch office in 
1901. In March 1906, the Mitsui Company’s Shantou branch office opened and set out to 
achieve its primary objective: to sell Japanese goods to China. Mitsui’s Shantou branch office 
dealt with the imports of molasses and alcohol from Taiwan, coal from Keelung, cotton cloth and 
matches from Osaka and Kobe, seafood from Hokaidō, and ginseng from Korea. Among these 
items, cotton cloth and matches were the most important, reaching an approximate value of 700 
thousand silver dollars annually and constituting half of the volume of Mitsui’s trade by late 
1910s. It was not uncommon for shoppers in Shantou marketplaces to see items bearing the 
Japanese brand-names of Gekkin Ȣˆ and Jūrō ħͅ. In addition to Japanese goods, Mitsui’s 
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Shantou branch office imported some non-Japanese goods to Shantou, selling them to the local 
Chinese retail market or transporting them to other cities. For example, Mitsui’s Shantou branch 
office imported cotton cloth from Shanghai and India, flour from Shanghai, tin from Singapore 
and Hong Kong, soybean from Dalian, rice from Saigon, and sugar from Java. Moreover, 
beginning in 1918, the Taiwan General Government requested that Mitsui’s Shantou branch 
office spend 200 thousand fu yearly to buy leaf tobacco in Jiangxi Province and then transport it 
to Taiwan.85 
It is worth noting that although Shantou’s volume of exports and imports was substantial, 
and Mitsui’s Shantou branch carried out transactions involving many goods, the company still 
faced difficulties in the region. First, the currency risk in Shantou was high because the values of 
popular currencies there were in a near-constant flux. In order to lower the risks associated with 
this problem, in 1912, Mitsui contracted with Taiwan Bank to ensure that the former’s business 
would take place at a fixed currency value. Nevertheless, several secondary, though important, 
factors led to the idea that the branch office in Shantou was, on balance, counterproductive: the 
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85 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku ĩÁˮϪùŧ, Tsūshō isan ϪùƦ̽ (Bulletin of commerce), no. 53, p.1 (September 
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Tokyo: Maruzen kabushiki kaisha LüȻƞȡ˼, 2004. 
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alleged duplicity of Shantou’s Chinese merchants, the severity of Shantou’s anti-Japan 
atmosphere, and noted corruption linked to the branch officers themselves. These factors 
prompted, in 1926, the directors of Mitsui’s branch offices to consider whether they should 
dissolve the Shantou branch office or at least send an officer to the Shantou branch, where he 
could supervise its operations while, himself, submitting to supervision from Mitsui’s Amoy 
branch office.86 
In addition to the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank was an important Japanese company with 
an official presence in Shantou. The Japanese government established Taiwan Bank in 1899, and 
it served as Taiwan’s most influential financial institution during the Japanese colonial period. 
Responding to Japan’s intended objective of expanding commercial relations with China and 
Southeast Asia, Taiwan Bank in 1900 started to establish branch offices in such southern 
Chinese cities as Amoy (1900), Hong Kong (1903), Fuzhou (1905), Shantou (1907), and 
Guangdong (1910). The establishment of the Shantou branch office took place in 1900, when the 
Amoy branch office opened; in fact, the first president of Taiwan Bank, Jūichi Soeda ʊˏħ?, 
and the bank’s director Hiromi Kawasaki ŻŷŚ́ visited Amoy and paid visits to Fuzhou and 
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the meeting of the Mitsui Corporation branch−office heads), vol. 15 (1926), pp. 484−485, Tokyo: Maruzen 
kabushiki kaisha LüȻƞȡ˼, 2005. 
! 56!
Shantou. After inspecting the new sites, Soeda and Kawasaki perceived the necessity of 
establishing a branch office in Fuzhou and another one in Shantou. The functions of Taiwan 
Bank’s Shantou branch office were (1) to provide loans to both Japanese and Taiwanese 
merchants, (2) to promote Sino-Japanese economic cooperation, and (3) to assist Shantou’s 
development of public construction. For example, Taiwan bank provided a loan to the Mitsui 
Company and several loans to Shantou’s Chinese merchants for the construction of Shantou’s 
electrical infrastructure and sewer system. Moreover, Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office 
issued currencies. For example, the bank issued silver certificates (Ќ˿) in 1909, and issued 
Shantou certificates (ɲ˿) in 1913.87 
Taiwan Bank was significant for Shantou City, as well. Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch 
office was the city’s only branch office of a foreign bank to deal with “general affairs” in 
addition to overseas remittances. Some foreign banks had “agencies” rather than “branch offices” 
in Shantou, and these agencies dealt specifically with overseas remittance. For example, the 
Chinese Yuanxing ͙ Company was an agency belonging to Dutch Bank and Guang Yi-yu 
˩Β Private Bank was an agency belonging to Singapore’s Sze Hai Tong Banking & 
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Bank’s fortieth anniversary), pp. 20−21, 221−222, 226−227, 238−239. Tokyo: Taiwan ginkō, 1939. 
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Insurance Co.88 One example will suffice to illustrate the importance of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou 
branch office. When the Chinese Revolution occurred in 1911, the Revolutionary Army attacked 
two Chinese banks Daqing Bank (ĬʋЌΊ) and Jiaotong Bank (]ϪЌΊ), which dealt with 
Shantou Customs’ tariff duties and, in the process, plundered 9,700 haikwan tael. Later, the 
Revolutionary Army proclaimed that the tariff duties of Shantou would help cover the expenses 
of maintaining Shantou’s security. The director of Shantou Customs discussed the matter with 
representatives from seven foreign countries that had acquired certain guarantees regarding tariff 
duties, and specially, the discussions took place with Japanese, British, and American consuls 
among others. In the end, the Shantou Customs director decided to entrust the tariff duties to 
Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office. In order to preserve the guarantees regarding tariff duties, 
Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office established a new treasury and remitted tariff duties by 
telegraph to Shanghai every month until 1916, when Taiwan Bank ceded these business 
responsibilities to China Bank (KċЌΊ). The example illustrates foreign countries’ trust in 
Taiwan Bank and Taiwan Bank’s important role in Shantou.89 
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From 1907 to August 1937, when Taiwan Bank was forced to close owing to the outbreak 
of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the bank remained in operation in Shantou for 
thirty years. The reopening of Taiwan Bank took place during the Japanese occupation of 
Shantou in June 1939. Most directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office had been born 
and educated in the Japanese homeland, and had then worked at Taiwan Bank for several years 
before being assigned to branch offices in China. For example, Mimaki Toshio BØ}į, the 
director of the Shantou branch office between 1915 and 1916, was born in Yamaguchi Prefecture, 
Japan. In 1904, he graduated from Kyoto Imperial University and went to work at Taiwan Bank 
in Taiwan. Before his assignment to Shantou, he served as the director of the Taizhong branch 
office in central Taiwan in 1914.90  
Other directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office went through an experience similar 
to Mimaki’s. The directors of Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office usually were leaders of the 
Japanese Association in Shantou. For example, Chikara Uchimi ʅ¸ served as director of 
Taiwan Bank’s Shantou branch office and as the president of the Japanese Association in 
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situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan ginkō chosa ka ͗ʟЌΊΰȴί, 1919, p. 236. 
90 Hakusui Hashimoto ɒȪˤɰ, Taiwan tōji to so kōrōsha ͗ʟ̲ɸ!£¹Ã͆! (The governance of Taiwan 
and its contributors). Taihoku: Nankoku shupan kyōkai Óċ«ʳÒȡ, 1930, p. 54. 
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Shantou in the early 1920s.91 Mineji Takefuji ̚΂ųɸ was the director of Taiwan Bank’s 
Shantou branch office and simultaneously headed the Japanese Association in Shantou in the 
1920s.92 
 
            
 
Fig. 2-4 Taiwan Bank’s Shantou Branch Office. 
[Illustration] Since the early twentieth century, the pictured building has served as the Taiwan Bank’s 
Shantou branch office. Many Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin conducted business in the area 
neighboring the branch office. The building has been preserved and currently is the site of the Shantou 
Open Port Cultural Exhibition. (Source: Shantou Open Port Cultural Exhibition.) 
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she ǐǻ«ʳ˼, 1985, p. 76. 
92 Motoni Tani ρW, Taishū jinji roku: gaichi, manshi, kaigai hen Ĭ˰aVЍѣĩĒʔǲʅĩ̟ (Roster of 
public figures: Japan’s overseas territories−Manchuria and China). Tokyo: Teikoku himitsu tanteisha Ƈċ̉ŕǩ
˼, 1941, p. 13. 
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Shantou was home to many Japanese civil merchants, as well as to companies with a degree 
of official status. For example, Yu-shan street in Shantou City was home to the Japanese 
companies Kōsaka ƌО, Juntendō мĭĝ, and Kōkandō ƚωĝ. The Kōsaka Company was 
established in March 1916 by Michisuke Kōsaka ƌОϲc, a native of Yamaguchi Prefecture. 
The company supplied Shantou’s residents with medicine and products like toys, socks, and coal; 
moreover, the company was the Japanese Navy’s designated supplier of articles for daily use. 
While managing this company, Michisuke Kōsaka managed the Kōsaka Hotel, which was 
located in Yu-shan Street. In 1921, Michisuke Kōsaka served as a member of appraisal meetings 
for the Japanese Association in Shantou. During the Shanghai Incident in 1932, when many 
Japanese stores were forced to close because of the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere in 
Shantou, Kōsaka nevertheless continued to do business in China.  
In August 1906, an Osaka merchant Kikumatsu Yamaguchi ŭáͰȮ established 
Juntendō in Shantou, which would become one of the most prosperous pharmacies and general 
stores in Shantou. In July 1918, Yamaguchi invested in the Shantou Hotel which was located on 
Hai-an Street. In 1920, Yamaguchi extended his business to Korea and opened a branch office of 
Juntendō in Keijō (today’s Seoul). After the Shanghai Incident in 1932, Yamaguchi terminated 
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his business in Shantou. In 1911, Kōkandō, whose head office was in Amoy, opened a branch 
store in Shantou. The company dealt in general and pharmaceutical products. The director of the 
Shantou branch office was initially Kisaku Takakuwa яȿýw and later Gisaburō 
Takabayashi яȯ̓BϽ. The company sold glass, toys, socks, fountain pens, and insurance 
plans to Shantou residents. 93 
Several Japanese merchants opened stores on Zhenbang Street (ВϼΌ), Wanan Street  
(ʹŋΌ), and Yongping Road (ɱƊϚ). In 1915, Osaka merchant Taizō Yamamoto ŭȪɼϬ 
opened the Nikka ȅͲ Company, dealing in general and medicinal products. In 1918, the 
Suzuki Company, run by Kuninosuke Hiruta ·ˏċP», opened up for business in Shantou, 
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importing Japanese cotton cloth, Javanese sugar, Shanghai flour (wheat from Wuxi, or ʨЏ), 
and Singaporean tin to Shantou. In 1924, the Suzuki Company made a contract with Taiwan 
Renwa Kaisha ͗ʟʪˋȡ˼ (the Taiwan Brick Company) to import 30 thousand tons of brick 
to Shantou. In 1918, Seigorō Kuramoto ΁ȪʋZϽ opened a general store pharmacy—known 
as the Nichi Ryu ȅў Company—in Shantou. In 1920, Teikichi Maeda ¶ˏ̃ê opened the 
Maeda Company in the same city, spending an initial capital outlay of 80 thousand yuan to do so. 
The company was co-run by three Maeda brothers and was the strongest general store-pharmacy 
in Shantou. The items for sale there included socks, umbrellas, cotton products, pottery, electric 
appliances, and aluminum products. The Maeda Company established branch offices in other 
Chinese cities: Shanghai, Hankou, Nanjing, and Wuhu. In Osaka, Maeda established a soap 
factory.94 
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ʅĩʀÀ#Л2ɤå˦ΰȴ (Historical surveys of the overseas activities of Japanese). Tokyo: Yumani shobō 
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The abovementioned Shantou-based Japanese companies and merchants replied significantly 
on shipping companies to transport goods. The most important Japanese shipping company in 
Shantou was the Osaka Shosen Kaisha ĬОù͞ȡ˼ (the Osaka Shipping Company). Before 
the Osaka Shipping Company assigned special correspondents to Shantou in January 1920, 
Bradley &Co. served as the Osaka Shipping Company’s contact there, assisting the arrangements 
of passengers and commodities. In March 1926, the burgeoning prosperity stemming from 
Sino-Japanese trade and the rapid increase in travelers back and forth led the Osaka Shipping 
Company to establish a branch office on Shantou’s Haikwan Road.95  
The Osaka Shipping Company opened a route to Shantou in response to the Taiwan General 
Government’s policy of meirei kōro òh͛Ϛ (command of the sea routes). The 
command-of-the-sea-routes policy rested on the Taiwan General Government’s subsidization of 
the Osaka Shipping Company in exchange for the right to designate sea routes, the number of 
vessels on the high seas, their tonnage, and even the velocity. In order to expand Japanese 
influences in southern China, the Taiwan General Government requested that the Osaka 
Shipping Company open a route connecting colonial Taiwan to treaty ports in southern China. 
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On April 2, 1899, the Osaka Shipping Company opened the Tansui−Hong Kong line (involving 
the two ships the Sumida Maru and the Maitsuru Maru), which featured weekly stops in Amoy 
and Shantou. In 1900, the company established the Anping−Hong Kong line and the Hong 
Kong−Fuzhou line, both featuring a layover in Shantou. In 1907, the Anping−Hong Kong line 
changed to the Takao−Hong Kong line, and in 1911, again changed to the Takao-Guangzhou line 
(Takao being today’s Kaohsiung). In April 1915, the Tanshui−Hong Kong line changed to the 
Keelung−Hong Kong line (involving the two ships the Kaijō Maru and the Taijin Maru). The 
Osaka Shipping Company faced severe competition in managing the sailing lines between 
Taiwan and southern China, with the stiffest competition coming from the British Douglas 
Company, which had managed similar routes many years earlier than the Osaka Shipping 
Company. In order to overcome the competition, the Osaka Shipping Company adopted several 
strategies, such as decreasing its transportation fees and shipping at frequent, regular intervals. 
These strategies were successful, and in 1904, the British Douglas Company withdrew from the 
shipping lanes between Taiwan and southern China.96 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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In addition to the Taiwan General Government’s command of various sea routes, some 
Japanese goods came to Shantou by way of the Kobe−Hong Kong line and the Osaka−Hong 
Kong line. Some Japanese goods made their way to Shantou aboard vessels operated by other 
Japanese shipping companies, like Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha ȅȪЀ͞ȡ˼ (the Japan 
Mail Boat Company) and Yamashita Kisen Kaisha ŭDɴ͞ȡ˼ (the Yamashita Steamship 
Company). For example, Yamashita Kisen Kaisha managed the Keelung−Haiphong line (using 
the ship the Daika Maru), which completed its circuit once every two weeks with stops in Amoy, 
Shantou, Hong Kong, and several ports in Vietnam.97 But in general, the Osaka Shipping 
Company was the most important Japanese shipping company that transported Japanese and 
Taiwanese goods to Shantou. 
The Osaka Shipping Company, like the Taiwan Bank, was a so-called kokusaku kaisha  
ċ̞ȡ˼ (National-Policy Company). In other words, the companies were supported by and, 
indeed, demanded by the Taiwan General Government. In Shantou’s Japanese communities, 
directors of the Osaka Shipping Company’s Shantou branch office often served as directors of 
the Japanese Association in Shantou. For example, both Shunzō Kodama ʽȏB and Kiichi 
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Mori Ʉý? were directors of the Osaka Shipping Company’s Shantou branch office and 
directors of the Japanese Resident Association in Shantou in the 1920s.98 
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Fig. 2-5 The Map of Shantou City Painted by Japanese in the 1920s. 
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[Illustration] On the right side of the figure, the bold black line along the coastline is Wai Road (ĩшϚ). 
Most foreign institutions were along this road: for example, the American, French, Germany, and 
Japanese consulates, as well as the Japanese-funded hospital (Hakuai Hospital), Japanese-funded schools 
(Tōē School, the Japanese Elementary School), and a Japanese-run hotel (the Shantou Hotel). On the left 
side of the figure, a fan-shaped area with many bold black lines represents the main commercial area, 
including the Shantou Customs, Sheng-ping Road (ȊƊшϚ), Yong-ping Raod (ɱƊϚ), Yu-shan Street 
(͏üΌ), and Zhen-bang Street (ВϼΌ). Most Japanese and Taiwanese companies were established in 
this area. Today, these street names remain in place in Shantou. (Source: Gorō Uchida, Shin Swatō. 
Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927.) 
         
 
2.3 Taiwanese Sekimin Merchants in Shantou 
The previous paragraphs introduced the management practices typical of Japanese 
companies and merchants in Shantou. In this section, I want to explore the question of when the 
Taiwanese sekimin merchants entered Shantou and how they maintained and expanded their 
businesses. 
A useful primary source regarding Taiwanese sekimin merchants in Shantou is Tsūshō Isan 
B+=, a published volume containing collected economic reports issued by overseas 
Japanese consulates to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan. One report notes that, in 
September 1899, a Taiwanese sekimin named Guang-qin Tzeng -(/ opened the Ekian 
Company (4$2>) in Shantou. The company sold grocery items and provided private banking 
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services. Tzeng was probably the first Taiwanese sekimin to settle in this area.99 By 1904, when 
Japan established a primary imperial consulate in Shantou, the Chaoshan area was home to only 
14 Taiwanese sekimin, including 4 members of the Chaoshan Railroad staff and 10 
businessmen.100 In 1905, the area was home to 57 Taiwanese sekimin, including 33 businessmen 
and their family members.101 In 1907, the year in which a formal Japanese Imperial Consulate 
was established in Shantou, the population of Taiwanese sekimin was 113, including 94 shop 
owners and clerks living in the area and dealing in such markets as clothing, private banking, 
groceries, rice, sugar, and straw bags.102 In 1916, the population of Taiwanese sekimin was 
151.103 In 1917, the population of Taiwanese sekimin jumped to 217, including 148 males and 
69 females.104 By the end of 1918, the population of sekimin was 269.105 In the latter half of the 
1920s, Japanese “nationals” constituted the largest foreigner group in Shantou. For example, in 
1927, Shantou was home to about one thousand foreigners, among whom were 568 Japanese 
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“nationals,” including 377 Taiwanese, 173 Japanese inlanders, and 18 Koreans. The Japanese 
“nationals” constituted almost 60% of the foreign population in this area and Taiwanese sekimin 
constituted the largest group.106   
The Japanese inlanders in Shantou were hōkyū seikatsu sha ̱ˌʀ͆ (salaried 
workers), working in Japanese governmental institutions, like the branch office of the Taiwan 
Bank, the Japan-funded Hakuai Hospital, the Tōē School, and the Japanese elementary school in 
Shantou; in contrast, most Taiwanese sekimin in this area were merchants and shop clerks.107 
Why did the majority of Taiwanese sekimin conduct business in Shantou? The reason is likely 
complex: First, sekimin, as Japanese nationals, enjoyed most-favored-nation privileges, which 
included exemption from paying taxes to the Qing government. Second, Shantou featured many 
markets of both Japanese and Taiwanese goods (e.g., Japanese coal, Keelung coal, Japanese 
matches, Japanese silk, Japanese seafood, Taiwanese sugar, and Taiwanese alcohol). Third, the 
local language of Shantou was Chaozhouness, which was very similar to the Minnan language, 
the most popular language in Taiwan. The reason for this similarity can be traced back to 
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historical migration patterns: the ancestors of a majority of Taiwanese had migrated from south 
Fujian Province (Minnan) to Taiwan in the seventeenth century. Therefore, Taiwanese sekimin 
enjoyed the convenience of a familiar language and familiar social networks when conducting 
business in Shantou.  
By 1922, according to a report issued by Shantou’s Japanese consul Shōroku Uchida  
ǛˏƎ , the five most powerful sekimin merchants in Shantou were Bing-zhang Luo ̀ʥ̗, 
who owned the Sanrin Company , Chuan-zhi Lin ȯP, who owned the Rikyō Textiles 
Company, Guang-shu Chen Фƚϧ, who owned the Kōgen Company, Zhen-xian Wang  
ʾǦô, who owned the Kanki Company , and Zhen-guo Lin ȯǦĈ, who owned the Fuji 
Company.108  
Bing-zhang Luo’s family was registered in Taipei, but he had in fact been born in Zhejiang 
Province in 1878, when Taiwan was under Qing governance. When Japan governed Taiwan, Luo 
served as an interpreter for the Japanese Navy and helped Japan conduct surveys along the 
Taiwan coast. In February 1898, Luo started to work in Taipei City’s post office. A 
contemporary news report in Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō entitled “dojin ni mezurashiki koin”   
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Shantou, part 2), Gaimushō kiroku ĩÁˮΡЍ (Records of the Foreign Ministry in Japan), B03050703300 (1921). 
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Đa#ˀö (a rare native employee) suggested that Luo was a rare “native” (Taiwanese) 
employee of the post office and was good at translating Japanese. The report further suggested 
that Luo was cautious, and had acquainted himself with finer aspects of money remittance and 
financial deposits. He was a model employee who, unaffected by the less-than-ideal 
circumstances of his residential neighborhood (on Mengjia’s Xiashin Street), concentrated on his 
work.109 
In 1904, after six years working in the post office, Luo went to Shantou as a staff member 
for the Chaoshan Railroad Company. Apparently, he was not a technician and probably served as 
an interpreter. Later, Luo started to conduct business, importing liquor, seafood, matches, and 
groceries into Shantou. In November 1916, Luo established the Sanlin Company on Wai-ma 
Road, where the most prosperous establishments had set up shop. The name ‘Sanlin’ literally 
meaning “three lins,” probably was an homage to his three sons, whose names were Bing-lin  
ʥњ, Zhen-lin Ǧњ, and Zhao-lin њ. The Sanlin Company imported Keelung coal, 
Taiwanese liquors and molasses , seafood, matches, and flour to Shantou.110 
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About the importation of alcohol, the sixth article of Guang dong quan sheng jiu shui zhang 
cheng ƚȭˮЄ̗̌̍ (the alcohol tax for the whole of Guangdong Province) prohibited 
the scale of blended liquors (i.e., of alcohol blended with water) throughout Guangdong Province. 
Transgressors would be fined between ten and one hundred yuan. This article triggered many 
disputes between Japanese merchants, Taiwanese merchants, and Chinese officials because of 
the prohibition’s ambiguous terminology. However, “Taiwanese sekimin Bing-zhang Luo 
understood local affairs in various regions of China, and thus he could mitigate various obstacles 
presented by complicated Chinese business customs, and the result was the ongoing importation 
of Taiwanese alcohol into Shantou.”111 
In addition to the importation of Japanese and Taiwanese goods, Bing-zhang Luo was an 
agent for Teikoku Seimei Hoken Kaisha Ƈċˌò~Ыȡ˼ (Imperial Life Insurance 
Company), which is today’s Asahi Seimei Hoken Sōgō Kaisha ȥȅˌò~Ы˭Yȡ˼ (Asahi 
Life Insurance Company).112 The company was established in Tokyo in 1888, and with Japan’s 
expansion in East Asia, the Imperial Life Insurance Company expanded its business to Japan’ 
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colonial and semi-colonial holding, including Taiwan (colony) and the Chinese treaty ports 
(semi-colonies). For example, when Imperial Life Insurance expanded their business in colonial 
Taiwan in 1918, the main subjects of insurance were Japanese officials and their family members. 
Concerning the insurance business in Shantou, Japan assigned technicians and staff to the 
Chinese city beginning in 1904 to facilitate the construction of the Chaoshan Railroad. Later, 
with the formation of a primary Japanese community in Shantou, more and more Japanese 
officials and merchants relocated there, despite facing many risks including dangerous work and 
local diseases, such as cholera. In addition to Japanese residents, some Taiwanese residents in 
Shantou expressed demand for insurance, as well. In this sense, the demand for insurance was 
significant, and Bing-zhang Luo—as an agent for Imperial Life Insurance—responded to this 
demand.  
In general, several factors explain Bing-zhang Luo’s business success. First, he spoke both 
Japanese and Mandarin, and this bilingual ability facilitated his business. Second, he was trusted 
by both the Japanese and Chinese communities for his credit worthiness. Third, he was well 
versed in the Chinese customs surrounding trade. Because of Luo’s success in business, 
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moreover, he had been the vice-director of the Japanese Association in Shantou.113 In the 
Personal Matters section of the November 7, 1924 issue of the Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, a 
report stated that Bing-zhang Luo had arrived in Taipei from Shantou on November 5, 1924.114 
Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō was the official newspaper of the Taiwan General Government and 
was the most important newspaper in colonial Taiwan. The report of Baing-zhang Luo’s voyage 
to Taipei indicates that he was an important figure whose activities were newsworthy. 
Chuan-zhi Lin was the second most powerful Taiwanese sekimin merchant according to 
Japanese consul Uchida’s report. The household register for Chuan-zhi Lin listed a residence in 
Taipei, but he had been born in Shantou. After Japan’s governance of Taiwan commenced in 
1895, Lin registered as a Japanese citizen, but not before starting up a business that would 
eventually import towels, socks, and cotton products into Shantou. In September 1913, Lin 
co-invested with a Chaoyang merchant Feng-wu Fan ͧђʧ in establishing the Likyō Textiles 
Company (²Ƥ̼ʴƙ), which was located on Sheng-ping Street (ȊƊΌ) in Shantou. The 
company specializing in making socks and rested on capital value at 50 thousand yuan, with 
most of the investments coming from Chuan-zhi Lin. In 1914, with its factory complex finally 
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constructed, Likyō Textiles Company started to operatations.  
The Likyō Textiles Company imported Japanese materials and, processing them with 29 
American-made machines, put out 160 dozen products daily. The socks exported to Singapore 
served the needs of Chinese workers there. The Likyō Textiles Company was the largest 
manufacturer in Shantou in 1914. At that time, there were two soy-bean factories, two canning 
factories, one roof-tile factory, and two ramune (soft drink) factories in Shantou. All these 
factories were much smaller than the factory used by the Likyō Textiles Company.115 
In 1918, Likyō Textiles Company expanded its facilities, no longer limiting itself to the 
production of socks. The company manufactured cotton cloth, towels, handkerchiefs and other 
cotton-made products. In the rush seasons, the company would hire as many as 180 employees, 
and even in the slack seasons, the company hired approximately 130 employees. It was regarded 
as the most prosperous Japanese (and Taiwanese) business in Shantou.116  
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Chuan-zhi Lin spoke both Japanese and Nankinese and was regarded as a trustworthy man 
in both the Japanese and Chinese communities in Shantou. He was appointed to a position on an 
appraisal board of the Japanese Association in Shantou, and was active in the Japanese 
communities in Shantou.117  
Guang-shu Chen was the third most powerful sekimin merchant in Shantou. The household 
registration of Guang-shu Chen listed him as residing in Taipei (the Da dao cheng area). He was 
born in Chaozhou in 1856. In 1876, when he was twenty years old, he went to Shantou, Amoy, 
and other places in southern China with his father while conducting business in the tea trade. 
When Japan began governing Taiwan in 1895, Chen registered as a Japanese citizen and kept 
conducting the tea business in Chaozhou, Shantou, and Taiwan. The Chen family grew very rich, 
as it ranked in profits from tea shops in Taipei, Siam, Shantou, and many other places. In Taipei, 
Guang-shu opened a baozhong tea shop (É̎ͩ) named Mei sheng shu ji ́˪ϧΡ, 
conducting business with Siam.118  
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During the Qing period, the machines used for weighing of baozhong tea were hand-crafted 
according to subjective standards, not universal ones. In 1907, the Taiwan General Government 
undertook the task of designing and producing universal weighing machines in conjunction with 
universal standard for packaging tea. However, some tea stores in Taipei (mainly in Da do cheng) 
disobeyed the Taiwan General Government’s policy. Guang-shu Chen was one the most 
powerful tea-shop owners who resisted the Taiwan General Government’s calls for the 
unification of standards. The Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō published a news report that, criticizing 
Guang-shu Chen, galvanized other tea merchants’ decision to violate governmental orders and 
measure tea with non-standard counterweights and scales.119 Being very active in the circle of 
tea business in Taipei, Guang-shu Chen in 1908 and 1910 was elected to the position of 
executive secretary of the Taipei Tea Merchants Guild, and in 1915, he became a member of an 
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In 1918, Chen opened the Kōgen Tea Store on Sheng-ping Street in Shantou. The venture 
became the most important Japanese (and Taiwanese) tea company in the city. In March of every 
year, which was a peak period in the purchase of tea, Guang-shu Chen assigned between thirty 
and forty Shantou-based employees to Taiwan, where they would appraise and purchase tea. 
Chen’s fluency in Japanese and mandarin earned him the trust of both the Japanese and Chinese 
communities in Shantou.121 
Zhen-xian Wang made the list of important Taiwanese merchants in Shantou at the time. He 
was born in Tainan and received a bachelor’s degree from the Japanese university. In 1919, he 
opened Kanki Company (TΡɽΊ) on Yong-he Street in Shantou, dealing in the excavation and 
sale of mineral substance. His wife graduated from the feminine school in Kobe, and was known 
for her graceful and diplomatic social skills. Zhen-xian Wang received an appointment to the 
appraisal board of the Japanese Association in Shantou.122 
Zhen-guo Lin was the last important Taiwanese merchant mentioned in Japanese Consul 
Unida’s report. The household register of Zhen-guo Lin listed him as residing in Taipei. It is not 
clear where he was born. In January 1920, Lin opened the Fuji Company on Sheng-ping Street in 
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121 Swatō ni kansuru chōsa jikō hōkoku no ken (2)” ɲп#Н2ΰȴVлğð$k 2 (A survey report on 
Shantou, part 2), Gaimushō kiroku ĩÁˮΡЍ, B03050703300 (1921). !
122 Ibid.  
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Shantou, where the business imported and sold seafood and groceries. He understood the 
Japanese language and served as a member of an appraisal board at the Japanese Association in 
Shantou.123 
Sekimin merchants outside those mentioned in Japanese Consul Uchida’s report, excelled at 
conducting business in Shantou since the 1910s. The Chen Family stood out in this regard, 
owing largely to their oversight of the Mangen Company (ʹʐɽΊ), which was the brainchild 
of Tainan merchant Guan-ying Chen Ф¨ͥ, (1880−1926) in Shantou. Guan-ying Chen was a 
comprador of sugar and rice who established the Chen Wanyuan Фʹʐ Company in 1906 in 
Tainan, dealing in those same two products. Later, he established the Douliu Sugar Company  
(Ǽ Δ̥) and was a supervisor of the Tainan Sugar Company (͗ÓΔ̥). Chen also 
participated in the Tainan Prefecture Conference (͗ÓżÒξȡ) from 1921 to 1925.124 In 
December 1916, the Mangen Company opened on Sheng-ping Street in Shantou, and sold 
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123 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku ĩÁˮϪùŧ, Tsūshō kōhō Ϫùğ (Public report on commerce), no. 527 (June 17, 
1918), p. 1041; no. 528 (June 24, 1918); “Swatō ni kansuru chōsa jikō hōkoku no ken (2)” ɲп#Н2ΰȴVл
ğð$k 2 (A survey report on Shantou, part 2), Gaimushō kiroku ĩÁˮΡЍ, B03050703300 (1921); 
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shibu ÓɽÒȡ͗ʟǲϾ, 1922, p. 106. 
124 Tainan shinpō sha ͗ÓǾğ˼, Nanbu Taiwan shinshi roku ÓϾ͗ʟ̭ĥЍ (The roster of Taiwanese 
gentlemen in southern Taiwan). Tainan: Tainan shinpō sha, 1907, p. 53; Taiwan taikan sha ͗ʟĬΜ˼, Saikin no 
nanbu Taiwan ȠϦ$ÓϾ͗ʟ (Contemporary southern Taiwan). Tainan: Taiwan taikan sha, 1923, p.12; Fuhō 
Ɠğ (Bulletin of the Taiwan General Government), no. 3834, p. 51 (June 25, 1926). 
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imported alcohol, molasses, seafood, pineapples, matches, and flour from Japan and Taiwan.125 
The Mangen Company’s capital was valued at 50 thousand yuan during the primary stage of 
operations, and in 1919, three years after the opening of the company, the value of the capital 
had reached 70 thousand yuan. In the same year, the Mangen Company made a contract with the 
Osaka Suzuki Ekiji Company (ЊȧюəùƑ), exporting tungsten to Japan. It was said that the 
annual volume of tungsten trade was valued at 500 thousand yuan. Early in the company’s 
history, Zun-ding Chen Ф϶ѝ was responsible for operations. In the early 1920s, Fan-shu 
Chen ФͽͿ became the director of the Mangen Company, and later, Guan-ying Chen’s 
nephew Qi-hui Chen Ф́Ϡ became the director.126  
Qi-hui Chen was very active in Shantou’s Taiwanese communities. He served as the 
secretary in charge of the Taiwanese Association in Shantou in the late 1910s. In the early 1930s, 
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China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu ÓɽÒȡ͗ʟǲϾ, 1938, , p. 66; Kamesaburō Anjū ŋІSBϽ, 
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ʷɹ (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, p. 240; 
Xue-ying Xie ιгƫ, Shantou zhinan ɲпǤÓ (A guidebook to Shantou). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 
1933, p. 168; Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku ĩÁˮϪùŧ, Tsūshō kōhō Ϫùğ, no. 451(September 3, 1917); no. 476 
(December 10, 1917); no. 484 (January 17, 1918); no. 494 (February 21, 1918); no. 877 (October 6, 1921). 
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ɹ (The Japanese situation in southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku Taiwan ginkō chosa ka, 1919, p. 240; 
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southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu ÓɽÒȡ͗ʟǲϾ, 1938, , p. 66. 
! 82!
when the Tainan gentry and entrepreneur Shin Huang established the Dadong Ice-making 
Company (ĬȭΔ©ç)127 in Shantou, Qi-hui Chen ranked as one of the most important 
shareholders in the venture. Later, owing to the dispute between the Japanese consul in Shantou 
Kumakichi Befu and the Dadong Ice-making Company, Befu issued orders of deportation to 
Qi-hui Chen and other important Taiwanese shareholders in the company (see Chapter three for a 
more detailed discussion of the dispute). Nevertheless, the dispute was settled and Qi-hui Chen 
was able to remain in Shantou with his family until the end of the Second World War. Qi-hui 
Chen, his wife Shu-qing Lin, and their daughter Hui-juan Chen returned to Taiwan in 1946 as 
“non-guilty Taiwanese residents in Shantou.”128 
Xin-dong Xiao’s ;Ƀ was an important Taiwanese investor in Shantou. Born in 1887, 
he hailed from a rich family of Hakka ethnicity in southern Taiwan’s Pingdong area (Jiadong). In 
1906, he graduated from the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School (ĉάň
Ⱥ).129 Later, he attended the Tokyo Engineering School (today’s Japan Engineering School) 
specializing in machinery. After studying in Japan, Xiao returned to Taiwan and became active 
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127 Among the investors in the Dadong Ice-making Company were members of Tainan’s gentry, the merchant Shin 
Huang, and other Taiwanese residnets in Shantou. The value of the company’s capital reached 90 thousand yuan, 
and the company itself was the largest producer of ice in Shantou. 
128 Taiwan sheng xing zheng zhang guan gong shu dang an ͗ʟˮΊǳЗŎ̿ɕȾ! (The government office 
files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 00306520001157 (February 11, 1946). 
129 Fuhō Ɠğ, no. 1942, p. 13 (April 6, 1906); no. 1980, p. 6 (June 2, 1906). 
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in business circles. Xin-dong invested in several companies, including in light-rail and 
ice-making companies. In 1912, Xin-dong—along with another local gentry A-bing Dai ǖПH
130—proposed a plan to the Taiwan General Government for constructing the light-rail Neipu 
Ahou Line in the Pingdong area for transporting rice from Neipu and Chaozhou (in Taiwan), two 
rice-production cites, and after being accepted, designated, constructed, the new contributed 
significantly to local prosperity.131 
In addition to the light rails, Xin-dong invested in at least four ice-making companies, 
including the Kagi Ice-making Company (ā̓Δ©ȡ˼), for which he served as a manager 
director in 1913; the Shinkō Ice-making Company (ǾяΔ©Ȼƞȡ˼), for which he served as 
supervisor in 1915 and 1916; and the Takao (today’s Kaohsiung) Ice-selling Company (яЬϒ
©ȡ˼), for which he served as director in1921.132 When I visited Xiao’s house in Pingdong, I 
found a financial statement for the Nittō Ice-making Company (ȅȭΔ©ȡ˼) dating from 
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130 A-bing Dai ǖПH (1876-1942) was a member of the Hakka gentry and a merchant in Taiwan. In 1898, when 
bandits attacked Japanese Chaozhou office in southern Taiwan, A-bing immediately informed the Japanese military 
police and helped the Japanese authorities pacify the area. In 1909, he received the shinshō ̭̗ award, given to 
Taiwanese gentry by the Taiwan General Government during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. 
131 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 4226, daily news 2 (March 5, 1912); no. 4227, daily news 4 
(March 6, 1912). 
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1919, and Xin-dong was listed as a shareholder in possession of 97 shares.133 
Xin-dong’s investment ambitions expanded to Shantou. In 1915, he invested in the 
construction of Shanzhang Light Rail (ɲɐϟ{Дϲ), which connected Shantou, Denghai  
(ʠʅ), and Zhanglin (ɐȯ) to one another covering a total length of 18.5 kilometers. In January 
1923, the line between Shantou and Denghai started to operate. It featured trolley-style cars, a 
style popular in southern Taiwan during the Japanese colonial period. The Shanzhang Light Rail, 
as well as the Chaoshan Railroad, played an important role in promoting the commerce and 
transportation in the Chaoshan area.134 
In 1916, Xin-dong invested 800 thousand yuan in establishing the Shantou-based Eiwa 
Company (ɱóɽΊ), which dealt in exports of tungsten. Since the outbreak of the First World 
War, tungsten had become an important strategic material. In 1918, Xin-dong bought a 
tungsten-rich strip of land in Longfeng Чσ, located in Guangdong Province. Xin-dong 
exported tungsten to Japan and to the United States. In May 1918, Xin-dong transported tungsten 
from Shantou to Keelung and Hong Kong by means of the Osaka Shipping Company. For 
example, 37 packages of tungsten were shipped to Keelung on May 1, 23 packages of tungsten 
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133 Nittō seihyō kaisha ȅȭΔ©ȡ˼ (the Nittō Ice-Making Company), Daiikkai eigyō hōkokushō ̜?ĆʰɊ
ğðȞ (A preliminary business report). Tokyo: Nittō seihyō kaisha, 1919, p. 50. 
134 Ōsaka asahi shinpū ĬОȥȅǾ͊ (June 22, 1939). 
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were shipped to Keelung on May 6, 2 packages of tungsten were shipped to Hong Kong on May 
15, and 90 packages of tungsten were shipped to Keelung on May 20. These preliminary 
numbers suggest that Xin-dong transported most of the tungsten to Keelung and only a small part 
to Hong Kong. He entered into a contract with the Kobe Kyūgen Company (˽ǗOÚùƑ) to 
export a volume of tungsten equivalent to 100 thousand yuan monthly. In this sense, the tungsten 
was probably transported from Shantou to the United Sates through Keelung and Japan.135 
However, the business did not make Xin-dong rich because when the tungsten finally arrived in 
the United States, the First World War had already ended (on November 11, 1918).136 
I had the opportunity to go through Xin-dong’s private letters in his house in Pingdong, and I 
took note of a letter that, sent from Kitōta Amano ĭЇý΂Į, identified engine production as a 
possible lucrative field for Xin-dong’s investments. According to the letter, Amano went to 
Shantou in March 1924; and on October 3, 1924, he returned to Kaohsiung, and promptly visited 
the Ogiwara Shipyard (ͭÚϬ͞Ǚ) established in March 1901 in Kaohsiung. The letter goes on 
to state that Amano heard from the Japanese workers in the shipyard that China had recently 
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135 Gaimushō tsūshōkyoku ĩÁˮϪùŧ, Tsūshō kōhō Ϫùğ (Public report on commerce), no. 531, pp. 6−7 
(July 1, 1918); Taiwan ginkō chosa ka ͗ʟЌΊΰȴί, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru hōjin no jōkyō ÓǲÓɽWȀ7
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1919, p. 240. 
136 Interview with Mr. Kun-yuan Xiao ;Ўɵ, a relative of Xin-dong Xiao ;Ƀ. 
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ordered two new ships (40 and 25 horsepower respectively), and that Amano later heard about 
Xin-dong’s involvement in the engineering of ships from various Taiwanese sources at the 
Ogiwara Shipyard; thus, Amano wanted to meet Xing-dong as soon as possible. This letter 
indicates that Xin-dong might have invested in the Ogiwara Shipyard’s manufacture of modern 
ocean-going vessels outfitted with powerful engines. 
Xin-dong resided on Shantou’s Yu-shan Street for many years until the end of Second World 
War.137 He had no offspring and adopted his brother’s son Dao-ying Xiao ;ϲǎ. Dao-ying 
and his son Kai-ping Xiao ;ЙƊ were both famous forensic medical experts in Taiwan. 
Wei-zhen Rao х̴ˀ was an important Taiwanese sekimin merchant in Shantou beginning 
in the 1920s. Wei-zhen Rao was originally from the Xinzhu (Toufen) area in northern Taiwan. In 
the mid-1920s, Wei-zhen Rao opened the Shinshū Company (˽żɽΊ) on Shantou’s 
Zhen-bang Street. The company’s capital had a value exceeding 10 thousand yuan, derived 
chiefly from such products as medicine, liquor, tobacco, and canned food. After the outbreak of 
the Shanghai Incident on January 28, 1932, many Japanese stores were forced to close because 
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137 Taiwan sheng xing zheng zhang guan gong shu dang an ͗ʟˮΊǳЗŎ̿ɕȾ (The government office 
files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 003065200001157 (February 11, 1946). 
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of the severe Sino-Japanese tensions, but the Shinshū Company continued to operate as usual.138  
Wei-zhen Rao also operated the Shinshū Hotel, a Chinese-style hotel in Shantou located on 
the third floor of the Guangdong Bank on Yong-ping Road, a prosperous area of Shantou. The 
hotel, whose facilities were top of the line, was one of the best Chinese-style hotels in Shantou. 
Wei-zhen Rao operated another hotel, the Kaan Hotel (ͲŋȂф), which was, in fact, not far 
from the Shinshū Hotel. However, the Kaan Hotel was less ritzy than the Shinshū Hotel.139 
Rao’s family members resided on Shantou’s Yu-shan Street, and the children received their 
education in Shantou. For example, Wei-run Rao х̴ʘ, born in 1913, attended the Zheng-shi 
Elementary School (ɡļŢŉ) and then the First Junior School in Shantou. Wei-shin Rao  
х̴, born in 1915, was a student at Ling-dong Commercial School.140 The Rao family stayed 
in Shantou until the end of the Second World War. Wei-yun Rao х̴ϱ, his wife Duan Lin  
ȯ̷, and their daughter Mei-hui Rao х́ǃ returned to Taiwan as “non-guilty Taiwanese 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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Vǁ (The circumstances inside the Shantou imperial consulate). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō chsaka, 1922, p. 
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$ùɊ (Commerce in southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu ÓɽÒȡ͗ʟǲϾ, 1938, p. 66.   
139 Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaijika ͗ʟ̺˱ƓŎǘĩVί, Nashi nanyō rykō no shiori ÓǲÓɽȂΊ$ȹ (A 
travel guide for southern China and the South Seas). Taihoku: Taiwan sōtokufu kanbō gaijika, 1919, p. 61; Gorō 
Uchida ˏZϽ, Shin Swatō Ǿɲп (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu ÓɽÒȡ͗ʟǲϾ, 
1927, , p. 42. 
140 Gaimushō kiroku ĩÁˮΡЍ, B04011305400 (1930). 
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residents of Shantou.” Wei-zhen Rao’s name appeared on Shantou shi tai qiao shen qing liu shan 
ju zhu xing ming ce ɲпƅä˒β˖ɲŨsĽì¦ (the roster of Taiwanese residents who 
applied to stay in Shantou City).141 
Hailing from Taiwan, the members of the Yu family who owned the Yūtai Company (Βɼ
ɽΊ) in Shantou also had a Hakka ethnic background. The Yu family’s main residence in 
Taiwan was in the Taoyuan (Zhong-li) area in northern part of the island. In 1916, A-cen Yu  
vПŮ graduated from the Industrial Training Institution in Taiwan, which was affiliated with 
Taiwan General Government.142 And thereafter, he became active in his hometown’s business 
circels. In February 1918, the Taiwan Minerals Company (͗ʟЖɊȻƞȡ˼) held its founding 
meeting at Zhong-li Christian Church, and in attendance were many Japanese officials, such as 
the director of the Industrial Training Institution and the director of Taoyuan’s General Affairs 
Section. A-cen Yu was appointed a member of the standing committee of the Taiwan Minerals 
Company. Meanwhile, the Japanese government grant A-cen permission to excavate coal in 
Taoyuan’s xincheng ǾĖ area.143 In 1925, A-cen took the lead role in founding the Zhong-li 
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files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 003065200001157 (February 11, 1946). 
142 Fuhō Ɠğ, no. 1060, p. 37 (July 13, 1916). 
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Joint Electricity Company.144 In 1927, the Yu family opened the Yūtai Company in Shantou, 
and Yuan-mei Yu vĎĻ, a woman, was the registered owner. The Yūtai Company facilitated 
the import of machines, chemical materials, medicines, and groceries from Japan and Taiwan to 
Shantou. The capital of the company was valued at over 10 thousand yuan in the 1930s. Later, in 
the 1930s, A-cen ascended to the top position in the company.145  
Born in 1907, A-cen Yu’s wife, Mei-xiang Lin ȯ́˾, was a native of Chaozhou. She 
graduated from Shanghai Dong-nan Medical School (CʅȭÓЅŉТ) and then traveled to 
Japan for further studies. She came back to China as a reconstructive surgeon. Their son 
Zheng-xiong Yu vɡЬ was born in 1931 and eventfully served as the chairman of the Taiwan 
Galleria Company (Ī͎̅lȣСç).146 A-cen, Mei-xiang, and Zheng-xiong resided in 
Shantou until the end of the Second World War.147  
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Many sekimin merchants, in addition to the aforementioned, conducted business in Shantou 
during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. For example, several sekimin merchants 
participated in business related to sea transport. Kun Lin ȯĕ operated the Daishin Ironworks 
(ĬǾДžƙ), specializing in ship repairs. Han Yang Ɉʕ operated the Kengen Keisei 
Company (θʐȽέɽΊ) in Shantou and the Tōgen Company (ȭʐùΊ) in Taiwan, each 
contributing to marine transportation. Wen-teng Tsai ͺǻъ operated the Jisei Company  
(͔ǐɽΊ), dealing in sea-transportation and deep-sea fishing. He-qing Zhang ƣɷʋ ran the 
Kenmo Company (ƜͦɽΊ), dealing in imports of seafood and groceries. Headed by Jin-hai 
Xiao ;Љʅ, the Mika Company (BͲɽΊ) imported seafood and dyes. Textiles and tobacco 
were important products throughout the region. Concerning the manufacture of textiles, 
Taiwanese sekimin Ji-pu Liu ·Ȅʑ oversaw operations at the Liu Mei-tai Company  
(·́ɼΆ), which specialized in lace. Dealing in the manufacture of ramie fabrics, the Tokumi 
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As for the tobacco industry, Huang-xuan Xu ưʫþ operated the Kokushin Company  
(ċɽΊ) on Haikwan Road, which dealt not only in tobacco leaves but also in dyes, industrial 
medicine, and electric materials. Shen-lai Hong ɾ˽y operated the Taihan Company  
(͗ОɽΊ), selling processed tobacco. Located on Yong tai Street, the Fukuki Company  
(̄ΡɽΊ)—under You-fu Zheng Ѓȣ̄—sold processed tobacco, as did the Yōsōhō 
Company (ͶЯσ), which also dealt in alcohol, silks, satins, and general goods, owing in large 
measure to the diversifying efforts of the company’s head Zi-de Ye Ͷ͔Ʋ. 
Concerning the business of alcohol, Zhi-fang Lin ȯ͜͠ was a sekimin who headed the 
Kyūki Company (̇ΡɽΊ), selling alcohol and general goods. Ming-qin He uѓˆ ran the 
Kengen Company (θʐɽΊ), which specialized in three rather disparate products: molasses, 
alcohol, and pottery. The Giri Company (̓²ɽΊ) was under Zhu Pan ʗ», and also 
specialized in alcohol and molasses. Guang-de Zhou ñƴ took charge of the Heian 
Company (Ɗŋç), which sold alcohol and coal. Overseeing two ventures, Ming Liu  
·Ȍ was known for directing both the Meihatsu Company (ȌˣɽΊ) and the Renhatsu 
Company (͋ˣɽΊ) in the brick business. Qi Zhou ñ£ operated the Gensei Company 





2.4 Brief Conclusion 
In studying this commercial network in East Asia, I drew inspiration from the “network 
mode” and “inter-port mode” concepts developed by Japanese scholar Takashi Hamashita  
ʜDɣƷ, who provided a new approach to exploring Asian history. His focus is not on a 
specific national history (which traditional Oriental studies have favored) but on the important 
waterway connections among different ports and regions. For example, he argues that to analyze 
the connections among ports yields more details than would a traditional examination of the 
historical relationships among nations.150 In my case, an examination of Japanese goods sold in 
Shantou can clarify the relationships among the Japanese city of Kobe, the Taiwanese city of 
Keelung, British Hong Kong, and Shantou in southern China. 
Beginning in the early twentieth century, Japan established closer commercial relations with 
Shantou. Shantou was an important market for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including 
coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. The Japanese and Taiwanese goods served not only 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
149 Ibid. 
150 Takashi Hamashita, Ya zhou jia zhi, zhi xu yu zhong guo de wei lai: hou guo jia shi dai zhi ya zhou yan jiu \
ɿ̋Ə͘Kċ˦Ȩy—ƯċœȓgP\ż˴̑ (Asian Value, Order and the Future of China: Asia studies 
in the post-national era), Taipei: zhong yang yan jiu yuan dong bei ya qu yu yan jiu Kİ˴̑ТȭË\Íę˴̑ 
(North Eastern Area Studies at Academia Sinica), 2000. 
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Shantou’s local needs but also those of other Chinese cities and of various regions in Southeast 
Asia. In Shantou, three Japanese companies with a certain degree of government sponsorship 
were the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company. Japanese 
companies that profited without as much governmental assistance included Kōkandō, the Kōzaka 
Company, and the Nikka Company. Moreover, Taiwanese merchants played a crucial role in 
Shantou’s business circles. The sekimin merchants established tea shop, textile company, mining 
company, pharmacies and groceries. Most Japanese and Taiwanese companies concentrated in 
Shantou City’s Qilu area (˸˷), a coastal and prosperous commercial area. Specific sites for 
these businesses were Wai-ma Road, Zhen-bang Street, Yu-shan Street, and several other 
noteworthy thoroughfares. Here, Western, Japanese, Taiwanese, and Chinese merchants would 
gather and interact. In this chapter, I have argued that a cross-boundary commercial network 
emerged among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou in southern China and 
that the network was a consequence chiefly of interactions between Japanese officials and 
Taiwanese merchants whose commercial activities were of great significance. 
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Chapter 3: The Case of the Dadong Ice-making Company and Relations 
among Japan, China, and Taiwan 
3.1 Prelude 
In this chapter, I explore the cooperation and competition, the conflict and compromise 
among Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese 
imperial consulate in Shantou, a major city connected to other cities in the Chaoshan area151 by 
both railways and waterways. Specifically, I explore the Sino-Japanese co-investment Dadong 
Ice-making Company in Shantou (ɲпĬȭΔ©ç). 
This chapter enters into a dialogue with research conducted by Timothy Brook and Fu 
Poshek ͵˳, who tried to revise the conventional nationalist discourse emphasizing the 
resistance and hardships of the Chinese people during the Sino-Japanese War. Brook 
concentrates on the initial period of the occupation (mainly 1937−8), and on five different 
locations, all within the Yangtze delta, and investigates wartime collaboration between Chinese 
local elites and Japanese army agents. In sum, Brook suggests that the line between resistance 
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151 The Chaoshan area (ʙɲĒÍ) corresponds to eastern Guangdong Province in China and includes Chaozhoutl 
ʙż, Shantou ɲп, and Jieyang ǭЦ. The region is the origin of Teochew (ʙɲΨ) and many local people from 
this region immigrated to southeastern Asia, including Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.      
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and collaboration is not, in fact, an easy one to draw.152 Poshek Fu’s research explores how 
Chinese intellectuals in Shanghai reacted to the Japanese occupation during the period between 
1937 and 1945, and records their choices of retreating from, resisting, or cooperating with Japan, 
all while facing the dilemma between remaining loyal to China and confronting hard, unpleasant 
realities.153 Both Brook’s and Fu’s studies indicate that the interactions between Japanese and 
Chineseand on some important occasions, Taiwaneseduring the wartime period were much 
more complicated than traditional perceptions have suggested.  
Moreover, Karen Laura Thornber examines the literary output of writers in Japan’s colonies, 
semi-colonies in China, and Manchukuo, illustrating how these writers translated, adapted, and 
reinterpreted Japanese literature. Her study indicates that the boundaries, cooperation, and 
resistance characterizing relationships between colonizers and colonized under the Japanese 
empire were blurred.154 In this chapter, I will use the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company 
to explain the interactions among Japanese, Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou between 
late the late 1920s and the mid-1930s, to illustrate the complexities in a Chinese treaty port, 
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152 Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2005). 
153 Fu Poshek, Passivity, Resistance and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937−1945 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993). 
154 Karen Laura Thornber, Empire of Texts in Motion: Chinese, Korean, and Taiwanese Transculturations of 
Japanese Literature. Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center: Distributed by Harvard University Press, 2009. 
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where ethnicity, nationality, identity, and commercial interests were prominent factors. 
 
3.2 Nanshin ÓϮ  policy and nisshi shinzen ȅǲΛü  
The Dadong Ice-making Company was one of the most important Taiwanese- invested 
industries in Shantou. The main founder, Shin Huang ћɚ, was a famous entrepreneur and 
politician from Tainan. In response to the Taiwan General Government’s nanshin policy 
(southward expansion), around 1926, Huang collected money both from his countrymen in 
Tainan and from Taiwanese sekimin in Shantou to establish the company. In 1928, the 
company’s founding conference was formally held in Tainan. Dadong was not only a reaction to 
Japan’s nanshin policy, but also a product of Japan’s policy of nisshi shinzen (Japan−China 
friendship), promoting Japanese and Chinese co-investment in companies and other institutions, 
like schools and hospitals. In addition to Japanese (in this case, Taiwanese) shareholders, 
10−20% of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s funds stemmed from Chinese investors. In 1930, 
the company started to operate in Shantou.155  
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155 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933). 
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Shin Huang,156 the main founder of the Dadong Ice-making Company, was a prominent 
figure in Taiwanese history during the Japanese colonial period. He graduated from the Japanese 
Language School ( ĉάňȺ), an elite school affiliated with the Taiwan General Government. 
He worked at Tainan Hospital after graduation, and then, like many Taiwanese elites, Huang 
went to Japan in pursuit of higher education. In 1914, he came back to Taiwan with a bachelor’s 
degree of law from Meiji University. Later, he played an active role in Taiwan’s business circles. 
He occupied numerous high-ranking positions, including executive director of the Taiwan Seishi 
͗ʟΔ̫ (Taiwan paper-making company) in 1917, inspector of the Tainan Jidōsha ͗Ó͔À
Ϝ (Tainan Automobile Company) in 1919, director of Kagi Bank ā̓ЌΊ in 1919, inspector 
of the Taiwan Seien ͗ʟΔĢ (Taiwan salt-making company) in 1919, and director of the 
Taiwan Keitetsu ͗ʟϞД (Taiwan Light Rail Transit Company) in 1927.  
Moreover, Huang earned permission from the Monopoly Bureau of the Taiwan General 
Government to sell tobacco and opium in Taiwan. Huang played an active role not only in 
business circles but in the political arena, as well. He participated in the Tainan Prefecture 
Conference (͗ÓżÒξȡ) in 1920, and was a member of the Council of the Taiwan General 
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156 Shin Huang (1885−1947) has other names, like Mao-sheng Huang ћ̛ͦ and the Japanese name  Nanmei 
Kunie ċɳÓѓ. 
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Government (̺˱ƓΦξȡ) in 1921; and in the same year, he was granted shinshō ̭̗, an 
honorary title bestowed by the Taiwan General Government on Taiwanese local elites. In short, 
Shin Huang was one of the most powerful men in southern Taiwan during the Japanese colonial 
period.157  
In contrast to Shin Huang’s outgoing personality, his younger brother Xi-quan Huang  
ћςͫ (1891−1960) was an introvert and moderate in his goals. Xi-quan had no interest in 
serving public office and preferred spending most of his time in composing poems. Actually the 
Huang brothers were key figures in Nansha Ó˼, a major circle of poets in Tainan.158 In spite 
of these significant personalities differences between the two Huang brothers, they were very 
close to each other and when Shin Huang decided to establish the Dagong Ice-making Company, 
Xi-quan supported his brother completely. 
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157 Shinkōshinpōsha ǾяǾğ˼, Taiwan shinshi meikan ͗ʟ̭ĥìЕ (Directory of the Taiwanese gentry). 
Taihoku: Shinkōshinpōsha, 1937, p. 226; Ichizō Ōsono Ĭčƅͼ, Taiwan no chūshin jinbutsu ͗ʟ$KƵaʴ 
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Huang ћ́Ȣ, master thesis, Tainan shi shen Huang shin zhi yan jiu ͗Óĥ̭ћɚP˴̑ (Research on Shin 
Huang, member of the Tainan gentry), National Normal University, 2005. 
158 Tian-heng Huang ћĭɔ, Huang tian-heng xian sheng fang tan lu ћĭɔˌ΢αЍ (The oral history of 
Tian-heng Huang), interviewed by Feng-jiao He uђŃ and Mei-rong Chen Ф́͹. Xindian: Guo shi guan, 2008, 
pp. 66−67. 
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Fig. 3-1 Shin Huang. (Source: Taiwan jinshi kan, A list of famous Taiwanese. Taihoku: Taiwan 
shinminpōsha, 1934, p. 124.) 
 
 
As mentioned, the Dadong Ice-making Company was a product of Japan’s nanshin policy. 
In the early Taishō period (1912−1926), the Taiwan General Government encouraged Taiwanese 
to explore nanshi (southern China) and nanyō (southeastern Asia) to strengthen the Japanese 
influence in these areas. As an influential figure in Tainan, in December 1924, Shin Huang 
received an appointment from the Taiwan General Government to undertake his own 
explorations in nashi and nanyō. He travelled in Indochina, Dutch Indonesia, British Hong Kong, 
British Singapore, Siam (modern-day Thailand), Guangdong Province, and Yunnan Province.159 
He probably visited Shantou in this trip. Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, a major official newspaper in 
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colonial Taiwan, indicated that Shin Huang had been active in Shantou since 1925.160 By 1928, 
the Huang brothers, having already collected funds from multiple shareholders, decided to 
establish an ice-making company named “Dadong.”161  
Among the various fields of business they could have entered, why did the Huang brothers 
choose the ice-making business? A news report in Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō offered an 
explanation. 
     
         “When Taiwanese are competitive to promote developing overseas, as the pioneer  
          of Taiwanese, (they) plan to do business in southern China. Shantou is located in  
          east Guangdong province. The population is large. The residents are rich. Moreover,  
          the weather is warm. Thus, the ice-making business could be managed.”162  
 
 
          ͗Paĥ̙ʅĩˣŪȓѢʦw͗aьѢ˭ζmɊÓͲѢiɲп̣ȭѢ 
          aá̻ĪѢŨɭŖƖѢ¥PɯʓȘѢΔ©VɊѢϙϐ̳ʰ	 
 
In the late 1920s, the population of Shantou numbered approximately 120,000. The nearby 
cities included Chaozhou, with a population of approximately 150,000; Chaoyang ʙЦ, with a 
population of approximately 120,000; Jieyang ǭЦ, with a population of 100,000; Anbu ͳĚ, 
with a population of approximately 50,000; and Chenghai ʚʅ/ Dahao ϳτ, with a population 
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160 Taiwan nich nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 14107, daily news 7 (June 25, 1939). 
161 Taiwan nich nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 10227, evening news 4 (October 10, 1928). 
162 Taiwan nich nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933). 
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of approximately 30,000. All these cities were connected to Shantou by both railways and 
waterways, helping extend the great political and economic circles that took Shantou as their 
center to some 500,000 people.163 The significant size of this population and the warm weather 
in the region explain the demand for ice, especially during the summer season. In addition, 
before the Dadong Ice-making Company entered the picture, Shantou had only one ice-making 
company, Wutunji ZŬɓ, operated by a Taiwanese named Tian Wang ʾˏ.164 These factors 
are likely reasons for Shin Huang’s decision to establish an ice-making a promising business in 
Shantou.  
The list of Dadong Ice-making Company’s shareholders covered most of the powerful 
Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou, and many of them were originally from Tainan, Shin Huang’s 
hometown. In addition to Shin Huang, four important Taiwanese who took the position of 
executive directors merit our attention here: 
Executive director 1: Mu-yi Huang ћȧϺ (1901−?) was a teacher at a junior high school 
in Tainan. In 1927, Mu-yi resigned from his teaching job and moved to Shantou after receiving 
an invitation from Shin Huang to be the manager of the Dadong Ice-making Company. In the 
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163 Gorō Uchida ˏZϽ, Shin Swatō Ǿɲп (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu ÓɽÒȡ
͗ʟǲϾ, 1927, p. 3. 
164 Tainan shinpō ͗ÓǾğ, no. 10171, evening news 4 (May 15, 1930). 
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early 1930s, conflicts between the Japanese consulate in Shantou and the Dadong Ice-making 
Company prompted the consul Befu to order Mu-yi back to Taiwan (the conflict is explained in 
the next section). However, Mu-yi later returned to Shantou, and in addition to investing his 
personal wealth in the Dadong Ice-making Company, he served as the general manger of the 
Baixing Company (˥͙ɽΊ), a large company that dealt with Sino-Japan trade, was 
headquartered in Shanghai, and had branch offices in Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou, Guangzhou, 
Hong Kong, and Nanjing.165  
Executive director 2: Chi-hui Chen Ф́Ϡ was the nephew of Guan-ying Chen  
Ф¨ͥ,166 a prestigious merchant in Tainan.167 On the basis of his family’s abundant financial 
support, Chi-hui went to Shantou in the 1910s and eventually started the Wanyuan Company  
(ʹʐɽΊ), a large company established in 1916 with funds exceeding ten thousand yuan. The 
Wanyuan Company participated in the trade of seafood, pineapples, matches, flour, alcohol, and 
syrup among Japan, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou. In 1919, the Wanyuan Company entered into 
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165 Taiwan shinminpōsha ͗ʟǾɭğ˼, Taiwan jinshi kan ͗ʟaĥЕ (Directory of the Taiwanese people). 
Taihoku: Taiwan shinminpōsha, 1934, p. 159. 
166 Guan-ying Chen Ф¨ͥ (1880−1926) was a comprador of sugar and rice. He established the Chen Wanyuan 
Фʹʐ Company in 1906 in Tainan, dealing in sugar and rice. Later, he established the Douliu Sugar Company (Ǽ
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Prefecture Conference (͗ÓżÒξȡ) from 1921 to 1925. 
167 Tainan shinpō ͗ÓǾğ, no. 10163 (May 7, 1930), evening news 4; no.10170 (May 14, 1930), evening news 4; 
Taiwan taikan sha ͗ʟĬΜ˼, Saikin no nanbu Taiwan ȠϦ$ÓϾäʟ (Contemporary southern Taiwan). 
Tainan: Taiwan taikan sha, 1923, p. 12. 
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a contract with the Suzuki Ekiji Company (ЊȧюəùƑ) in Osaka, exporting tungsten from 
Shantou to Japan. Chi-hen was active in Shantou’s Taiwanese circles and was the secretary of 
the short-lived Taiwanese Association of Shantou, an organization that operated between 1918 
and 1919.168  
Executive director 3: Chang-sheng Chen ФЗˌ graduated from the Japanese Language 
School (ĉάňȺ) of the Taiwan General Government and then taught in Tainan. In 1921, 
Chang-sheng and his wife Yin-zhi Zheng Chen DC)1 were assigned by the Taiwan General 
Government to teach at Tōē School in Shantou, a Japanese-funded educational institution 
accommodating both the children of Taiwanese residents and the children of local Chinese. The 
Chens worked at Shantou Tōē School from 1921 to 1927. They then resigned from their teaching 
jobs and started to pursue business opportunities,169 including investments in the Dadong 
Ice-making Company. It is worth mentioning that Chang-sheng was the father of famous 
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168 Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu ÓɽÒȡ͗ʟǲϾ, Nanshina no shōgyō Óǲϻ$ùɊ (The commerce of 
southern China). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1938, p. 66; Kamesaburō Anjū ŋІSBϽ, Swatou shōfu 
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169 Qi-lu Chen Фı̂, Chenghuai guandao: Chen qi-lu xiansheng fangtanlu ʚǏΜϲ: Фı̂ˌ΢αЍ (An 
oral history of Chi-lu Chen), interviewed by Yi-zhen Chen ФƼ˯. Xindian: Guo shi guan, 2004, pp. 4−6. 
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Taiwanese anthropologist Chi-lu Chen Фı̂, an academician at Academia Sinica. 
Executive director 4: Yong-lu Jian ̠ɱ̂ was different from the abovementioned 
executive directors who were originally from Tainan, as Jian was originally from Taizhong 
Prefecture. After graduating from the Medical School of the Taiwan General Government,170  
he worked at Taipei Hospital. In the 1920s, he operated Yamato Hospital (ĬóЅТ) in Shantou 
and was a respectable doctor in Taiwanese circles. 171  
In addition to these four executive directors, the list of shareholders of the Dadong 
Ice-making Company included some Taiwanese doctors in Shantou. For example, Ji-yu Jian  
̠̐ʽ, originally from Taizhong Prefecture, was a graduate of the Taipei Medical Professional 
School. Later, he went to Shantou and worked at Yamato Hospital (ĬóЅТ).172 He was 
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ɲпǤÓ (Shantou guidebook). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 1933, p. 168, 302, 367; Gorō Uchida ˏ
ZϽ, Shin Swatou Ǿɲп (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927, p. 12. 
172 Xue-ying Xie ιгƫ, Shantou zhinan ɲпǤÓ (Shantou guidebook). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun she, 
1933, p. 56; Gorō Uchida ˏZϽ, Shin Swatou Ǿɲп (New Shantou). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 
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ÓǲÓɽ#2Ѕ˟Σȁ (The medical facilities in southern China and the South Seas), Vol. 1. Taihoku: 
! 105!
probably from the same family as Yong-lu Jian. Ji-yu Jian stayed in Shantou until the end of 
World War Two, at which time the ROC Government decided not to prosecute him for 
complicity with the Japanese enemy.173 Zhen-qian Wang ʾǦθ, a Taiwanese doctor in 
Shantou, was another shareholder of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Originally from 
Kaohsiung, Wang graduated from the Medical School of the Taiwan General Government and 
later operated a private Zhen-qian Clinic in Shantou.174  
Because Dadong was a product of nisshi shinzen ȅǲΛü (Japan−China friendship), 
Shin Huang invited some Chinese to invest in the company, not just Taiwanese. Among these 
Chinese investors, the chief councilor of Shantou City Zi-bin Zheng Ѓńƪ(1887−1944) was 
the most important one. He was born in Chaoyang City in Guangdong Province, and in 1905, the 
18−year−old Zheng went to Siam as a coolie, as many of his hometown were doing. Several 
years later, he operated two pawnshops and a liquor store in Bangkok, and became a rich 
Chinese merchant.175 Because of Zheng’s wealth and power, Shin Huang invited him to invest 
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Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku ēseika, pp. 128−129 (publishing date unknown). 
173 Taiwan sheng xing zheng zhang guan gong shu dang an ͗ʟˮΊǳЗŎ̿ɕȾ (The government office 
files of the chief executive of Taiwan Province), 00306510119011 (June 6, 1946). 
174 Taiwan sōtokufu keimukyoku ēseika ͗ʟ̺˱ƓμÁŧ΍ˌί, Nanshi nanyō ni okeru iryō shisetsu ÓǲÓ
ɽ#2Ѕ˟Σȁ (The medical facilities in southern China and the South Seas), Vol. 1. Taihoku: Taiwan 
sōtokufu keimukyoku ēseika, pp. 128−129 (publishing date unknown); Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuinroku ͗ʟ̺˱Ɠ
͍öЍ (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 130 (1933); p. 134 (1934). 
175 Ying-qiu Zhang ƣȎ̇, “Aiguo qiaoling Zheng zi-bin jiqi zhesi Zheng wu-lou xiansheng” ǇċоЃńƪÞ
! 106!
in the Dadong Ice-making Company. In total, the Chinese stockholders’ investments reached 
10−20% of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s total capital.176   
 To harmonize with Japan’s policy of southward expansion and Japan−China friendship, 
Shin Huang raised funds from both Taiwanese residents of Shantou and local Chinese merchants 
to establish the Dadong Ice-making Company. The total capital outlay for this venture was 
90,000 yuan. The factory was located in Qilu, an area home to many foreign companies and 
institutions. The expected amount of production daily was twenty tons ice.177 
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£÷ĀЃÐɏˌ (Patriot leader of overseas Chinese Zi-bin Zheng and his son Wu-lou Zheng), Hai wai chao ren 
shi lian zhuan ji: Shantou wen shi dai ba ji ʅĩʙaåǽşϡ: ɲпǻå̜ϡ, vol. 8. Shantou: Zhong guo ren 
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пƅľöȡǻåϐǽľöȡ, 1990, , pp. 70−72. 
176 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933).  
177 Tainan shinpō ͗ÓǾğ, no. 10171, evening news 4 (May 15, 1930), evening news 4; Taiwan nichi nichi 
shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933).  
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3.3 The Order of Deportation Incident (òhϨÛVk)  
Because the Dadong Ice-making Company was a product of Japan’s policy of southward 
expansion and of Japan−China friendship, the Japanese consulate should have protected and 
promoted the business venture in Shantou. However, actual events were starkly inconsistent with 
the aforementioned agenda. In the initial stage of the Dadong Ice-making Company’s operation, 
a conflict arose between the Japanese consul in Shantou whose name was Kumakichi Befu ±Ɠ
ʭê and the shareholders of the Dadong Ice-making Company; indeed, the conflict was so 
severe that the company almost failed to open its doors for business. 
   
          
 
 
Fig. 3-2 The Japanese Consulate in Shantou in the 1920s. (Source: Uchida Gorō, Shin Swatō, Taihoku: 
Taiwan sōtokuhu kōnai nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu, 1927. National Taiwan Library.) 
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Fig. 3-3 The Building That Served as Shantou’s Japanese Consulate from 1904 to 1945.  
 
[Illustration] The buililding that served as the Japanese consulate from 1904 to 1945 in Shantou has beem 
preserved and currently is part of the Shantou Entry-Exit Inspection and Quarantine Bureau (ɲп«ģ
ɖэɖ˜ŧ) (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2010.) 
 
In 1929, after Shin Huang had collected enough funding to establish the ice-making 
company, he went to the Japanese consulate in Shantou, requesting a business permit. Consul 
Befu told Shin Huang that the consulate had issued a business permit several years earlier to 
Riichirō Taenaka ĹK²?Ͻ, a Japanese resident in Hong Kong whose intention had also been 
to open an ice-making company in Shantou. Moreover, a Taiwanese man by the name of Tian 
Wang ʾˏ had already been operating the Wutunji ZŬɓ Ice-making Company in Shantou. 
Consul Befu told Shin Huang that “Japanese” should not compete with each other. Thus, Befu 
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suggested that Shin Huang purchase the previously issued business permit from Taenaka at the 
price of 6,000 yuan. After negotiations, a deal was struck for the price of 600 yuan.178  
 In 1930, the construction of the Dadong Company’s ice-making facilities reached 
completion, and operations were ready to begin. Suddenly, consul Befu requested that Shin 
Huang name Taenaka the manager of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Shin Huang refused this 
proposal furiously. From the perspective of Shin Huang and other shareholders in the Dadong 
Ice-making Company, the completed payout of 600 yuan to Taenaka in exchange for his 
business permit was a done deal. Moreover, Taenaka has proven to be a rather inept manger, so 
Dadong has no reason to appoint Taenaka to any kind of managerial position in the Dadong 
Ice-making Company. It seems that the head of the Taiwan Bank’s branch office in Shantou 
attempted to mediate the dispute, specifically suggesting that the Dadong Ice-making Company 
hire Taenaka for three years at a salary of 50 yuan per month. Not surprisingly, Shin Huang 
rejected the suggestion. Consul Befu was indignant at the Dadong Ice-making Company’s 
actions. When the company started operations, Befu made straight for the factory and demanded 
that it shut down immediately. Facing Befu’s arbitrary action, the shareholders of the Dadong 
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178 Tainan shinpō ͗ÓǾğ, no. 10171, evening news 4 (May 15, 1930). 
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Ice-making Company decided to go to the Shantou City Government, registering Dadong as a 
Chinese company. As a company registered with the ROC Government, Befu had no authority to 
stop operations, and the ice-making business maintained its work schedule.179  
Surprisingly, on May 3, 1930, Shin Huang who was in Tainan at the time received a 
telegram from Shantou. The telegram reported that four Taiwanese executive directors of the 
Dadong Ice-making Company, Qi-huei Chen ФɂϠ, Yong-lu Jian ̠ɱ̂, Chang-sheng Chen 
ФЗˌ, and Mu-yi Huang ћȧϺ had earlier been handed an “order of deportation” (ϨÛò
h) from the Japanese consulate in Shantou. Consul Befu argued that these four individuals were 
interfering with the peace of the Japanese community in Shantou and that they, should be 
ordered back to Taiwan. Regarding their details, the deportations affecting these four men varied 
from one to the other. Doctor Yong-lu Jian, the owner of Yamato Hospital (ĬóЅТ), and 
Qi-huei Chen, the owner of the Wanyuan Company (ʹʐɽΊ), were ordered to leave Shantou 
within two months, and were prohibited from returning to Shantou for one year. Chang-sheng 
Chen and Mu-yi Huang, the two previously mentioned teachers from Tainan, were ordered to 
leave Shantou within two weeks and were prohibited from returning to Shantou for two years.  
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179 Tainan shinpō ͗ÓǾğ, no. 10163, evening news 2 (May 7, 1930). 
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These deportations were obviously acts of revenge on the part of Consul Befu. No evidence 
has surfaced suggesting that these four individuals had been “disturbing the local peace.” Doctor 
Yong-lu Jian had resided in Shantou over many years, and was a respected leader in the area’s 
Taiwanese community. Qi-huei Chen, the owner of the Wanyuan Company, was a successful 
businessman who had facilitated trade among Shantou, Taiwan, and the Japanese homeland. 
Furthermore, Mu-Yi Huang and Chang-sheng Chen had been pivotal in getting the Dadong 
Ice-making Company’s operations underway. Befu had made an unjust series of accusations, 
acting on a personal grudge while exerting power in an official capacity.180  
On May 14, 1930, both Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang arrived at Taiwan’ Keelung 
Port within two weeks of having been expelled from Shantou. The incident attracted public 
attention in Taiwan, and on the following day (May 15), Tainan shipō published an interview 
with Chen and Huang. In the first part of the interview, they made the following statement:  
 
          A few days ago, the Japanese Consulate suddenly demanded that we show up there 
for a meeting.[Consul Befu] harshly scolded us and denounced our decision to start 




180 Tainan shinpō ͗ÓǾğ, no. 10171, evening news 4 (May 15, 1930). 
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          been settled. [Consul Befu] wanted us to choose between accepting deportation back 
to Taiwan and closing the factory down. We convened an emergency meeting of the 
Chinese shareholders, and sent out an emergency telegram to shareholders in 
Taiwan. The Chinese shareholders Zi-bin Zheng and Qi-yun Xie were very angry 
with the attitude of the Japanese consul. Having no choice, however, we received 
permission [by telegram] from the shareholders in Taiwan to change the register 
owner from a Taiwanese individual to a Chinese individual.! 181!
 
 
          Υǅȅ¶ȅȪоV̓Šv̝òhyф	η͘ĹK̝]ʇPVɊţȨŌ˗	!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !ʱ̝̖ǰʦϖɊ	Ĭº˞ϊ	ȝηɜòhϨÛǒŝБëžĠ	v̝ǆʩ	!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !̕đëĒІƬŐ	Ϲ³KċaІƬЙ̵ƽȡξ	?йеğ͗ʟPІƬÞ͎M	!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !͇¶ΡKċaІƬЃńƪιɅдɬ	̂ ĬǌǋȅȪоVPǉƔ	ʩV³ĸɢ	!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !ʨãĲu	NеƲ͗ʟ͎MPëǅ	πȝKċaPì̓	!
 
 
This interview shows that the registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company had not been 
Chinese. After all, the Chinese shareholders had accounted for only 10-20% of the total 
investment, so it would generally be unreasonable to register a Chinese individual as the owner 
of the company. However, oppressive actions targeting the Taiwanese shareholders had left them 
no choice but to register—under the name of a Chinese individual—the Dadong Ice-making 





In the latter part of the interview, Chen and Huang offered further insights into the affair: 
  
          The Japanese consul demanded that the two of us as well as Yong-lu Jian, Qi-hui 
Chen, and Fan-shu Chen—five in total—come to the consulate. [Befu] handed Jian 
and the two Chens their deportation orders. They objected, arguing that they three 
were members of the local gentry and that it was extremely unreasonable to demand 
their deportation on received only a yushi taikyo (suspendable order). However, we 
two received formal, legally binding orders of deportation. We objected, but had no 
resources: we had to return to Taiwan by Kōdōmaru [a Japanese steamship].182 
 
 
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !ȅоòhǑ̝Þ̠ɱ̂	ФɂϠ	ФͽͿ̝Zɬyф	Eήu̝˃ː	! ! !
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !×]fϨÛòhȞ̠͘Фēʦ˙Ḙ̄ĥ	͇iȀŋř̋ƏĺŒPì!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !òhϨÛ	iEé˃͇ǞξP	̰ŧWɬiδ˻ϨÛ͇Ʋʹυ	v!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !̝iɺƮʦĜ	ƞòhϨŨ	v̝Ю͘Ǟξ	±ʨǵȱ	ϯР{͞!
! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! ! !ƚȭLɥ͗XX	!
 
 
The interview confirms that, on this occasion, but five people visited the Japanese consulate, 
including Fan-shu Chen who—like Qi-hui Chen—was a representative of Wanyuan 
Company.183 Befu had issued orders of deportation to five people and they all had objected. In 
response to the objections, Befu partly conceded by issuing two different kinds of orders. On the 
one hand, Doctor Jian and the two Chens of the Wanyuan Company received comparatively light 
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182 Ibid. 
183 Kamesaburō Anjū ŋІSBϽ, Swatō shōfu ɲпùĚ (Shantou treaty port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan 
shibu, 1922, p. 105. 
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orders of deportation that could be suspended at a future date. On the other hand, Chang-sheng 
Chen and Mu-yi Huang received formal orders of deportation. The two kinds of orders reflected 
the different degree of involvement of these five people in Shantou. Jian and the two Chens of 
the Wanyuan Company were much more involved in Shantou than were Chang-sheng and Mu-yi. 
Mu-yi Huang had come to Shantou only in 1927, after Shin Huang had invited him to work at 
the Dadong Ice-making Company.   
   Facing Befu’s oppressive vindictiveness, Shin Huang decided to fight back. We should not 
forget that Shin Huang was a powerful entrepreneur and politician in Taiwan. He exercised 
political relationships and personal networks asking for assistance. First, he asked Chief of 
Police Ishii ˳[ and Director-general Gotō Fumio Ư΂ǻį (1884-1980), both in the Taiwan 
General Government, to negotiate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan for a 
cancellation of the orders of deportation. Second, he visited Chief Officer Ishii of the Taiwan 
General Government’s Hygiene Section and Chief Officer Yamauchi ŭ of the Taiwan 
General Government’s Safety Section for their support of a petition. Third, he employed a 
lawyer to submit an administrative petition to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Fourth, 
because Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi Huang were Tainan residents, Shin Huang submitted a 
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petition to the Mayor Nagayama ɱŭ of Tainan Prefecture, asking for a cancellation of the 
orders of deportation. Shin Huang decided that if the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan would 
not solve this problem to his satisfication, he would politicize the issue. He suggested that it was 
even worth exhausting the Dadong Ice-making Company’s funds to pursue justice in this 
matter.184 
Three months passed and the problem had yet to be settled. On August 30, 1930, a news 
report in Taiwan shinminpō stated that the Taiwan General Government was sorry for Consul 
Befu’s brusk actions, and that it had tried to negotiate with Befu in pursuit of a cancellation of 
the deportation orders. However, Consul Befu had ignored the Taiwan General Government’s 
request and the negotiations had gone nowhere.185 
The news report identified a political ambivalence between the Taiwan General 
Government and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Consul Befu answered to the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and only the higher authority of gaimushō (Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Japan) could result in a cancellation of his orders. If gaimushō kept silent on the matter, 
the Taiwan General Government would be powerless even to modify the orders. 
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184 Taiwan shinminpō ͗ʟǾɭğ, no. 312 (May 10, 1930).    
185 Taiwan shinminpō ͗ʟǾɭğ, no. 328 (August 30, 1930). 
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The orders of deportation greatly annoyed Chang-sheng Chen. He had resided in Shantou 
with his wife since 1921, after the Taiwan General Government had assigned the couples to 
teaching positions at Tōē School. Later, he had resigned from his teaching job to become a 
businessman. In addition to his investments in the Dadong Ice-making Company, Chang-sheng 
Chen’s business ventures included the construction of the Dapu Bridge (ĬėĬɒ) in Chenghai 
County (ʚʅ̹), an area near Shantou. The price of the construction of Dapu Bridge reached 
120,000 yuan. By May 1930, 90% of the bridge’s construction was complete. However, because 
of Befu’s order of deportation, Chen was forced to leave Shantou, bringing the construction to a 
standstill. On July 6, a flood occurred in Chenghai County, and the existing bridge construction 
suffered serious damage. The Bureau of Construction of Guangdong Province assigned 
commissioners to investigate the damage to the bridge and asked Chen to come back and 
supervise the continuation of the construction. It was assumed that if Chen could not come back 
to Chenghai as soon as possible, the oversight of the construction would probably transfer to 
other parties. Chen was deeply concerned about this turn of events because he had already 
invested a great amount of money in the construction and could not easily sustain a complete 
loss.  
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In response to this situation, Chang-sheng Chen went to the Tainan Prefecture Government, 
asking for a temporary travel permit to Shantou. The Tainan Prefecture Government 
sympathized with Chen’s position and was willing to issue a temporary travel permit. However, 
the Taiwan General Government took a different stance, contending that issuance of the travel 
permit depended on Consul Befu’s approval. Not surprisingly, Befu did not reply to the Taiwan 
General Government’s request for his approval, and thus, the temporary travel permit was not 
issued. Adding to his woes were letters that Chang-sheng Chen received from his family in 
Shantou, informing him that some relatives were ill. The bad news convinced Chen that he had 
to smuggle himself back into Shantou. In mid-September of 1930, Chen secretly took a 
steamship to Moji Иç in Kyushu, Japan and then proceeded to Shanghai, finally arriving in 
Shantou. Afraid of being deported by Consul Befu, Chen stayed in Chaozhou, an inland city near 
Shantou. However, not long thereafter, Befu received information of Chen’s arrival and set about 
to deport him once again. Chen could no longer tolerate these oppressive tactics from the 
Japanese consulate anymore, and he made a firm decision: he would abandon his Japanese 
nationality. In January 1931, Chen submitted an application to the Minister of Domestic Affairs 
of the ROC government to register as a Chinese citizen. In April, Chen formally acquired 
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national citizenship with the ROC and, meanwhile, renounced his Japanese nationality. From 
then on, Chang-sheng Chen operated the Dadong Ice-making Company as a “Chinese” 
shareholder, free from the constraints of the Japanese consulate.186  
Chang-sheng Chen’s change of nationality, from Japanese to Chinese attracted public 
attention in Taiwan. On June 27, 1931, a news report in Taiwan shiminpō declared, “The 
Shantou Dadong Ice-making Company’s executive director Chen renounced his Japanese 
nationality to carry on in the position. The renunciation stemmed from the Japanese consulate’s 
oppressive actions toward Chen, who was left with no other choice. Where happened to the 
southern development to be undertaken by the Taiwan authority?” The last part of the news 
report stated the problem in the form of a question:  
           
          How did the Taiwan authority, which constantly advocates development  
          in southern China and the South Seas, perceive this problem? The authority  
          has spent immense sums of money every year on the pretense of subsidizing  
          development in southern China and the South Seas. However, the fact of the  
          matter is that people’s suspicions are targeting just how sincere the authority  
          really is. Therefore, from now on, we hope that the Taiwan authority acts with  
          the utmost sincerity and generosity, advising the Japanese consulates in China  
          never again to make a similar mistake.187  
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186 Taiwan shinminpō ͗ʟǾɭğ, no. 328 (August 30, 1930); no. 370 (June 27, 1931). 
187 Taiwan shinminpō ͗ʟǾɭğ, no. 370 (June 27, 1931). 
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It would seem that there was considerable public criticism of Taiwan General Government’s 
weak position in dealing with the problem between Consul Befu and the Dadong Ice-making 
Company. The passive attitudes of the Taiwan General Government prompted Chang-sheng 
Chen to denounce his Japanese nationality and become a “Chinese” citizen. A popular feeling, as 
expressed in the above quote, was that the Taiwan authority truly wanted to develop southern 














Fig. 3-4 News Report on Tainan Shinpō. 
 
[Illustration] The news report criticized the order of deportation issued by Shantou’s Japanese consulate 
forcing Taiwanese in Shantou return to Taiwan. (Source: Tainan shinpō, evening wews, May 7, 1930 and 





Fig. 3-5 News Report on Taiwan Shinminpō. 
 
[Illustration] A news report stating that Cheng-sheng Chen’s renunciation of his Japanese nationality 
stemmed from the Shantou Japanese consulate’s oppressive actions toward Chen. (Source: Taiwan 
shinminpō, June 27, 1931.) 
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3.4 The Conflict between Taiwanese and Chinese Shareholders  
A product of Japan−China friendship, the Dadong Ice-making Company benefited from the 
co-investment of by both Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders, with the former accounting for 
80−90% of the funds and the latter accounting for 10−20% of the funds. In the initial stage of 
operations, interference by the Japanese Consul Befu prompted the registered owner of the 
company to change his national status from Japanese to Chinese. Thereafter, the Dadong 
Company did good business, divvying up profits among the Chinese and Taiwanese shareholders. 
However, with the outbreak of the Shanghai Incident on January 28, 1932, anti-Japanese 
sentiment gripped all of China, and Shantou was no exception. Under this circumstance, the 
position of Taiwanese who were Japanese subjects became nearly untenable, and more 
specifically, conflicts between the Dadong Ice-making Company’s Taiwanese and Chinese 
shareholders became more frequent and more intense. The Chinese shareholder Zi-bin Zheng 
decided to drive out Taiwanese shareholders and to monopolize the company by taking 
advantage of the severe anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou. Early on in this struggle for 
control, Taiwanese shareholders endured the maneuverings of Zheng out of the fear that their 
status as Japanese subjects might put them at risk of even worse outcomes. However, Zheng’s 
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actions became so severe that the Taiwanese found it impossible to continue enduring the 
ruthless plotting. In early April of 1933, under Taiwanese shareholders’ request, Shin Huang 
came to Shantou to supervise the business of the Dadong Ice-making Company and especially to 
investigat Zi-bin Zheng’s action. He exposed the conspiracy of Zi-bin Zheng and other Chinese 
individuals who, associated with the company, sought to monopolize their control over it. It was 
a difficult problem to deal with because Zi-bin was the registered owner of Dadong and the 
anti-Japanese atmosphere was very intense in Shantou then. Aware of these diverse factors, Shin 
Huang only fired the Chinese staff who had colluded with Zi-bin. As for Zi-bin, Shin Huang 
decided to increase his share of the profits, thus not only satisfying his personal quest for wealth 
but also removing key reasons for his initial plotting, or so it would seem.188 
In truth, Shin Huang’s pacification policy did not work as intended. Zi-bin Zheng again 
colluded with the fired Chinese staff to gain control over the Dadong Ice-making Company. Shin 
Huang grew aware of this second round of plotting and requested that Chief Chen, who headed 
the Investigation−&−Detention Team at the Shantou City Government’s Bureau of Public Safety, 
negotiate with Zheng; however, this effort came to nothing. Meanwhile, Zi-bin published an 
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188 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 11882, evening news 4 (May 6, 1933). 
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announcement in Shanbao ɲğ and Qiaoshengbao ͌ğ, two major local newspapers in 
Shantou, proclaiming himself the general manager of the company and declaring that the 
property of the Dadong Ice-making Company should belong to him (and by extension, to the 
Chinese) rather than to the Taiwanese, who were willing subjects of Japanese imperialism. He 
attempted to channel public anti-Japanese emotion by manipulating local Chinese newspapers.189  
Facing Zheng’s second wave of maneuvering, Taiwanese shareholders decided to fight back 
to protect the company. Right around the corner was the summer season, which was the Dadong 
Ice-making Company’s most profitable period; moreover, the company’s property was valued at 
approximately 160,000 yuan, of which only 4,000 yuan came from Chinese investors. Taiwanese 
shareholders, hoping to retain their majority control over these current and future assets, took 
two steps. First, they published an announcement in local newspapers, clarifying that most of the 
Dadong Ice-making Company’s shares belonged to Taiwanese shareholders. Second, they 
registered the Dadong Ice-making Company with the Japanese Consulate in Shantou. Thus, as a 
Japanese company, the Dadong Ice-making Company could receive protection from Japan. In 




May 2 and 6), discussing with Taiwan−based shareholders how they could best settle this 
matter.190 
During Shin Huang’s return to Taiwan, Taiwanese shareholders in Shantou negotiated with 
Zi-bin Zheng and his “Chinese” partner Chang-sheng Chen, the former Taiwanese executive 
director of the Dadong Ice-making Company who had renounced his Japanese nationality in 
1931 in order to avoid Consul Befu’s obstructions. Zheng and Chen proposed multiple 
conditions, including the dismissal of the board of directors and the appointment of Zi-bin Zheng 
as general manager and Chang-sheng Chen as general supervisor. They further proposed that 
they should sell their own shares to Taiwanese shareholders at the price of 190 yuan per share 
(original price: 100 yuan), and meanwhile, Zheng and Chen should be able to buy shares from 
other shareholders at price of 80 yuan (original price: 100 yuan). All these conditions were 
unreasonable to and rejected by the Taiwanese shareholders.191 
Zi-ben Zheng and Chang-sheng Chen took further action. They forced the Shantou 
Ice-making Company (ɲпΔ©ƙ) to terminate its “co-sell contract” (¡ëψϒĵ̨) with the 
Dadong Ice-making Company. Being the only two ice-making companies in Shantou, they had 
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perceived the competition between them as disadvantageous to each company. Thus, under 
negotiations, the two companies had entered into a co-sell contract to share the profits equally. 
When the dispute between the Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders arose, Zi-bin Zheng, being 
the registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making Company, withdrew 2,000 yuan from the Co-sell 
Office without other shareholders’ consent. He further requested that the Co-sell Office regard 
him as the only legal representative of the Dadong Ice-making Company. Once aware of these 
events, Shin Huang and other Taiwanese shareholders went to the Co-sell Office to stop the 
withdrawal of money undertaken by Zi-ben Zheng. The Co-sell Office was annoyed with all of 
these back-and-forth-maneuvers and decided not to hand out money to each side until a solid 
resolution to the dispute was reached.  
Later, Zheng and Chang-sheng Chen forced the Co-sell Office to accept a plan: on May 1, 
1933, the side able to deliver ice would be the only legal representative of the Dadong 
Ice-making Company and would, thus, have the right to acquire 10,000 yuan from the Co-sell 
Office. Zheng and Chen provided this condition because they controlled the company’s Chinese 
drivers and workers and was confident that they could win over Shin Huang. Under this situation, 
Taiwanese shareholders held an emergency meeting in Yamato Hospital. Then, with the 
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assistance of the President Takahayashi яȯ of the Association of Japanese Residents in 
Shantou, Consul Tonegi Ǘȼȧ of the Japanese consulate in Shantou, and Chief Iwada Űˏ 
of the Japanese Police Force in Shantou, Taiwanese shareholders visited the Shantou City 
Government’s Bureau of Public Safety, asking for Chinese officials’ assistance. On May 1 (the 
day the competition for supremacy at the company was to have been decided) and on May 2, 
both Japanese consulate officials and armed Chinese police officers closed and garrisoned the 
Dadong Ice-making Company. On May 3, the company factory re-opened as usual.192    
Zheng and Chen, despite the setbacks, did not give up their goal of monopolizing the 
Dadong Ice-making Company. This time, they manipulated specific anti-Japan associations  
(Ǟȅȡ) to disrupt the company’s operations, and even employed lawyers to harass the 
company’s Taiwanese shareholders. Moreover, Zheng and Chen pushed the Shantou City 
Government’s Bureau of Sanitation to check the sanitation at the company’s facilities. It seems 
that the investigators found no evidence of wrongdoing, but on May 20, 1933, local newspapers 
published several unfavorable articles with such titles as “The Dadong Ice-making Company’s 




Bans Sales of Dadong Ice, and Will Crack Down on Buyers.” The news reports prompted many 
customers to stop purchasing ice from the Dadong Ice-making Company, and the slowdown 
forced operations to terminate for several days. Zi-bin Zheng’s disruptive tactics convinced 
Taiwanese shareholders to dismiss Zheng from his position, and the registered owner of the 
Dadong Ice-making Company was changed to Bao-zhi Luo щ͵͠, the head of the Chinese 
Association in Tainan. The Shantou City Government approved the new personnel change on 
June 7, 1933.193 At this point, Zheng was formally expelled from the Dadong Ice-making 
Company. 
Why did Bao-zhi Luo choose to be the new registered owner of the Dadong Ice-making 
Company? Luo was Chinese, born in Guangdong Province in 1880. Later, he moved to Tainan 
and operated a company called Shunji мΡ, conducting medical business between Taiwan and 
China.194 In March 1926, he established the Chinese Association in Tainan and was elected to 
the position of chairman. Tainan was an important city in colonial Taiwan, and by 1926, the 
members of the Chinese Association in Tainan reached eighty, as many member as could be 
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found in the Chinese Association in Taipei.195 As the leader of Tainan’s sojourning Chinese, 
Luo was active in the city. Luo’s close relationships with Taiwanese made Shin Huang and other 
Taiwanese shareholders regard him as an adequate choice for the position of registered owner of 
the Dadong Ice-making Company. According to one news report on the personnel change, “Luo 
has been a shareholder in the Dadong Ice-making Company. He has lived in Taiwan for a long 
time and has earned the trust of every shareholder. The obstacles recently afflicting company 
operations have been overcome, and prospects are good for strong business growth in the 
future.”196 
The problem with Zi-bin Zheng was settled. How about the problem with Chang-sheng 
Chen? A news report suggested that the dispute between Chen and Dadong had finally been 
settled by February 1937. According to this report, Shin Huang and other Taiwanese 
shareholders had held a meeting in Tainan, discussing the lawsuit between Chang-sheng Chen 
and the Dadong Ice-making Company. Chen had long been strongly opposed to the company, 
accusing it of wrongdoing several times. Finally, with the assistance and conciliatory 
dispositions of both Bing-shen Hu ͐H˒ and Bao-zong Chen Ф~ō, Dadong bought back 
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(March 16, 1926). 
196 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 11917, evening news 4 (June 10, 1933). 
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all the company’s shares from Chen and the longstanding dispute was settled.197 Like 
Chang-sheng Chen, both Bing-shen Hu and Bao-zong Chen were graduates of the Taiwan 
General Government’s Japanese Language School (ĉάňȺ). Bao-zong Chen and 
Chang-sheng Chen had been in the same class, and Bing-shen Hu had been in a class several 
years up.198 Probably the friendship among these three men facilitated Shin Huang’s request that 
Bing-shen and Bao-zong help mediate the dispute between the Dadong Ice-making Company 
and Chang-sheng Chen. 
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Taiwan General Government), p. 255 (1913); pp. 309, 311 (1918).  
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Fig. 3-6 News Report on the Chinese Version of the Taiwan Nichi Nichi Shinpō. 
 
[Illustration] This news report states that the Taiwanese shareholders of the Dadong Ice-making Company 
were risking significant losses stemming from Shantou’s severe anti-Japanese atmosphere. (Source: 
Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō, Chinese version, May 6, 1933.) 
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3.5 Brief Conclusion 
Over its history, the Dadong Ice-making Company faced at least two big crises: the first big 
crisis was brought on by the obstructionist actions of Consul Befu, and the second one took place 
in the severely anti-Japanese atmosphere of Shantou, where the Chinese businessman Zi-bin 
Zheng attempted to expel Taiwanese shareholders from the Dadong Ice-making Company. The 
company passed through these crises safely and business grew prosperous. In 1936, the company 
expanded to Chaozhou, a nearby city where they bought Chaozhou’s Huiqun Ice-making 
Company (ǃ͂©ƙ) and renamed it the Chaoan Ice-making Company (ʙŋ©ƙ).199 
With the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, the Dadong Ice-making 
Company was forced to close. Its facilities were severely damaged during the fighting, and on 
June 21, 1939, Japanese forces formal occupied Shantou; thereafter, the Japanese authority in 
Shantou made efforts to reestablish the Dadong Ice-making Company. On July 5, 1939, the 
headquarters of the East Guangdong Expeditionary Army (̣ȭʁϵϝ) granted the Dadong 
Ice-making Company a permit for establishing factory facilities in the area. On July 16, 1939, 
Shin Huang and shareholders in Taiwan held a meeting in Tainan. Shin Huang reported on the 
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199 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 13072, daily news 8 (August, 17, 1936); no. 13095, evening news 
4 (September 9, 1936). 
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situation in Shantou, to which he had paid a recent visit after the Japanese occupation, and he 
suggested a plan for revival, including collecting funds for immediate purchase of machines to 
deal with the summer season’s high demand.200 With Shin Huang’s efforts and the assistance of 
the Japanese authority in Shantou, the Dadong Ice-making Company reopened and operated 
smoothly during the Japanese occupation of the city. 
The story of the Dadong Ice-making Company brings to light several interesting issues. First, 
although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects, it was not necessarily the case that Japanese 
authorities overseas would protect these Taiwanese. On some occasions, the Japanese authority 
was the origin of conflicts and obstacles besetting Taiwanese interests in China. Consul Befu 
exemplifies this pattern. As the preeminent representative of Japanese authority in Shantou, he 
chose to not to protect Dadong’s interests and, indeed, exerted his power to expel Taiwanese 
shareholders from China. Acting on a personal vendetta, he even tried to terminate the Dadong 
Ice-making Company’s operations. 
A second interesting issue brought to light here is the fact that the Dadong Ice-making 
Company exposed the discord between the Taiwan General Government and the Japanese 
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200 Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 14131, daily news 5 (July 19, 1939). 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When Shin Huang and later, Chang-sheng Chen asked officials of 
the Taiwan General Government for help, the officials sympathized with the Taiwanese’ 
situation and attempted to negotiate with the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, the 
Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs did not react to the request from the Taiwan General 
Government for a cancellation of the deportation orders targeting Chang-sheng Chen and Mu-yi 
Huang. It seems that the two institutions lacked a mechanism of coordination.  
Third, the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company emphasizes the important role that 
nationality played in conducting business in Chinese treaty ports, in this case, the treaty port of 
Shantou. In the initial stage of the company’s operations, Consul Befu’s oppressive actions 
resulted in the Dadong Ice-making Company’s decision to register as a Chinese company by 
taking Zi-bin Zheng as its registered owner. Later, in 1933, Zi-bin Zheng’s own strategic 
maneuvering led the company to register with the Japanese consulate in Shantou as a Japanese 
company, which afforded the company a degree of Japanese protection. In other words, both 
Japanese and Chinese nationals protected the Dadong Ice-making Company’s interests at 
different times. By way of example, Chang-sheng Chen renounced his Japanese nationality and 
registered as Chinese to avoid the stream of obstacles erected by Consul Befu. In Chang-sheng 
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Chen’s case, his Chinese nationality protected his interests in Shantou. Both the Dadong 
Ice-making Company and Chang-sheng Chen exemplify the importance of nationality to 
Taiwanese interests in Shantou.  
Fourth, the dispute between Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders in 1933 manifested the 
ambivalence of Taiwanese who lived in China. Taiwanese who lived in Shantou had similar 
languages, ethnic backgrounds, and customs, and cooperated with local Chinese in business and 
in local civic matters. However, the situation of Taiwanese was strongly influenced by the local 
atmosphere, that is, by anti-Japanese sentiment. Compared with Xiamen (Amoy) and Fuzhou, the 
other two treaty ports in southern China, Shantou had been famous for its anti-foreign 
atmosphere, especially when it came to Japan. When anti-Japan movements were active in 
Shantou, Taiwanese found themselves personally in very real danger as their business would 
often experience significant losses. Therefore, how Taiwanese sojourners in Shantou protected 
themselves and their interests in an atmosphere of pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment is an 
issue of great importance here. 
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Fig. 3-8 Taiwan Zuo Xiang äʟſƄ  (Taiwan Left Lane). 
[Illustraiton] Shantou city still uses the names “Taiwan Left Lane” and “Taiwan Right Lane” in the old 
city area. The two lanes were located at the intersection of Wai ma lu ĩшϚ (Wai Road) and Guo-ping 
lu ċƊϚ (Guo-ping Road). The names of these two lanes suggest that this area was a central site where 
Taiwanese sekimin lived and conducted business in Shantou during the Japanese colonial period in 
Taiwan. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.) 
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Chapter 4: The Educational Network Encompassing the Japanese Homeland, 
Colonial Taiwan, and the Shantou Treaty Portthe Tōē School in Shantou 
 
4.1 Prelude 
Focusing on the Tōē School in Shantou, this chapter explores the transnational network 
characterizing the relationships among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty 
port of Shantou. The word ‘tōē’ ȭʝ literarily means “the sea in the East,” and has long been 
an alternative name for Japan. In this sense, the Tōē School means “the school of Japan.” In 1914, 
the Japanese Association in Shantou submitted a petition to the Taiwan General Government, 
requesting that it establish Japanese educational institutions in Shantou. In the next year, in 1915, 
with the assistance of the Taiwan General Government, the Japanese Association in Shantou 
established two schools: the Japanese Elementary School and the Tōē gakkō (the Tōē School) in 
Shantou. The former accommodated children of Japanese residents in Shantou with a clear 
purpose of providing Japanese-style education to the Japanese children while the latter 
accommodated both children of Taiwanese residents in Shantou and local Chinese children. 
Through this offering of Japanese-style education to Taiwanese and Chinese children, Japan 
aimed both to cultivate Taiwanese colonial subjects’ loyalty to the Japanese empire by granting 
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them its academic privileges and to enlarge Japan’s influence in Shantou by immersing Chinese 
students in all things Japanese, including the Japanese language. In other words, the 
establishment of the Tōē School was closely related to both colonial consciousness and Japan’s 
ambitions for expansion in China.  
In this chapter, I will explore two aspects of the Tōē School in Shantou: (1) the “network of 
human resources,” regarding which I will discuss some Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom 
the Taiwan General Government assigned to the Tōē School in Shantou; and (2) the “network of 
words,” regarding which I will analyze teachers’ travel writings and reports published in colonial 
Taiwanese periodicals, including Taiwan kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏ (Taiwan Education). By analyzing 
their words, I will explore these teachers’ perceptions of the educational affairs in Shantou, and 
specifically the perceptions of European- and American-funded schools in the city. In sum, from 
both the network of human resources and the network of words in this particular setting, we will 
see how an educational network established itself among the Japanese homeland, colonial 
Taiwan, and the Chinese treaty port of Shantou. 
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4.2 The Establishment of the Tōē School in Shantou and Its Contributors  
The establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School was closely related to Japan’s southward policy 
(ÓϮ, nanshin). Japan developed the southward policy in the early Taishō period (1912-1926), 
which thus historically was called “Taishō nanshin ki” ĬɡÓϮȦ (the Taishō southward 
period). Taiwan was Japan’s most important outpost of the southward movement, and Japan’s 
Taiwan General Government established companies like the Sango Company (BZç) and 
the Taiwan Takushoku Company (͗ʟǠɨ), whose function was to pursue development in 
southern China and the South Seas. Japan aimed to enlarge its influences in the south by means 
of economic expansion. In addition to economic penetration, Japan’s southward policy sought to 
establish cultural facilities in the south. And in association with the increasing number of both 
Japanese and Taiwanese residents in southern China during the Taishō period, the Taiwan 
General Government established schools in Chinese treaty ports. Among these schools were 
schools serving the needs of young Japanese residents and schools for Taiwanese sekimin 
residents. By establishing these schools, the Taiwan General Government aimed to strengthen 
the relationship between Taiwan and southern China.  
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Before the establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School, two other schools in southern China had 
been accommodating Taiwanese sekimin: Amoy’s Tōa shoin ȭ\ȞТ (the Tōa Academy)201 
and Fuzhou’s Tōē gakudō ȭʝŉĝ (the Tōē School).202 Two members of the Taiwan General 
Government were crucial in pushing for the establishment of Shantou’s Tōē School: Hankichi 
Kumamoto ШȪ̻ê, who was the chief of School Affairs Ministry (ňÁϾЗ), and 
Yoshikichi Uchida ˏāê (1866−1933), who was the chief of Civil Administration  
(ɭǳЗŎ) and later became the ninth Taiwan General Governor.  
Kumamoto was born in Fukuoka, Japan. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, 
he worked at Japan’s Department of Education (ǻϾˮ, monbushō). In 1908, Kumamoto went 
to work for the Korean General Government, and during his stay in Korea, he devoted himself to 
popularizing the Japanese language on the peninsula. In March 1911, he was assigned to a 
position in the Taiwan General Government, where he was responsible for educational affairs. 
During his term in office, Kumamoto earned the trust of the Civil Administration chief, 
Yoshikichi Uchida ˏāê, who was enthusiastic about the southern expedition. Uchida was 
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201 Tōa shoin ȭ\ȞТ was established in 1899. Later, in 1910, it changed its name to Kyōē shoin ȉʝȞТ and 
was run by Amoy’s Taiwanese Association.  
202 Fuzhou’s Tōēi gakudō ȭʝŉĝ was established in 1908. Later, in 1915, it changed its name to Tōēi gakkō 
and was run by Fuzhou’s Taiwanese Association. 
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born in Tokyo, Japan. After graduating from Tokyo Imperial University, he served as the chief of 
Civil Administration in Taiwan from August 1910 to October 1915.203 Uchida then became a 
crucial assistant to Taiwan’s sixth General Governor, Sadayoshi Andō ŋȭφ́ (1853−1932), 
who governed Taiwan between May 1915 and June 1918 and who worked to implement the 
southward policy. Uchida was deeply concerned about southern China’s Japanese-funded 
educational institutions, and under his assignment, Kumamoto paid an inspection visit to 
southern China, including Fuzhou, Amoy, Shantou, and Hong Kong during the period between 
December 11, 1912 and January 8, 1913. While staying in Shantou, Kumamoto visited 
Chinese-funded schools as Zhong deng shang ye xui xiao K̝ùɊŉȺ (the secondary 
commercial school) and British-funded Presbyterian boys’ school as Anglo Chinese College (ͥ
ͲŉТ). He met members of Shantou’s Japanese consulate and of Shantou’s Japanese Residents 
Association, and discussed the possibility of establishing schools to accommodate the children of 
Shantou’s Japanese and Taiwanese sekimin residents.204  
With the support of Kumamoto, Etsuji Yanagi ȶǀ͈, who headed the Japanese 
Association of Shantou, persuaded Shantou’s Taiwanese residents to donate money for 
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203 Pei-feng Chen Фěσ, Encyclopedia of Taiwan (http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=5751) 
204 Takashi Nakamura , Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan ȅȪ$ÓǿЛF!͗ʟ (Japan’s concern 
about the south and Taiwan). Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988, pp. 120−121. 
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establishing a Taiwanese-oriented school in the city and successfully collected 700 USD. 
Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association donated 100 USD, and thus 800 USD were in hand. 
Having solved the school-funding problem, Yanagi and others dealt with related issues, 
including naming the school ‘Tōē,’ renting a local house for the schooling to take place in, and 
hiring a Chinese teacher.205 
In February 1914, Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association submitted a petition to Taiwan 
General Governor Yoshikichi Uchidaˏāê through Shantou’s Japanese consul deputy 
Nobu Kasai ɷΕ, asking for the Taiwan General Government to assign a teacher to the new 
established Shantou’s Tōē School. The petition first declared that there was no local 
Taiwanese-oriented school serving the school-age children of Taiwanese residents in Shantou; 
thus, Taiwanese parents either would send their children to Chinese schools or, if money was 
readily available, would hire Chinese tutors for home schooling. Both of these choices centered 
on Chinese-style education, which the petitioners considered inadequate for cultivating the 
character of prospective imperial subjects.206 In other words, the reason for Japan’s 
establishment of a Taiwanese-oriented school in Shantou was closely related to Japan’s colonial 
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205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid; Taiwan Sōtokufu kōbun ruisan ͗ʟ̺˱Ɠǻс̽ (The collection of official documents of Taiwan 
General Government), vol. 61, no. 16 (February 6, 1915). 
! 143!
perspectives regarding the cultivation of Taiwanese subjects’ loyalty to the Japanese empire. The 
abovementioned analysis may reflect Patricia Tsurumi’s study, which examines the Taiwan 
General Government’s educational policies and the teaching materials of public schools in 
Taiwan, and which argues that Japan’s main purpose for installing a system of education in 
Taiwan was not to develop academic studies but to transform Taiwanese into docile followers of 
Japanese governance.207 
Further, the petition declared that with the assistance of Kumamoto, who was the chief of 
the Taiwan General Government’s School Affairs Ministry, and Yangi, who was the chief of 
Shantou’s Japanese Association, the Tōē School had finally opened its door to students in early 
February of 1915, and thus the school had an immediate need for the Taiwan General 
Government to assign Japanese or Taiwanese teachers to the school. In response to the petition, 
several days later, the Taiwan General Government decided to assign Shizuo Muraoka  
Ȭůϓį and his wife, Sen, to the new Tōē School located in the city’s Qilu ˸˷ area.208 It 
was at this point that the educational network comprising Japan, Taiwan, and Shantou formally 
got underway. 
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Shantou’s Tōē school accommodated two kinds of students: Taiwanese students and local 
Chinese students. For the former subjects, Japan aimed to provide them with a Japanese-style 
education to cultivate loyal subjects of the Japanese empire; for the latter subjects, the Taiwan 
General Government presumed that the Chinese students who attended Shantou’s Tōē School 
and who learned Japanese would become pro-Japan in their outlook. In other words, the function 
of Shantou’s Tōē School addressed not only the imperial responsibilities of Taiwanese residents 
there but also nishi shinzen ȅǲΛü (Japan-China friendship). Japan regarded its schools and 
hospitals in China as “cultural institutions” that could strengthen this Sino-Japanese friendship, 
chiefly by winning over the minds and hearts of Chinese people. Imperial Japan’s project of 
enlarging Japanese influence in China through the establishment of Japan-approved education 
for Chinese was influenced by similar projects undertaken by Western powers.  
After Shantou opened as a treaty port, the British and the Americans established 
Shantou-based Christian schools accommodating Chinese students. Japan entered Shantou much 
later than these Western powers and, in many ways, imitated them. The nominal founders and 
managers of Tōē School and the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou were members of 
Shantou’s Japanese Residents Association, but it was the Taiwan General Government that 
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provided most of the assistance and direction, including assigning teachers to these schools and 
financing them.209  
The first principal of the school, Shizuo Muraoka Ȭůϓį (1872−1919), was born in 
Gunma Prefecture in Japan. He graduated from the Taiwan General Government’s Japanese 
Language School (ĉάňȺ) in 1898 and, later that year, joined the staff at Kokugo denshūjō 
ĉάö́Ǚ (Japanese Short Course)210 in Yilan, Taiwan. In October 1898, he received a 
teaching license for public schools,211 permitting him to teach at public schools accommodating 
Taiwanese students. From 1905 to 1914, he taught at several public schools, including Touwei 
пČ and Luodong ̀ȭ in the Yilan area of Taiwan. Because of Muraoka’s prestige as a 
teacher, in 1915, the Taiwan General Government assigned him to be the first principal of 
Shantou’s Tōē School. His wife, Sen, was assigned to teach at the Japanese Elementary School 
in the same cityshe had previously been teaching at public schools in the Yilan area.212  
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209 For example, Tōē School’s annual operating expenses totaled 4,500 fu *. Of this amount, approximately 600 fu 
were covered by the Japanese Residents Association, 400 fu was from tuition-based revenue, and the Taiwan 
General Government covered 3,500 fu. Kinosuke Ishii ˳[ýP», “Swatō no ichinen (3),” ɲп$?Ƌ 3 (One 
year in Shantou, part three), Taiwan kyōiku, no. 292, p. 53 (October 1, 1926). 
210 In 1896, the Taiwan General Government established fourteen Kokugo denshūjō (Japanese Short Course) for 
propagating the Japanese language around Taiwan. 
211 During the Japanese colonial period, Taiwanese children went to kōgakkō (public schools) while Japanese 
children in Taiwan went to shōgakkō (primary schools). 
212 Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku ͗ʟ̺˱Ɠ͍öЍ (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 




The Muraoka couple, as the first Japanese teachers to Shantou, contributed greatly to the 
establishment of Shantou’s Japanese educational institutions. And specifically, as the first 
principal of Tōē School, Muraoka worked tirelessly in his position. At first, he and other staff 
would hold classes at local people’s houses in the Qilu area, where the attending students 
numbered only about twenty. In 1917, Muraoka opened new classes on Shantou’s Fu-an Street 
(̄ŋΌ), resulting in growing enrollment of students. In the same year, the Taiwan General 
Government granted the school significant funds for the purchase of land and for the 
construction of a new building, and Muraoka was the main supervisor of this project. During the 
construction phase, there were several setbacks from natural and human disasters, including a 
tremendous earthquake in February 1918, a storm in June 1918, and the Constitutional Protection 
War (1917−1922).213 After the earthquake, Muraoka sent an update report entitled “Shantou 
Earthquake Report” to the Taiwan General Government, reporting the damage to the school. 
This report was published in Taiwan kyōiku, the most important periodical about education in 
colonial Taiwan.214 In 1918, during the Constitutional Protection War, Taiwan kyōiku published 
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213 The Constitutional Protection War was a series of military conflicts between Sun Yat-sen’s forces and the 
Beiyang Government between 1917 and 1922. 
214 Shizuo Muraoka Ȭůϓį, “Swatō shinsai hōkoku” ɲпзʢğð (A report on a disastrous earthquake in 
Shantou), Taiwan kyōiku, no. 189, p. 72 (March 1, 1918). 
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Muraoka’s article “Swatō tsūshin” (News from Shantou), mentioning that with the geographical 
shift in fighting to Amoy, the markets in Shantou were stabilizing and the attendance of students 
was getting back to usual.215 In June 1919, Muraoka died from cholera. The Japanese 
government named him a recipient of the Order of the Sacred Treasure for his contributions in 
education.216 
After Muraoka’s death, the Taiwan General Government named Kamesaburō Anjū  
ŋІSBϽ (1882−1924) the second principal of Tōē School. Anjū was born in Ibaraki 
Prefecture, Japan. He graduated from Waseda University and came to Taiwan, teaching at 
several public schools in central Taiwan, including Lugang јʎ, Erlin Wȯ, Beidou ËǼ, and 
Shetou ˼п. Because of his prestige in teaching, in 1915, he was assigned to a teaching position 
at the Kyokuei Shoin in Amoy, a Japanese-funded school for accommodating children of 
Taiwanese sekimin and local Chinese. At that time, the school had plans for the construction of a 
new building. Anjū helped the principal Yōhachirō Okamoto ůȪΖϽ purchase the 
necessary land and oversee all the construction work. When the new buildingDaireiwas 
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215 Shizuo Muraoka Ȭůϓį, “Swatō tzūshin,” ɲпϪ (Newsletter from Shantou), Taiwan kyōiku, no. 197, p. 
54 (November 1, 1918). 
216 Takashi Nakamura KȬņƷ, Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan ȅȪ$ÓǿЛF!͗ʟ (Japan’s concern 
about the south and Taiwan). Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988, pp. 122, 136.   
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completed in 1917, Anjū’s reputation soared. In addition to this construction project, Anjū 
compiled two books: Kyokuei shoin yōran (Handbook of Kyokuei School) and Kamon jijō (The 
circumstances of Amoy). The former presented the school’s basic features, and the latter 
provided a contextualized introduction to Amoy. These two books helped disseminate important 
information about Japan’s expanding reach both to people in colonial Taiwan and to people in 
the Japanese homeland.217 
 Anjū brought his talents into full play at Shantou’s Tōē School. During his term of service, 
he contended with an anti-foreigner movement (the May−Fourth Movement) and the 
Constitutional Protection War. Even when circumstances were baleful, he tried to expand the 
school’s program, successfully attracting more Chinese students to the institution of learning. In 
1920, he established yagaku bu īňϾ (night school), and tokusetsu ka ʵΣ̈ (special 
courses), which was a Japanese-language course for Chinese students wanting to study in Taiwan 
or in the Japanese homeland. In 1922, Anjū established hoshū ka Γ̈́̈ (supplementary 
courses), and in 1924, he changed “supplementary courses” to jimuka ŏÁ̈ (practical 
business courses), providing education for those who were going to engage in practical business 
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217 Yōhachirōe Okamoto ůȪΖϽ, “Ā Anjū Swatō Tōei gakkō kōchō ikeri” ĄŋІɲпȭʝŉȺЗϫ? 
(In memory of the principal of Tōei School, Anjū), Taiwan kyōiku, no. 270, pp. 48−51 (December 1, 1924). 
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affairs. All these offerings were practical, aiming to propagate the Japanese language in Shantou 
and to provide Chinese students a practical means for studying in Taiwan or in the Japanese 
homeland.   
In addition to making the courses in Shantou more substantive, Anjū conducted an intensive 
survey of Shantou and communicated the information to people in colonial Taiwan. For example, 
in February 1920, Taiwan kyōiku published a report from Anjū,“Swatō annai” ɲпȾ (An 
introduction to Shantou), which presented a useful outline of the city, including the city’s 
historical background, the characteristics of the port, the foreign settlements there, and the city’s 
commerce, transportation, and diverse facilities, such as hospitals, schools, temples, churches, 
hotels, and tea houses.218  
Moreover, Anjū compiled two books about Shantou: Swatō shōfu ɲпùĚ (The treaty 
port of Shantou) and Nichiswago shōkei ȅɲάǧƱ (Transnational shortcuts between the 
Japanese language and the Shantou dialect). The former book provided comprehensive 
information about Shantou’s many features, including local customs, markets, and perhaps most 
important for the current study, the Japanese community there; the latter book helped Japanese 
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218 Kamesaburō Anjū ŋІSBϽ, “Swatō anai,” ɲпȾ (An introduction to Shantou), Taiwan kyōiku, no. 213, 
pp. 51−54 (February 1, 1920). 
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learn the Shantou dialect quickly. These books not only influenced Japanese readers, but also 
greatly influenced the local Chinese community. In 1933, eleven years after Swotō shōfu was 
published, the Chinese journalist Xue-ying Xie ιгƫ published a guidebook of the city,
Shantou zhinan ɲпǤÓ (An introduction to Shantou). Xie greatly contributed to a 
Chinese-language guidebook about Shantou, noting that until then, there had been no accurate 
and detailed publication on Shantou’s sites and institutions. One of the prefaces of this book was 
by Jia-lan Zhang ƣœ΄ (1888−1958), a Shantou-based educator, who suggested that Shantou 
had changed significantly since the early 1900s and which, in fact, had become a prosperous city. 
The Chinese government had experienced serious problems in preserving historically and 
culturally relevant documents, and when Zhang served in the Bureau of Education, he could find 
almost no documents about educational affairs. A similar situation beset other bureaus, like the 
Bureau of Hygiene and the Bureau of Construction. The city mayor Yu-ruo Wang ʾвͤ tried 
to compile a new gazetteer of the city; however, he failed owing to a lack of both sufficient funds 
and relevant documents. In the final part of the preface, Zhang wrote, 
One day I accidentally saw a Shantou guidebook in Japanese on my friend’s desk. It 
had been compiled by the principal of Shantou’s Tōē School (I forget the title of the 
book). I read the catalogue and the figures, and soon I realized that the work rested 
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on an extensive survey. It was a pity that foreigners had come to know our city 
much better than we had!219  
ĂđßaȾпʻΚȭʝŉȺȳȺЗ̸ͷPȅǻŢ¦ѠȞìƂƸѡѢΜ£ˬЍÞ
ǫďѢ˲£Ă̳ΰȴP¹͇͆ɟĩaP˲ǑɫΩȀǑ	
The abovementioned book was Anjū’s Swotō shōfu. Zhang’s preface, itself, reveals two 
important facts. First, the lack of relevant documents obstructed the efforts of Chinese 
researchers to compile a comprehensive city guide, whereas Anjū proved to be a marvelous 
researcher insofar as he overcame this obstacle and gathered significant relevant information, 
ultimately compiling a formidable city guidebook. Second, Swotō shōfu encouraged local 
Chinese to compile a guidebook about the city. The perception that Japanese knew Shantou 
better than Chinese themselves probably made local Chinese, like Zhang and Xie, feel 
disempowered.   
 Anjū was very active in the local Japanese community. In addition to helping manage Tōē 
School, he served as the vice president of the Japanese Residents Association and participated in 
the association’s Committee on School Affairs. During the last part of his life, he contributed to 
the establishment of Shantou’s largest Japanese hospital, the Hakuaikai Hospital (ɲпÕǇnЅ
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219 Xue-ying Xie ιгƫ, Shantou zhinan ɲпǤÓ (A guidebook to Shantou). Shantou: Shantou shishi tongzun 
she ɲпȓVϪΟ˼, 1933, p. 2. 
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Т) established in 1924, and served on the hospital’s governing council. Furthermore, it seems 
that Anjū had a good relationship with local Chinese leaders in Shantou. For example, the leader 
of the Guangdong Army, General Jiong-ming Chen ФʤȌ (1878−1933) asked Anjū to 
exercise his influence so that seven Chinese literati could safely arrive in Japan for their own 
studies. In November 1924, Anjū died at the young age of 43. In December, Taiwan kyōiku 
published an article by Yōhachirō Okamoto, Anjū’s previous superior at the Tōē School in 
Amoy, to mourn Anjū’s death.220 
After Anjū’s death, the Taiwan General Government named Kinosuke Ishii ˳[ýP» 
the third principal of Tōē School. Ishii was born in Nara Prefecture, Japan. He graduated from 
the Japanese Language School (ĉάňȺ) under the Taiwan General Government in 1908 and, 
later that year, received a public-school teaching license.221 From 1909 to 1920, he taught at 
several public schools in southern Taiwan (Bingdong). In 1920, he became the supervisor of the 
General Affairs Section for the local government in Hualian, a port area in southeast Taiwan. 
Five years later, in 1925, the Taiwan General Government assigned Ishii to Shantou, where he 
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220 Yōhachirō Okamoto ůȪΖϽ, “Ā Anjū Swatō Tōei gakkō kōchō ikeri” ĄŋІɲпȭʝŉȺЗϫ? 
(In memory of the principal of Tōē School, Anjū), Taiwan Kyōiku, no. 270, pp. 48−51 (December 1, 1924); 
Kinosuke Ishii˳[ýP», “Swatō no ichinen (3)” ɲп$?Ƌ 3 (One year in Shantou, part three), Taiwan 
kyoiku, no. 292, pp. 51−52 (October 1, 1926); Takashi Nakamura KȬņƷ, Nihon no nanpō kanyo to Taiwan ȅ
Ȫ$ÓǿЛF!͗ʟ (Japan’s concern about the south and Taiwan). Nara: Tenrikyō dōyūsha, 1988, p. 138.   
221 Fuhō ', no. 2400, p. 79 (March 28, 1908); no. 2407, p. 21 (April 8, 1908). 
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spent four years at Tōē School. At the end of his stay there, the Taiwan General Government 
assigned Ishii to Tōē School in Fuzhou, a city in Fujian Province, where he stayed from 1929 
until 1936. Because of his long residence in southern China, Ishii was familiar with local patterns 
of life and local current events. On the basis of his familiarity with the region, he published 
several articles such as “Swatō wo kataru” (A discourse on Shantou) and “Fuken shō no kyōiku 
wo ronji” (The debate surrounding education in Fujian Province).  
The fourth principal was Kishio Kitahara ËÚˠƃ˓. Kitahara was born in Saga, Japan. 
Before his assignment to Shantou, he taught at Keelung’s Japanese Elementary School for one 
year. In 1922, Kitahara was assigned to Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School. His wife, 
Kitahara Fuji had a similar experience with Kisho. Fuji taught at schools in the Keelung area and 
later, in 1922, went to teach at Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School. When the third principal 
of Shantou’s Tōē School, Kinosuke Ishii, transferred from Shantou to Fuzhou in 1929, Kitahara 
was assigned to the concurrent post of principal of the Tōē School in Shantou. Kitahara 
essentially spent eighteen years in Shantou, where he was the principal of Shantou’s two 
Japanese educational institutions from 1930 to 1937, when he was transferred to Fuzhou.222 The 
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222 Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku ͗ʟ̺˱Ɠ͍öЍ (The staff listing of the Taiwan General Government), p. 
241 (1921); pp. 36−37 (1922); p. 36 (1923); p. 37 (1924); p.39 (1925); p. 42 (1926); p. 42 (1927); p. 44 (1928); p. 
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Kitaharas, succeeding the Muraokas, contributed greatly to Shantou’s Japanese educational 
affair.  
The abovementioned principalsMuraoka, Anjū, Ishii, and Kitaharawere important 
contributors to the operation of the Tōē School in Shantou during the period between its 
establishment in 1915 and the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937. 
   
4.3 The Profile of Taiwanese Teachers at the Tōē School in Shantou 
The network of human resources between colonial Taiwan and Shantou was exemplified by 
important figures above and beyond these four prestigious Japanese principals. Unlike the 
situation of Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School, which employed no Taiwanese teachers, 
many Taiwanese teachers taught at Shantou’s Tōē School. During the period between 1915 and 
1945, the Taiwan General Government assigned multiple Taiwanese teachers to Tōē School in 
Shantou. Some of these Taiwanese teachers were couples. The first couple was Zhao-xing Zhong 
А͙ and his wife Feng-jiao Lin Zhong АȯђŃ. Zhao-xing Zhong came from a rich family 
in southern Taiwan’s Bingdong area. As a child, he expressed enthusiasm for learning. When 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 (1929); p. 95 (1930); p. 101 (1931); p. 100 (1932); p. 104 (1933); p. 107 (1934); p. 112 (1935); p. 120 (1936); p. 
447 (1937). 
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growing up, he taught at a public school in his hometown, and enjoyed a good reputation as an 
educator. His wife, Feng-jiao taught in the Bingdong area, as well. In 1918, the Taiwan General 
Government assigned the Zhong couple to Shantou’s Tōē School. The couple stayed on at Tōē 
School only for one year before being reassigned to Taiwan for the fulfillment of teaching duties 
at the public schools in the Bingdong area.223 
The second couple was Feng-zhang Xu ưтɐ and his wife Bao-zhu Ye Xu ưͶŜˁ. 
Feng-zhang Xu was from Taipei. In 1916, he received a teaching license for public schools, and 
then taught at a public girls school in Dadaocheng Ĭ̏Ę in the Taipei area. In 1919, the 
Taiwan General Government assigned Xu to Tōē School in Shantou. Xu’s wife, Bao-zhu was 
assigned to the same school in 1920. They worked there until 1921, when a reassignment led 
them back to Taiwan, teaching at public schools in Taipei.224  
The third couple was Chang-sheng Chen ФЗˌ and his wife Yin-zhi Zheng Chen  
ФЃɬƟɸ. The famous Taiwanese anthropologist Chi-lu Chen’ s Фı̂ parents
Chang-sheng Chen and Yin-zhi Zheng Chenreceived assignments to teach at Tōē School in 
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223 Jin-fa LinȯϮˣ, Taiwan kanshin nenkan ͗ʟŎ̭ƋЕ (The almanac of officials and gentry in Taiwan). 
Taihoku: Minshū kōronsha ɭΉγ˼, 1933, pp. 391, 877; Taiwan sōtokufu shokuin roku ͗ʟ̺˱Ɠ͍öЍ 
(The staff listing for the General Government of Taiwan), p. 279 (1914); p. 282 (1915); p. 296 (1917); p. 309 (1917); 
p. 347 (1918); pp. 360, 372 (1919). 
224 Fuhō Ɠğ, no. 998, p. 69 (April 25, 1916). 
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Shantou. Chang-sheng Chen was born in Tainan. He graduated from Kokugo Gakkō ĉάňȺ 
in 1918. Later, he taught at Jalixing Public School in his hometown. Yin-zhi Zheng Chen was 
from Tainan, as well. She graduated from Kokugo gakkō daisan fuzoku gakkō (the Affiliated 
Third School of the National Language School).225 It was the most prestigious educational 
institution that Taiwanese girls could attend during the Japanese colonial period. After 
graduation, she taught at Xuejia Public School in Tainan.226  
In 1921, the Taiwan General Government assigned the Chens to educational positions in 
Shantou. The Chens worked at Shantou Tōē School from 1921 to 1927. Chi-lu Chen’s memoir 
states that his parents later resigned their teaching jobs and started their own business. They still 
lived in Shantou until the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937, when the situation 
for Taiwanese in Shantou was worsening, thus compelling the Chen family to flee to Hong Kong. 
Here, an interesting question arises: why had the Chens discarded their teaching jobs and 
launched their own business in Shantou? The records show that, in general, the Japanese in 
Shantou were “people living on salary” (̱ˌʀ͆, hōkyū seikatsu sha), working in Japanese 
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225 The school was established in Taipei’s Shilin area in 1898 with two courses: a regular course and a craft course. 
The school accommodated outstanding Taiwanese girls. In 1915, the school moved to Taipei’s Mengchia area and 
later, in 1922, it changed its name to Taipei Third Girls High School. During the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan, 
this school was the most prestigious educational institution for Taiwanese girls. 
226 FuhōƓğ, no. 1532, p. 49 (April 9, 1918); Chi-lu Chen Фı̂, Cheng huai guan dao: Chen Chi-lu xian sheng 
fangtan lu (ʚǏΜϲѣФı̂ˌ΢αЍ, The oral history of Chen Chi-lu), interviewed by Yi-zhen Chen ФƼ˯. 
Xindian: guo shi guan, 2004, pp. 4−6.  
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governmental institutions like the consulate and schools, while most Taiwanese sekimin were 
merchants and shop clerks.227 I think that the Chens’ change of jobs might have been 
attributable to such factors as the commercial network of Taiwanese in Shantou and the 
competition between Japanese and Taiwanese teachers. 
The fourth couple was Jia-chang Zheng Ѓāȋ and his wife Jin Pan Zheng Ѓʗɬκ. 
Jia-chang Zheng graduated from Kokugo gakkō ĉάňȺ in 1923 and taught at several public 
schools in the Yilan area. Toward the end of 1927, the Taiwan General Government issued an 
order assigning Zheng to Tōē School in Shantou. His wife, Jin Pan, was from a rich mining 
family in Pingchi Ɗʒ. In 1926, she graduated from the Taipei Third Girls High School, the 
prestigious educational institution for Taiwanese girls. In the following year, when she taught at 
the public school in Taipei, she met Jia-chang Zheng. After marrying Zheng, Jin Pan went to 
teach at Shantou Tōē School. The Zheng couple stayed in Shantou for five years, and in 1933, he 
returned to Taiwan, where he taught at a public school.228  
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227 Xiu-cong GuoϿ̆˅, “Kamon−Swatō” ƗИɲп (Amoy−Shantou), Reisei љɡ, no. 44, p. 164 (March 3, 
1937). 
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In addition to the abovementioned Taiwanese couples, some Taiwanese whose hometown 
was Taipei taught at Tōē School in Shantou. These individuals include Shang-zhou He uʯ͚, 
Shui-sheng Yang Ɉɰˌ, and Shui-chun Ji ̧ɰ. Shang-zhou graduated from Kokugo gakkō 
in 1918, and went on to teach at Shantou Tōē School for fourteen years (1925−1939).229 
Shui-sheng Yang graduated from Kukugo gakkō in 1923, and after teaching at Banquio Public 
School in Taipei for several years, he was assigned to Shantou at the end of 1927. He taught at 
Tōē School in Shantou for another four years and then transferred to Kyokuei shoin ȉʝȞТ, 
an important Japanese-funded school in Amoy. He left Amoy and returned to Taiwan before the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and taught at Banquio public school again. In 1940, 
Yang resigned from the teaching position and became a businessman. Later, he was elected to 
the directorship position at the Banquio Industrial Union.230  
Shui-chuan Ji graduated from Kokugo Gakkō in 1926 and, before taking up a teaching in 
Shantou, taught at Dalongtong ĬўŲ, Beitou Ëǝ, and Laosong ͅȮ public schools in the 
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p. 37 (1921); p. 36 (1922); p. 46 (1929); p. 100 (1932); p. 104 (1933); p. 107 (1934); p. 112 (1935); p. 420 (1937); p. 
447 (1938). 
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Taipei area. He was interested in teaching music, and published several articles about ways of 
combining music and play for students. He stayed in Shantou from 1933 to 1936, and then 
returned to Taipei, where he continued to work as a teacher.231 It is interesting to note that all 
three teachers—He, Yang, and Ji—were from Taipei, taught at Tōē School in Shantou, and were 
assigned by the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education to interpreter positions for 
the Japanese military during the Second Sino-Japanese War.232 Yang served as an interpreter for 
the Japanese troops from 1938 to 1939, and he published an article entitled “With Brave Soldiers” 
describing his experiences during the war.233 During their tours of duty, both He and Ji were 
photographed on warships, and the caption under the photos read “Active in the Navy, 
Shang-zhou He from Shantou Tōē School” and “Teacher at Miyamae Public School, Shui-chun 
Ji.”234 
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Soldiers), Kokukō ċ, no. 92, pp. 10−12 (January 15, 1940). 
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Taiwanese). Taihoku: Taiwan shinminpōsha ͗ʟǾɭğ˼, 1940. 
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Shantou Tōē School was the workplace for several Xinzhou-based Taiwanese teachers, 
including Qi-rui Jian ̠ûˇ, A-sheng Guan ŎПÂ, Zhang-mei Rao хɬЗĻ, Shu-zhun 
Zheng Ѓϧª and Jing-hua Liu ·ГͲ. Of these teachers, Rao was the only female. Also of 
note is Jian, who was unique regarding the longevity of his thirteen-year stay at Shantou’s Tōē 
School (1917−1930).235 Indeed, Liu’s stay at Shantou Tōē School covered the whole period of 
the Second Sino-Japanese War and permitted him to observe the turbulent situation in Shantou 
during the wartime period.236    
In addition to Japanese and Taiwanese teachers, Shantou’s Tōē School employed a Chinese 
teacher, Fen-sheng Lin ȯĶˌ who worked at the school from 1917 to 1930. He was the only 
Chinese teacher at any Japanese educational institution in Shantou. 
The majority of the abovementioned Japanese and Taiwanese teachers graduated from the 
Taiwan General Government’s Japanese Language School, and, after graduation, taught at 
schools in Taiwan before being assigned to teaching positions at the Japanese Elementary School 
and Tōē School, which constituted the educational beachhead of the Japanese empire in southern 
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China. The Japanese government thoroughly navigated this flow of humans, and in particular, 
the Taiwan General Government determined the precise contours of these teachers’ stays in 
Japan’s informal empire in China.  
 
4.4 Network of Words: Teachers’ Writings about Shantou 
Colonial Taiwan and Shantou were connected to each other by more than just 
human-resource networks: networks of words brought the two regions closer together. For 
example, Japanese and Taiwanese teachers who had been assigned to Shantou and the staff 
working at the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education would submit their 
documentsin the form of travel writings and reportsto periodicals in Taiwan. Through these 
“words,” readers in Taiwan, most of whom worked in the field of education, would attain 
information and knowledge not only about Tōē School but also about Shantou at large. This 
information was comprehensive, covering political and economic matters, both the Chinese-run 
schools and the Western-run schools in Shantou, local customs, and the social atmosphere there. 
Using these “words,” researchers today can explore the teachers’ perceptions of the city.  
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In this section, I will analyze articles published in one of the most important educational 
periodicals in colonial TaiwanTaiwan kyōikuto explore teachers’ perceptions of Shantou. 
The magazine was the publication of Taiwan kyōikukai (the Taiwan Education Association),237 
and was in operation for a long period, from 1900 to 1943. It was a first-hand source for 
educators seeking to explore the educational history of Taiwan during the Japanese colonial 
period. In addition to this magazine, I examined the topic by analyzing some supplementary 
periodicals: one was Taichūshū kyōiku ͗KżǷ͏, a publication of Taichū kyōikukai ͗KǷ
͏ȡ (the Taizhong Education Association); and another was Reisei љɡ, a publication 
oriented toward the alumni hailing from the Taipei First High School, which had been 
established in 1898 and which presently is known as Taipei Municipal Jianguo High School, the 
best boys school in Taiwan. The writings in the abovementioned periodicals expressed at least 
two kinds of perceptions that Japanese and Taiwanese educators had of Shantou: (1) the 
perception that Shantou was a dangerous place, exemplified by Chinese civil wars and 
anti-Japanese activities (see chapter five for a more detailed discussion of this perception); and (2) 
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of Taiwanese through Japanese-language education. The original title of the magazine was Kokugo kenkyūkai kaihō 
@69..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again to Taiwan kyōiku. 
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the perception that comparisons of Chinese schools and Western schools should yield important 
information helpful to the Japanese and Taiwanese educators. In the following, I will focus my 
discussion on the second perception.  
Both Japanese and Taiwanese teachers in Shantou paid much attention to Shantou’s local 
educational affairs. In their reports to the Taiwan General Government, in addition to reporting 
on the situation of Shantou’s Japanese Elementary School and Tōē School, many writings 
reported on Shantou’s Western-funded schools, especially the American- and British-funded 
schools. In general, the writings expressed a strong sense of competition with Western powers 
regarding the establishment of schools in Shantou. Both Japanese and Taiwanese teachers 
reminded the Japanese authority to monitor the Western strategy of establishing schools in 
Chinaa strategy intended to expand Western influence there.   
It is understandable that these Japanese and Taiwanese teachers had a distinct sense of 
competition with Western powers. In contrast to Western powers’ mid-nineteenth century 
entrance into Shantou, Japan entered Shantou only after emerging victorious from the First 
Sino-Japanese War in 1895. Among the pre-WWI foreign powers in Shantou, Germany 
exercised the greatest influence over the port city; and in Shantou’s immediate post-WWI 
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circumstances, Britain was the most influential power there. During these years, Japanese reports 
about Shantou came from such sources as the city’s Japanese Consuls and from the Taiwan 
General Government’s visiting officials, and one common characteristic of these reports was the 
Japanese authors’ consciousness of competing Western powers. In general, the Japanese reports 
described Western powers’ presence in Shantou and how Japan should learn from its Western 
competitors in terms of conducting commercial business and establishing “cultural institutions” 
(namely schools and hospitals). Regarding commercial business, the Japanese reports recorded 
the number of foreign companies in Shantou, the value of trade (between Shantou and individual 
foreign powers), and the number and tonnage of foreign steamships. Regarding “cultural 
institutions,” Japanese reports recorded the number and size of foreigner-run schools and 
hospitals in Shantou. The authors of these Japanese reports expressed their belief that the 
Western powers were essentially buying Chinese people’s hearts and minds by bestowing on 
Chinese communities a host of impressive schools and hospitals. The authors further noted that 
this strategy seemed to be working quite well. For example, Kiwata Ishii [«ŇóĮ, a tariff 
officer in the Taiwan General Government submitted a report in the early 1920s containing the 
following passage: 
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Why did Japanese merchants lack commercial power [in Shantou]? The essential 
reason lay in Japan’s national character. Generally speaking, Japanese neither had 
faith in Chinese nor cooperated with or shared gains and losses with Chinese. 
[Japanese] did not have plans to expand and manage sustainable development [in 
China], and thus, a severe anti-Japanese atmosphere easily took hold [in Shantou]. 
Moreover, Japan lacked both experience in managing local institutions and the spirit 
of taking up permanent residence in a place for such managerial activities. In 
contrast, the British and Americans possessed the equipment for developing 
maritime trade, and invested in social and cultural facilities, like schools and 








Ishii’s repot directly pointed out the problem of Japanese management in Shantou and why 
Japanese influence was inferior to that of British and American powers. 
These same reports, when addressing British investment in Chinese cultural matters, 
focused on two aspects, religious education and higher education. The British established many 
high schools in China, and the graduates were accommodated in Hong Kong University, where 
they submitted to strict educational discipline. Moreover, the very best graduates would have a 
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238 Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ, “Swatō no bōeki” ɲп$ώȍ (Trade in Shantou), Taiwan Jihō ͗ʟȓğ 
(December 1922), p. 79. 
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chance to pursue higher education in Great Britain. In the 1920s, Chinese students in Shantou 
had access to about ten British-run schools, such as the Bethel Christian Church Elementary 
School (pʵ²̅ǢĝŢŉ), Anglo Chinese College (ͥͲŉТ), and Shude Feminine School 
(ʈƴķŉȺ). Most of the British-run schools were located on Wai-ma Road and in the 
neighboring area. American investment in China’s cultural business was similar to British 
investment insofar as the Americans developed a diverse portfolio covering education, medical 
treatment, and religion. In the 1920s, about eight American-run schools in Shantou 
accommodated Chinese students, and included the True Light Elementary School (˯Ţŉ), 
Baptist Academy (˺˳Kŉ), and Baptist Girls’ Academy (˺˳ķK). Most of these schools 
were located in the Queshi ˺˳ area, an island located opposite the Shantou port. Regardless 
of whether these foreign schools were run by British or American, most were Christian and had 
been established by Western missionaries.239 
Facing so many British-run and American-run Christian schools, the Japanese teachers in 
Shantou had ambiguous responses. On the one hand, Japanese teachers admired Western powers’ 
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well-founded plans and generous financial support to these schools, and on the other hand, 
Japanese teachers grew convinced that Japan should compete with these Western powers.  
Since the British-funded and American-funded schools had been established in Shantou 
much earlier than the Japanese-funded schools, local Chinese people tended to experience a 
greater sense of awe and wonderment at Europe and America than at Japan. In order to 
demonstrate the educational achievements of the Japanese empire to local Chinese residents in 
Shantou, the Tōē School held a three-day exhibition of educational works (Ƿ͏õŪΙn, 
kyōikuhin tenrankai) in January 1919. The exhibition collected students’ works from multiple 
schools, including the Tōē School in Shantou, the Tōē School in Fuzhou, Kyokuei shoin in 
Amoy, and many schools in Taiwan. To popularize the exhibition, the Taiwan General 
Government had documentary films shown during the exhibition period. The documentaries 
presented the streets of Taipei City, the beautiful campuses, and the well-behaved school 
children in Taiwan. Owing to the limited number of available seats, Shantou’s Tōē School issued 
only seven hundred tickets for showings of the documentaries, but so many people expressed 
interest in the films that the school eventually tripled the number of tickets. The Chinese 
audience was most impressed with the films depicting Taiwanese students’ handicrafts and the 
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Maruyama Zoo. One Japanese teacherHiroshi Katase ʲʞơrecorded the event. 
Katase was born in Kumamoto Japan. Before acquiring his teaching position in Shantou, he 
taught at public schools in Taizhong, Taiwan (1915−1917). In 1918, Katase was assigned to a 
teaching position at Tōē School, where he stayed for seven years until 1924. At the end of his 
report recording the educational exhibition in January 1919, he wrote, “The exhibition and the 
films enabled the Chinese audiences to experience the greatness of Japan; otherwise, they would 
have continued to assume that only Britain and the United States were great.”240 (Śô/åǠs
 3ůƚ0ȨŴ/ƻ*ǎƯi/|É=?ÇĄ0@ú¾ħȅi-®º/|*É
*/TƩCĎ!:ÿ#@dCŚ/X;,ċă-Òâ{). 
In the same report, Hiroshi Katase stated that visible on the streets of Shantou were 
Western-operated schools’ advertisements aimed at recruiting Chinese students. In his report to 
the Taiwan General Government, he wrote,  
Local schools run by European, Americans, and Chinese used the month of 
December in the Lunar Calendar to mark the end of a semester. Many schools held 
graduation ceremonies during this month, and around the same time, the streets 
everywhere were flooded with leaflets declaring “such-and-such a school is now  
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240 Hiroshi Katase ʲʞơ, “Swatō tsūshin” ɲпϪ (Newsletter from Shantou), Taiwan Kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏, no. 
202, pp. 52 (March 1, 1919). 
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accepting applications from prospective students.” This is the season for recruiting 
new children. I heard that the American-run school Zhen-guang Elementary School 






At the end of the above passage, Katase seems to have been expressingwhether implicitly or 
explicitlya sense of competition with the Americans.     
 The second principal at the Tōē School, Anjū, suggested that the most attractive aspect of 
education in Shantou was the marvelous collection of British and American schools there. 
Through carefully constructed programs and English-language lessons, the schools attracted 
Chinese students. Moreover, the schools, which tended to include Western religious curricula, 
served as forums where students could discuss current events, organize boycotts, and win over 
local people’s hearts through the presentation of popular dramas and films. Anjū wrote,  
Recently, I heard that American Baptist churches are planning to establish an 
architecturally magnificent stone-made girls school in Kakuseki. Moreover, they are 
planning to invest 50−60 thousand fu in establishing more junior high schools in  
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241 Hiroshi Katase ʲʞơ, “Swatō tsūshin” ɲпϪ (Newsletter from Shantou), Taiwan Kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏, no. 
202, pp. 52−53 (March 1, 1919). 
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Shantou. I heard that they already bought a vast swath of land along the Han River 







The description expresses Anjū’s strong sense of wonder atand perhaps an equally strong 
sense of competition withthe Western powers.  
Regarding this competition with Western-funded schools, the Japanese teacher of the Tōē 
School in Shantou, Matsugorō Okabe ůϾȮZϽ, offered some telling comments. Okabe was 
born in Kumamoto, Japan. He taught at public schools in Tainan beginning in 1913. Between 
October 1924 and March 1925, the Taiwan General Government assigned him to a position at 
the Tōē School in Shantou. During his stay in Shantou, he visited other cities in Guangdong 
Province, and even Hong Kong. The section of Okabe’s report addressing the recruitment of 
Chinese students asserted that the Shantou’s Tōē School faced two problems in competing with 
Shantou’s American- and British-funded schools: problem one was the practicability of the 
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242 Many Japanese and Taiwanese teachers called the area Kakuseki Ν˳ instead of the given name of Queshi ˺
˳. This shift in terms took place probably because the word Que ˺ would have been extremely difficult for 
Japanese and Taiwanese to write as well as to pronounce. Anjū Kamesaburō ŋІSBϽ, Swotō Shōfu ɲпùĚ 
(Shantou Treaty Port). Taihoku: Nanyō kyōkai Taiwan shibu ÓɽÒȡ͗ʟǲϾ, 1922, pp. 37−38. 
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Japanese language; and problem two was continuity of education. The number of students at the 
Tōē School was declining. Every year about one hundred students would enter the school, but 
when these one hundred students would move up one grade, many of them would drop out. What 
accounted for this phenomenon? Okabe contended that in addition to the anti-Japanese 
atmosphere in Shantou, the practicability of the Japanese language was an important reason for 
students’ decision to transfer from the Tōē School to non-Japanese schools in the area. For 
Chinese students studying either in the Japanese homeland or in colonial Taiwan and hoping to 
maintain contact with Japanese society following the completion of their education, learning 
Japanese was practical. But for Chinese students who wanted to work locally in China, English 
typically proved to be more useful than Japanese. Most students who dropped out of the Tōē 
School transferred to Western schools. If the Japanese language was not indispensable to 
Chinese students, why did Chinese parents send their children to Shantou’s Tōē School to learn 
Japanese? Okabe attributed this behavior to two factors, one being psychological and the other 
economic. As for the psychological factor, the Chinese parents believed that sending their 
children to attend a Japanese-funded school would make them more competitive in the future and, 
meanwhile, granted the parents an opportunity to express their tastes in education. As for the 
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economic factor, the Tōē School’s tuition was more affordable than the Chinese-run and 
Westerner-run schools’ tuitions in Shantou.243   
In addition to the issue of the practicability of the Japanese language, a significant problem 
besetting Shantou’s Tōē School as it competed with Western-funded schools for Chinese 
students was “continuity of education.” Okabe asserted that to influence development in China, 
Europeans and American had established extensive educational institutions in various parts of 
the country. He noted that the mission schools were built in grand architectural styles and 
boasted dormitories and sports grounds. He went on to note that Western powers had thus 
skillfully combined mission work with education and attracted the attention of many Chinese 
children and their families: these academic strongholds in the centers of big cities and branch 
schools in neighboring suburbs even included kindergartens. Okabe’s assertions seem to be 
consistent with the facts. Indeed, Chinese students who finished their junior-high courses at the 
schools could earn eligibility to enroll in a senior high school or a college in Western countries. 
Thus, it was popular for Chinese students to study abroad in the West. Moreover, missionaries at 
Western-oriented schools based in China would help Chinese students search for work 
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243 Matsugorō Okabe ůϾȮZϽ, “Nanshi wo kaku (2) Sonochi no kyōiku” Óǲ3Ǫ(2)ѣ$Ē$Ƿ͏ 
(Describing southern China, part two: local education), Taichūshū kyōiku ͗KżǷ͏, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 39−41 
(February 23, 1937). 
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opportunities upon graduation. At the end of his report, Okabe wrote, “It is a great pity that, 
despite Shantou’s proximity to our country [Japan], our educational system in China was so 
inferior to that of the Western powers.”244 (TǔîŤ/ľ;ȌxųĔº*ŘƯǪº*
ħȅ/ĮdŒ#@īǂ-ı(5/Íșŭ/ēȑ@*0Ů-ȃĒ/œ8
)0@7). 
As an educator concerned about Japan’s educational management in Shantou, Okabe 
commented that it was a pity to see Japan investing large amounts of money and human 
resources in students who would eventually drop out of Shantou’s Tōē School at the half-way 
mark. In order to fulfill the mission of these Japanese-funded schools (which was essentially to 
earn the admiration of Chinese students and to expand Japanese influence in China), Okabe 
argued that there was an urgent need to establish an overall program of Shantou-based vocational 
schools capable of accommodating not only Chinese but also Japanese and other foreign students 
thereschools similar to Taiwan’s vocational school directly under the jurisdiction of the 
Taiwan General Government.245  
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244 Ibid., p. 40. 
245 Matsugorō OkabeůϾȮZϽ, “Nanshi wo kaku (2) Sonochi no kyōiku” Óǲ3Ǫ(2)ѣ$Ē$Ƿ͏ 
(Describing southern China, part two: local education), Taichūshū kyōiku ͗KżǷ͏, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 39−41 
(March 31, 1937). 
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The abovementioned writings expressed Japanese teachers’ ambiguous emotions toward 
many Christian schools established by Western powers in Shantou. As noted previously 
regarding a similar context, on the one hand, Japanese teachers admired Western powers’ 
generous financing of educational institutions; and on the other hand, Japanese teachers 
expressed their strong sense of competition between Japan and the Western powers. 
In general, Shantou’s Japanese and Taiwanese teachers observed that Western powers, 
especially the Americans and British, had been skillfully expanding their influence in Shantou by 
establishing grand mission schools and by providing comprehensive long-term curricula to 
Chinese students. 
Concerning Shantou’s Chinese-funded schools, Japanese and Taiwanese teachers pointed to 
myriad problems, including unstable finances and low teacher salaries. Kinosuke Ishii, serving as 
the third principal of Shantou’s Tōē School, suggested that the development of the Chinese 
educational program in Shantou faced many disturbances, including the region’s unstable 
political situation and local government’s disproportionate funding of military affairs among 
total expenditure. Compared with the Chinese schools in Shantou, the city’s foreigner-operated 
schools had stable finances and sufficient facilities, which attracted students and which, thus, 
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made these schools’ enrollment much greater than the corresponding numbers for Chinese 
schools. The faculty in foreigner-operated schools enjoyed a relatively stable life, too. In these 
senses, the faculty and staff in Shantou’s Chinese schools would have been envious of the city’s 
foreigner-operated schools.246 
Moreover, some Japanese teacherslike the third principal of the Tōē School in Shantou, 
Kinosuke Ishiicriticized Chinese political parties’ excessive influence on education in China. 
Ishii noted, for example, that after the Guangdong Army took control of Shantou, the nature of 
schools’ commencements changed for political reasons. Previously, the five color flag (the flag 
of the Beiyang Government) had been on display during commencements, but now, the flag on 
display was that of the Republic of China. In addition, students were now to bow to the iconic 
image of Sun Yat-sen during commencements, and then were to read his testament out loud, sing 
songs of the Chinese Civil Revolution, and shout slogans in praise of the Guangdong Nationalist 
Government. Ishii’s observation indicates the instability of Chinese schools in Shantou at that 
time. Changes in local leaders and in the dominant ideology triggered changes in school events 
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246 Kinosuke Ishii ˳[ýP», “Swatō no ichinen (4)” ɲп$?Ƌ 4 (One year in Shantou, part four), Taiwan 
Kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏, no. 293, pp. 73−77 (October 30, 1926). 
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like commencements. These changes reflected the overall turbulence gripping Shantou.247  
At Shantou’s Tōē School, the Taiwanese teacher Jia-chang Zheng Ѓāȋ pointed out that 
although Shantou had made great progress recently in the realm of material life, spiritual life in 
the city was poor and its cultural industry was underdeveloped. According to Zheng’s report, the 
Chinese schools there were suffering from two problems: First, the number of schools was not 
small, but the quality of these establishments’ curriculum and instruction was disappointing. 
Some of these establishments actually were small-scale tutoring centers even though they bore 
the title of “school.” Second, most of the schools were private: only five of the thirty-seven 
elementary schools and two of the twenty junior high schools were public. Also, most of the 
schools had been established by private entities, including (1) native place associations, (2) 
benevolent groups, (3) labor unions, (4) teachers overseeing for-profit private schools, (5) and 
Christian churches. Zheng added that in Shantou’s Chinese schools, full-time jobs for teachers 
were rare. The Chinese society did not consider women capable of being top teachers. Regarding 
salary, the earnings of a male teacher in the Chinese countryside could cover just one single 
person’s living expenses. Compared with teachers’ salaries in Taiwan, those earned by Chinese 
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247 Ibid., p. 75 (October 30, 1926). 
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teachers in Shantou were paltry. The size of a profession’s typical salary can powerfully 
influence people’s perception of the profession: in colonial Taiwan, teachers were held in high 
esteem, but in Shantou, teachers’ worth was associated with their poor remuneration.248      
Moreover, Japanese teacher Matsugorō Okabe pointed out that although Chinese schools 
throughout the country were managed by the new Chinese government’s educational system, 
established in 1912, Chinese schools remained primitive. The underdevelopment of education in 
China was closely related to China’s tumultuous political conditions. Most schools lacked money 
and could not sustain themselves satisfactorily. Lacking sufficient financial support from the 
government, schools had to impose high tuitions (15 to 20 yuan annually), which accounted for 
the better part of schools’ incomes. However, even high tuitions could not erase the difficulties 
in maintaining the schools, and thus the principals sought to pad these incomes with funds raised 
from individual Chinese, including those living overseas, particularly those in Southeast Asia.249  
 According to Chi-lu Chen’s memoirs, he traveled to Shantou with his parents, who had been 
assigned by the Taiwan General Government to teaching positions at Tōē School. For one year, 
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248 Jia-chang Zheng Ѓāȋ, “Shina kyōiku jijō no kenkyū (2)” ǲϻǷ͏Vǁ$˴̑ 2 (An examination of 
education in China: part two), Taiwan Kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏, no. 339, pp. 45−53 (October 1, 1930).  
249 Matsugorō Okabe ůϾȮZϽ, “Nanshi wo kaku (2) Sonochi no kyōiku” Óǲ3Ǫ(2)ѣ$Ē$Ƿ͏ 
(Describing southern China, part two: Local education), Taichūshū Kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏, vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 39−41 
(March 31, 1937). 
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Chen studied at Tōē School, which accommodated the children of Taiwanese sekimin. Later, his 
parents decided to transfer him to a local public school because they frowned upon the idea of 
teaching their own son. In this situation, Chen spent six years at First Elementary School in 
Shantou. Chen recollected, “As for my six years in a Chinese elementary school, I don’t have 
any special memory. The only thing I remember is the school’s old and shabby condition.”250    
The abovementioned writings strongly suggest that many Japanese teachers, Taiwanese 
teachers, and even Taiwanese students like Chi-lu Chen observed dreadful conditions in Chinese 
schools. 
 
4.5 A 2013 Interview with 83-year-old Ms. Mei-hua Zheng 
Mei-hua Zheng Ѓ́Ͳ is the daughter of Jia-chang Zheng Ѓāȋ and Jin Pan Zheng  
Ѓʗɬˈ, both of whom were teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School during the period between the 
late 1920s and the early 1930s. Mei-hua was born in Shantou in July 1930, and her two brothers 
were born in Shantou, as well. The Zheng family lived in the Tōē School’s teachers dormitory. 
In September 1931, the Manchurian Incident occurred (Mei-hua was 14 months old), and in 
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250 Chi-lu Chen Фı̂, Cheng huai guan dao: Chen Chi-lu xian sheng fangtan lu ʚǏΜϲѣФı̂ˌ΢αЍ 
(The oral history of Chen Chi-lu), interviewed by Yi-zhen Chen ФƼ˯. Xindian: guo shi guan, 2004, pp. 4−6.  
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January of the following year, the Shanghai Incident occurred. The two incidents reflected the 
deeply troubled Sino-Japanese relations at the time, and the Zheng family, like many Taiwanese 
and Japanese families in China, repatriated to Taiwan as a consequence. Both Jia-chang Zheng 
and Jin Pan continued their teaching professions at schools in Taiwan. 
However, the relationship between the Zheng family and Shantou did not end with this 
repatriation. In July 1941, the Zheng family again moved to Shantou because Taiwan General 
Government had assigned Jia-chang Zheng to an interpreter position in Shantou, which had been 
under Japanese occupation since June 1939. Mei-hua enrolled in Shantou’s Tōē School as a 
fifth-grade student. This time, she stayed in Shantou for one and a half years until her graduation 
from the Tōē School in February 1943. Because Jia-chang Zheng was no longer a member of 
Tōē School’s faculty at this time, the Zheng family were unable to reside in the teachers 
dormitory, and they thus opted for a four-floor rented townhouse located in the city’s Tongyi 
houlu (ë˩ƯϚ) neighborhood. The owner of the townhouse was a successful Shantou-based 
businessman in Southeast Asia. The townhouse itself was well designed, and even in the more 
than a half century that has passed since Mei-hua left the house, she still vividly remembers its 
layout. During the interview, she recalled a small court-yard with landscape gardening just inside 
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the entrance. The original arrangement of the house was such that the first floor was for the host, 
the second floor was for the legal wife, the third floor was for the concubine, and the fourth floor 
was the balcony. In the backyard was a beautiful old well. Because the structure’s owner and his 
family had left for Southeast Asia, Mei-hua and her family could live comfortably in this 
perfectly acceptable residence. 
Regarding school life in Shantou, Mei-hua’s recollections reveal that there were thirty some 
students in her class. All were Taiwanese, though some had been born to Shantou-based mothers. 
Each grade had only one class, and Mei-hua’s teacher was Kazuhiko Era ǃ̀?ƨ, who was 
responsible for the fifth and sixth grades. Mr. Era was very young and just married. His wife, 
remembered as a great beauty, gave birth to a baby boy for him. Not only was Mei-hua a student 
at Shantou’s Tōē School but so too were both of her younger brothers. One brother was in Mr. 
Shirō Inokuchi’s [áϐϽ class, and the other brother was in Mr. Kido Morikazu’s ȧǗŊ? 
class. Mei-hua was most impressed with her teacher Fujie Tajima ˏŴŖĥǃ, who was 
responsible for home economics. Ms. Tajima was friendly and earnest as she instructed students 
on the finer points of such activities as sewing. She also taught at Shantou’s Japanese Elementary 
School, and on some occasions, Ms. Tajima—if she were too busy to make the trip to the Tōē 
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School—would ask Mei-hua and her classmates to go to the Japanese Elementary School for 
class there. Mei-hua recorded that the relationships between students and teachers were close. 
After class, they often went to teachers’ homes (i.e., the dormitories) to play and found the 
premises very clean and well designed.  
Sometimes, the Tōē School would hold field trips in Shantou city. Students would tour the 
city in Japanese military vehicles with one soldier as the driver and one soldier as a guard. After 
the field trips, school teachers would ask Mei-hua and her classmates to record their thoughts on 
the events of the day, and she even submitted one of her papers to a Shantou-based newspaper 
company. 
Among the Taiwanese teachers at Tōē School, Shui-sheng Yang Ɉɰˌ was the Zheng 
family’s best friend. Jia-chang visited Shui-sheng’s home almost every night for a chat and he 
told Mei-hua and his other children that Yang was a respected senior. Moreover, the Chens
Chang-sheng Chen ФЗˌ and Yin-zhi Zheng Chen ФЃɬƟɸwere familiar with 
Jia-chang’s family. Because Yin-zhi and Jia-chang had the same surname, Zheng, Jia-chang 
regarded Yin-zhi as his sister and the two families were close. Yin-zhi would bring his son Qi-lu 
Chen, who became a famous international anthropologist, to Mei-hua’s home and Mei-hua’s 
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mother, Jin Pan was responsible for his preschool teaching. Furthermore, Zhang-mei Rao  
хɬЗĻ visited Zheng’s family often because Rao and Jin Pan had graduated from the same 
girls school in Taiwan. 
On weekends, Mei-hua’s family would go to Shantou’s largest park, Zhong-shan Park, 
where she saw many local people wearing Chinese-style robes while playing soccer. Mei-hua’s 
parents would bring her and her siblings to restaurants near the port to enjoy Chaozhou cuisine 
(ʙżͱ).251 Her favorite dish was crispy crab, a delicacy for which crabs were coated in batter 
and deep-fried. Zheng’s family hired a local Chinese female as a helpmate, who happened to be 
good at making Shantou-style soy-sauce pickles. First, she would stir-fry raw olives and Chinese 
pickled vegetables in peanut oil. Then she would place the cooked ingredients in a pot and store 
them there for one year, until the olives had turned a purplish color. Shantou people were used to 
eating these Shantou-style pickles with porridge for their breakfast.  
The local markets would sell various kinds of fruits, soft Japanese sweets, and kasutera, a 
Nagasaki-style honey cake. Mei-hua’s mother sometimes brought her to a pastry shop named Tai 
yang guan ĮЦΜ, where shoppers could purchase refined candies. Moreover, professional 
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251 Chaozhou cuisine originated from the Chaoshan (Chaozhou and Shantou) region in the east of Guangdong 
Province, and thus it was one kind of Guangdong cuisine. However, Chaozhou cuisine bears more similarities to 
Fujian cuisine, owing to Chaoshan’s and Fujian’s geographic proximity and language similarities. Chaozhou cuisine 
is renowned for its seafood, soups, and sparse use of oil. 
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dressmaking activities in Shantou were very progressive. Mei-hua’s parents would occasionally 
take her to a local dressmaker for new tailored clothes. Sometimes, Mei-hua’s mother would 
bring her to the Nan Sheng Department Store (Óˌ˥χç), a seven-floor magnificently laid 
out building constructed in 1932 and featuring Shantou’s earliest usable elevator. There, the 
mother and daughter would shop for daily-use articles. 
When Shantou was under Japanese occupation, the city’s Japanese and Taiwanese residents 
received “military tickets,” a kind of money that buyers and sellers could use for daily-use 
articles. One military ticket equaled one hundred yuan. Mei-hua and her classmates at Tōē 
School would tear military tickets in half and declare each half equal to fifty yuan. With this 
currency, they were actually able to rent comic books; in fact, half a ticket could rent about ten 
comic books. According to Mei-hua, her friends and she would sit in the shade of trees and read 
comic books, which tended to be quite different from comic books today: back then, each page 
of a comic book would present only one square, in contrast to post-war comic books, with each 
page presenting multiple squares.  
Mei-hua sometimes went to Kakuseki Ν˳, an island across from Shantou Port, to her 
classmate’s home for playtime. Kakuseki was a British settlement and had many Western-style 
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houses and gardens. The classmate’s father had already passed away and her mother, who hailed 
from Shantou, worked at an American Baptist Church in Kakuseki as a cleaner. As recollected 
by Mei-hua, the church was very clean and the sounds of piano playing could be heard from 
somewhere inside.  
In February 1942, Mr. Era brought Mei-hua and other students back to Taiwan by the 
Japanese steamship Hongkong Maru цʎL. Their purpose was to participate in the entrance 
examinations for junior high school in Taiwan, held in March. After arriving in Taipei, Mr. Era 
and the students stayed at the Hikōya Hotel near the Imperial Taipei University Affiliated 
Hospital. In the morning, Era gave students lessons for preparing for the entrance examinations, 
and in the afternoon, students undertook further preparations. In early March, students were 
dismissed from their preparatory studies and went back to their hometowns to take the entrance 
examinations. Mr. Era returned to Shantou at that time, as well.    
Later, Mei-hua entered a junior high school, the same school that her mother Jin Pan had 
attended. When Mei-hua started her new life as a junior high school student in Taiwan, Jia-chang 
Zheng still lived in Shantou, but he was working no longer as an interpreter for the Japanese 
Army, but as a businessman helping to oversee the operations of the Yoshimura Company (êȬ
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ɽΊ), a rice-and-grains business centered in Shantou’s suburbs. Before the end of the Second 
World War, Jia-Chang decided to return to Taiwan, but chose to make the trip by a private 
fishing boat rather than by a Japanese steamship, which would have been a likely target for 
Allied forces. Of course, it was an extremely dangerous voyage one way or the other. Before his 
departure for Taiwan, Jia-chang attended Shantou’s Mazu Temple, where he prayed for safety. 
Luck turned out to be on his side, as he arrived safely in Taiwan.   
In conclusion, Mei-hua’s recollections of this period in her life provide us with precious 
records of Taiwanese students who attended Shantou’s Tōē School between 1941 and 1943. For 
Mei-hua, it was a precious time, which she spent with her parents, siblings, classmates, and 




4.6 Brief Conclusion 
Regarding Japanese imperialism, Peter Duus reminds us that we should consider both the 
formal empire and the informal empire of Japan to understand Japan’s influence on wider East 
Asia. The scope of Japan’s informal empire sometimes may not have been as clear as Japan’s 
formal empire. This chapter reflects an attempt to explore, from a transnational framework, some 
of the connections between one of Japan’s formal territories (here, colonial Taiwan) and one of 
Japan’s informal territories (here, the treaty port of Shantou). I have focused on a group of 
“Japanese” teachers (including Taiwanese) whom the Taiwan General Government assigned to 
teaching positions at Tōē School in Shantou. I have analyzed their stories and writings in order to 
explore Japanese imperial formations in colonial Taiwan and in Shantou. It is clear that the 
Taiwan General Government was the main organization responsible for the connection between 
colonial Taiwan and Shantou, at least in the field of education. In addition to assigning teachers 
and financing schools, the Taiwan General Government published teachers’ reports and travel 
writings in periodicals, such as Taiwan kyōiku. By means of these periodicals, people in the field 
of education in colonial Taiwan attained information about Shantou. To varying degrees, readers 
in Taiwan shared Japanese teachers’ perceptions of Shantou, including perceptions of Chinese 
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schools’ status in Shantou, of Western-based schools in Shantou, and of Japanese teachers’ 
self-examination stemming from Japan’s management of education in Shantou. My examination 
of Japanese teachers’ writings specifically reveals these teachers’ strong sense of competition 
with Western-funded schools in Shantou. In sum, these travelers under the blanket of Japanese 
imperialismthe teachers at Tōē School in Shantoureflect the significant transnational 








Native place Period of designation 
Shizuo Muraoka  Ȭůϓį Gunma ͂ш  1915−1919 
Kamesaburō Anjū ŋІџBϽ Ibaraki ͨĖ 1920−1924 
Kinosuke Ishii ˳[ýP» Nara Ĳ͟ 1925−1928 
Hiroshi Katase ʲʞơ  Kumamoto ʭȪ 1918−1924 
Masaru Wada óˏÂ   Kagawa цŻ 1925−1934 
Kishio Kitahara ËÚˠƂ˓  Saga tϏ 1930−1936  
Shirō Inokuchi [áϐϽ Hiroshima ƚŴ 1928−1929; 1940−1944 
Noboru Kawasaki Żŷˢ  Fukushima ̄Ŵ 1930 
Masaichi Kubo O~ɡ?  Nagasaki Зŷ 1931−1935 
Morikazu Kido ȧǗŊ? Hiroshima ƚŴ 1936−1944 
Fujie Tajima ˏŴŖĥǃ Hiroshima ƚŴ 1940−1941;1943−1944 
Tsuruji Gondō ɘ΂іə Fukuoka ̄ů 1941 
Tokuji Nakashima KŴƴɸ Nagasaki Зŷ 1941−1944 
Kazuhiko Era ǃ̀?ƨ Yamaguchi ŭá 1941−1944 









Native place Period of designation 
Qi-rui Jian ̠ûˇ Xinzhu Ǿ̚ 1917−1930 
Zhao-xing Zhong А͙ Bingdong ũȭ 1918 
Feng-jiao Lin Zhong АȯɬђŃ  Bingdong ũȭ 1918 
A-sheng Guan ŎПÂ Xinzhu Ǿ̚ 1919−1924 
Feng-zhang Xu ưтɐ  Taipei ͗Ë 1919−1920 
Bao-zhu Ye Xu ưͶɬŜˁ  Taipei ͗Ë 1919−1920 
Chang-sheng Chen ФЗˌ  Tainan ͗Ó 1921−1927 
Yin-zhi Zheng Chen ФЃɬƟɸ  Tainan ͗Ó 1921−1926 
Shu-zhun Zheng Ѓϧª Xinzhu Ǿ̚ 1921−1927 
Shang-zhou He uʯ͚ Taipei ͗Ë 1925−1939 
Zhang-mei Rao хЗĻ Xinzhu Ǿ̚ 1928−1931 
Jia-chang Zheng Ѓāȋ  Taipei ͗Ë 1928−1932 
Jin Pan Zheng Ѓ΃ɬκ  Taipei ͗Ë 1930 
Shui-sheng Yang Ɉɰˌ Taipei ͗Ë 1928−1931 
Shui-chuan Ji ̧ɰ Taipei ͗Ë 1933−1935 
Shu-zhi Yu vɑȲ Taipei ͗Ë 1935 





Fig. 4-1 Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.) 
[Illustration] In the front line on the far left was Inokuchi Shirō and on the far right was the Chinese teacher 
Fen-sheng Lin, who taught the Chinese language. In the back line on the far left was Jia-chang Zheng, third from the 
left was Qi-rui Jian, on the far right was Shang-zhou He, and third from the right was Zhang-mei Rao.  
 
 
           
Fig. 4-2 Teachers and Guests at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.) 
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Fig. 4-3 Teachers at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.) 
[Illustration] On the far left was Jia-chang Zheng, second from the left was Inokuchi Shirō, third from the 
left was Shang-zhou He, in the middle was Zheng-mei Rao, and on the far right was Qi-rui Jian.  
 
 
         
        Fig. 4-4 Teachers and Students at Shantou’s Tōē School. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.) 
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Fig. 4-5 Jia-Chang Zheng in Shantou. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.) 
 
 
Fig. 4-6. Jin Pan Zheng in Shantou. (Source: Mei-Hua Zheng.) 
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Fig. 4-7 Wedding photo of Jia-chang Zheng and Jin Pan Zheng in Shantou.  
(Source: Mei-hua Zheng.) 
 
Fig. 4-8 The Yoshimura Company in Shantou. (Source: Mei-hua Zheng.) 
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Fig. 4-10 Mazu Temple in Shantou. (Source: Photo by Lin-Yi Tseng, 2013.) 
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Chapter 5: The Image of Shantou in Japanese Writings from the 1910s to the 
Outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in 1937 
 
Anti-Japanese boycotts occurred frequently in many Chinese ports.  





                                         Kiwata Ide " , 1922 
5.1 Anti-Foreign Sentiment: The Character of Shantou’s Native Residents 
Since the 1910s, the Japanese government had been carrying out the “nanshin” (Southward 
Advance) policy, and thus, the Taishō period (1912−1926) was called “the period of the Taishō 
Southward Advance.” During this period, the Taiwan General Government sent a great number 
of Japanese (and some Taiwanese) to southern China, where they collected information and 
explored business opportunities. Meanwhile, large Japanese enterprises like Mitsui and the 
Osaka Shipping Companyin cooperation with the government’s Southward Advance policy
established branch offices in southern China and assigned staff to local branch offices. Moreover, 
the Taiwan General Government assigned a group of Japanese and Taiwanese teachers to 
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Japanese-financed schools in southern China. As one of the treaty ports in southern China, 
Shantou was the destination of many Japanese travelers and all these officials, businessmen, and 
teachers produced reams of reports and travelogues about Shantou. 
As citizens who enjoyed most-favored nation treatment in China, Japanese were, if not 
colonizers, at least “semi-colonizers” benefiting from diverse privileges in Chinese treaty ports. 
This chapter raises the question of how Japanese travel writings depicted Shantou, which was an 
important part of Japan’s informal empire in China. Did these writings present unique features of 
Shantou that differentiated the site from other southern Chinese treaty ports, such as Xiamen 
(Amoy)? In responding to these questions, my approach has been to analyze writings, including 
travelogues, official reports, and news reports authored by Japanese who had travelled and 
resided in Shantou, and in this way, I have reconstructed these communities’ perceptions of 
Shantou. Concerning my approach to these topics, I have been inspired by Emma Teng, who 
used travel writings, pictures, and maps to discuss the evolution of sovereignty and territorial 
concepts that existed between the non-Western Qing empire and peripheral Taiwan.252 By 
analyzing the writings of Japanese about Shantou, I will explore Japanese perceptions of Shantou. 
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252 Emma Teng, Taiwan’s Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683−1895. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004. 
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This chapter illuminatesin Pratt’s words253how the Japanese used imperial gaze to see 
Shantou, an important contact zone for Chinese, Japanese, Taiwanese sekimin, and other 
foreigners. This chapter shows that Japanese writings reflected the experiences of Japanese in 
Shantou, and the most powerful of these many experiences were of Shantou’s strident 
anti-Japanese atmosphere and political instability. 
Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ, a revenue officer in the Taiwan General Government, was one of 
many Japanese travelers who visited Shantou during the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan, and 
his writings reflected many Japanese perceptions of Shantou—the young treaty port in southern 
China. Ide was born in Nagano Prefecture, Japan, in 1880. In 1909, he received a degree from 
the Department of Politics at Imperial Tokyo University. In 1915, when he was 35 years old, he 
served in the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Financial Affairs. In the following years, 
he headed customs offices in Danshui, Keelung, Kaohsiung, and Taipei.254 In March 1921, Ide 
was assigned by the Taiwan General Government to a one-month-long sojourn in southern China. 
He went to Xiamen (Amoy), Shantou, Guangzhou, and Hong Kong. In December 1922, the 
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253 Mary Louise Pratt. Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation. London and New York: Routledge, 
1992, 1−11. 
254 Shigeo Nakamura KȬͦį, Zaitai Shinshū jin đ͗$ża (The Shinshu people in Taiwan). Taihoku: 
Nihon kōronsha Taiwan shibuȅȪγ˼͗ʟǲϾ, 1925, p. 4. 
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widely read newspaper Taiwan jihō in colonial Taiwan published one of Ide Kiwata’s articles 
entitled “Trade in Shantou,” an investigative report based on his visits in 1921. A paragraph of 
this article suggested, “Anti-Japanese boycotts occurred frequently in many Chinese ports. 
However, Shantou was the site of the most pronounced ones.”255 (ħȅǪŴ/È0ĸ
ĢĴ
ǰȁA1Ŧȣ-ı@;/0ŝ-ȤǓ,@;/*  
Many Japanese travelogues and reports noted intense anti-Japanese sentiment and activities 
in Shantou. Tokusaburō Ida уˏƴBϽ, a former head of the Shantou branch office of the 
Osaka Shipping Company (Ōsaka Shosen Kaisha) suggested that, before the Japanese occupation 
of Shantou in June 1939, two main reasons explain the feeble connection between Shantou and 
Japan. First, Shantou exhibited the most pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment of any city in China. 
Every two or three years, the city would be the site of a significant anti-Japanese movement. 
Second, Shantou had been under British control since the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
which rendered Shantou an extension of Hong Kong. These two reasons underlie the difficulties 
experienced by Japanese seeking to expand in Shantou.256  
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255 Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ, “Swatō no bōeki” ɲп$ώȍ (Trade in Shantou), Taiwan jihō ͗ʟȓğ, p. 77 
(December 1922). 
256 Tokusaburō Ida уˏƴBϽ, “ Swatō yawa” ɲпīΨ (Nighttime discussions in Shantou), Taiwan jihō ͗ʟ
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As the head of the branch office of the Osaka Shipping Company in Shantou, Ida’s 
comments are pertinent. We might pose the question: What made Shantou the site of the most 
pronounced anti-Japanese sentiment of any city in China? Some Japanese travelers suggested 
that the native residents of Shantou possessed a pronounced anti-foreigner streak. For example, 
Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ pointed out, 
         
Shantou’s native residents are ungrateful, suspicious, and stubborn. They have had 
xenophobic tendencies since ancient times, and they are utilitarian and ruthless. On 
the other hand, they are easy to unite on the basis of local community and have 
exhibited the virtues of diligence and thriftiness. I heard from those who had lived 








This passage expresses Ida’s perception of the character of Shantou’s native residents. 
Kinosuke Ishii ˳[ýP», the third president of the Tōē School in Shantou, a 
Japanese-financed school in the city catering chiefly to Taiwanese and local Chinese children, 
expressed opinions similar to those of Kiwata Ide concerning the character of Shantou’s native 
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257 Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ, “Swatō no bōeki” ɲп$ώȍ (Trade in Shantou), Taiwan jihō ͗ʟȓğ, p. 86 
(December 1922).  
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residents. Ishii was born in Nara Prefecture, Japan in 1880. In 1908, he graduated from the 
Taiwan General Government’s affiliated Kokugo Gakkō (Japanese Language School). From 
1909 to 1920, he taught several public schools in southern Taiwan. In 1925, when the principal 
of the Tōē School in Shantou died, the Taiwan General Government took note of Ishii’s prior 
experience running schools and, on this basis, selected him to be the third principal of the Tōē 
School, prompting his four-year stay in Shantou.258 As a sojourning Japanese in Shantou, Ishii 
observed the local people close up, he commented that Shantou’s native residents were naturally 
“brave, aggressive, and good at exploring overseas. Many residents had relocated to Siam and 
Singapore at a young age.” (¾Ǹ Ϯà$ɮ#Ŗ4 2	ʅĩˡŪƾƤńz
$к0Ț̀-ǾāĔ#Ίr$V%u!,ƻ2"). Shantou indeed was the 
hometown of millions of Chinese workers in Southeast Asia, especially in Siam. Ishii further 
commented that these people’s aptitude at relocating in far-flung areas while preserving a 
cultural heritage was probably “due to their possession of strong self-awareness, and violent 
infiltrations by foreigners have sunk deep into their frame of mind, resulting in deeply set 
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258 Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku ͗ʟ̺˱Ɠ͍öЍ (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), pp. 
313, 130 (1909); p. 353 (1910); p. 371 (1911); p. 431 (1912); p. 270 (1913); p. 281 (1914); p. 285 (1915); pp. 
297-298 (1916); pp. 310-312 (1917); p. 326 (1918); p. 361 (1919); pp. 374, 245 (1920); p. 402 (1921); p. 426 (1922); 
p. 444 (1923); p. 455 (1924); p. 39 (1925); p. 42 (1926); p. 42 (1927); p. 45 (1928); p. 46 (1929); p. 95 (1930). 
! 201!
anti-foreign sentiment.”259 (ĔČùŸÇi/ŖĻȣ-8ǹD)@ŸĢÇā
@). Ishii’s comments specifically on the xenophobic tendencies of Shantou’s native 
residents can prove useful in the context of the current study’s discussions. 
The abovementioned writings imply that many Japanese perceptions of Shantou were of an 
uninviting place, since the city’s native residents were allegedly anti-foreign. According to a 
principal of the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou, Japanese citizens sojourning or residing 
in Shantou faced four principal difficulties: bad sanitation, an intense anti-Japanese atmosphere, 
an unstable political situation, and a lack of educational institutions for Japanese children.260 
After examining a good number of Japanese writings, I can state with a considerable degree of 
certainty that most Japanese sojourners who traveled to Shantou observed an intense 
anti-Japanese atmosphere and political instability there.  
Shantou was not the only Chinese city noted for its anti-Japanese atmosphere in the first 
half of the twentieth century. Since Japan’s victory over China in the First Sino-Japanese War in 
1895, the incursion of Japanese imperialism infuriated Chinese people, who organized strikes 
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259 Kinosuke Ishii ˳[ýP», ”Swatō wo kataru” ɲп3ά2 (Talking about Shantou), Taiwan jihō ͗ʟȓğ, 
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and boycotts of Japanese goods in protest. Many other Chinese cities registered anti-Japanese 
movements. Anyone familiar with early Republican history would agree that its tale includes 
numerous Chinese civil wars among warlords in the first half of the twentieth century. For 
example, in the Constitutional Protection Movement (1917-1922), war broken out between Qirui 
Duan’s ɩ́ˇ Beiyang Government and Sun Yat-sen, and Shantou became a battlefield fought 
over by various warlords. The subsequent changes in Shantou’s ruling government made the 
local residents and Japanese sojourners uneasy. In the following, I will examine Japanese 
writings in different time periods from about the 1910s through the 1930s to explore in greater 
detail Japanese perceptions of Shantou. 
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5.2 Japanese Writings on Shantou’s Reaction to the May Fourth Movement 
Japanese writings about Shantou in the 1910s show that the two greatest threats besetting 
most Japanese living in Shantou were political instability and intense anti-Japanese sentiment.  
Hiroshi Katase ʲʞơ, a teacher at a Japanese-financed Tōē School in Shantou, observed 
the situation at that time. Born in Japan’s Kumamoto Prefecture, Katase had taught from 1915 to 
1917 at a public school in Taizhong, which is located in central Taiwan. In 1918, the Taiwan 
General Government had assigned Katase to a teaching position at the Tōē School in Shantou, 
where he stayed until 1924.261 During his stay in Shantou, he submitted reports about the local 
situation to the Taiwan General Government’s Bureau of Education, and some of his reports 
were published in Taiwan kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏ (Taiwan Education), a publication overseen by 
Taiwan Kyōikukai (the Taiwan Education Association). In October 1919, a report entitled 
“Newsletter from Shantou” by Katase was published in Taiwan kyōiku. The article suggested that 
at the start of the second semester in August, only thirty some students attended classes owing to 
widespread anti-Japanese sentiment and to a lingering cholera epidemic. The anti-Japan 
demonstrations made Japanese goods unsalable, and Japanese businessmen were at a loss as to 
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how they should respond. Katase wrote, “The anti-Japanese [activities] at this time taught the 
egoistic Japanese businessmen a lesson.”262 (/ô/ĢĴ0Ĕ]ƽ/Ȇi²i-*?(
0īǥ-,?#'>
These activities were Shantou’s response to the May Fourth Movement. The May Fourth 
Movement was an anti-imperialist uprising that initially took the form of student demonstrations 
in Beijing on May 4, 1919, protesting the Chinese government’s weak response to the Treaty of 
Versailles, especially the transfer of advantage in Shandong from Germany to Japan. The May 
Fourth Movement provoked many responses nationwide, including in the treaty port of Shantou. 
On May 6, 1919, the local Shantou newspaper Gongyan ribao Ξȅğ issued an extra edition 
on May Fourth (ZąΆĩ), and many Shantou students publicly voiced their support of the 
student movement in Beijing. On May 14, students established the Ling Dong Student Union  
(Źȭŉˌ͋éȡ) at Huaying School (ͲͥŉȺ) and, through the union, called for a 
demonstration and for the cessation of economic relations with Japan. On September 13, masses 
of Chinese in Shantou publicly burned Japanese goods for the first time.263 
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Katase stated that Shantou’s participatory response to the May Fourth Movement sharply 
reduced the number of students (including Chinese as well as Japanese and Taiwanese) attending 
classes in the city’s Japanese schools and obstructed the sale of Japanese goods there. Regarding 
specifically the issue of school attendance, parents dared not let their children attend 
Japanese-financed schools for fear that they would make easy targets. And regarding the boycott, 
the issue was clear cut: Japanese goods were simply unmarketable in the heated atmosphere, and 
Japanese businessmen subsequently and unavoidably suffered severe economic losses. 
In another article, Katase depicted Shantou’s response to the Fuzhou Incident (7%), 
an event related to the May Fourth Movement. On November 16, 1919, some Chinese students in 
Fuzhou got into an altercation with Japanese and Taiwanese residents in Fuzhou while the 
students were boycotting Japanese goods as part of the May Fourth Movement. The conflict left 
one student dead and five injured. Katase wrote, 
 
Because of the Fuzhou Incident in November, students in Shantou carried out a 
week-long strike. During the week, students held daily conventions and carried out 






Fuzhou Incident in exaggerated detail. The posters specifically stated, “In front of 
the youth assembly hall, heavily armed Japanese killed Chinese and fired their 







Katase further stated that the stores in Shantou had started labeling their wares “Japanese 
goods” or “native goods,” thus helping consumers to distinguish between tarnished imports and 
preferable domestic articles of commerce. Because of the prohibition on imports of Japanese 
goods, the price of commodities generally rose, and people from all walks of life suffered 
accordingly.265 
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     Fig. 5-1 Hiroshi Katase’s “Newsletter from Shantou.” 
[Illustration] The words in the red frame suggest that the anti-Japanese demonstrations made Japanese 
goods unsalable, and that Japanese businessmen suffered subsequent financial losses. (Source: Taiwan 
kyōiku, October 1, 1919.) 
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The city’s Chinese residents as well as local Japanese and Taiwanese businessmen suffered 
from the aforementioned inflation because many Japanese goods were in fact considered 
daily-life necessities in Shantou. Among Shantou’s many imported goods were coal, matches, 
silk, and seafood (like dried abalone and salted trout) from Japan and alcohol from Taiwan. 
Shantou merchants mixed Taiwanese alcohol with local waters to make Shantou wine, and 
exported it to Southeast Asia for consumption by overseas Chinese. Shantou merchants mixed 
sorghum liquor from Tianjin with Taiwanese alcohol for Shantou residents’ consumption.266 In 
this sense, the boycott of Japanese goods forced Shantou residents to seek substitutes, thus 
driving up the prices of commodities in general.  
The boycott was not a unique phenomenon in Shantou. In other treaty ports in southern 
China, like Xiamen and Fuzhou, boycotts took root. However, the boycott in Shantou was 
different from those in Fuzhou and Xiamen. A report by Chinzō KondōϦ΂В΁, the head of 
the branch office of the Mitsui Corporation in Fuzhou and Xiamen, commented on differences 
among the three locations’ respective dispositions and boycotts.  
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First, Kondō suggested that native people’s dispositions in Fuzhou were similar to those in 
Kyoto, that is, the two communities were typically gentle and agreeable. He further noted that 
the native residents in Fuzhou were not good at conducting overseas explorations and that almost 
none of Fuzhou’s native residents went overseas to earn money. He asserted, in contrast, that 
native residents in Xiamen and Shantou were very aggressive and particularly apt at exploring 
overseas sites. Java and Manila were destinations preferred by most Xiamen workers, and Siam 
was the chief destination of Shantou migrants.267 
Kondō then analyzed differences among the three locations’ respective anti-Japanese 
activities. In Xiamen, the boycott was not successful and he predicted that the market would 
soon right itself because, first, many Taiwanese sekimin who were powerful businessmen lived 
in the city; second, Xiamen was not a city known for possessing excellent and comprehensive 
administrative functions, and indeed only a few high-ranking Chinese officials lived there; and 
third, the percentage of Xiamen’s population accounting for students, the main force supporting 
the boycott, was not high, thus restricting the boycott’s influence. About Fuzhou, Kondō 
suggested that the boycott manifested a straightforward conflict between students and 
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! 210!
businessmen. The students wanted to boycott Japanese goods, whereas businessmen wanted to 
trade. The businessmen ended up on the losing side in this conflict, in no small part because they 
feared being attacked by students. Kondō regarded the native residents in Fuzhou as neither 
aggressive nor creative, preferring to characterize them as followers. Thus, Kondō promoted the 
idea that Japanese merchants should strategically entice local Chinese businessmen in Fuzhou to 
trade in Japanese goods. He predicted that once some Chinese merchants started to trade in 
Japanese goods, other Chinese merchants might follow, as would be their tendency. He also 
predicted that the boycott in Fuzhou would gradually lessen in intensity. In general, businessmen 
in Xiamen and Fuzhou put a halt to their trade in Japanese goods for fear of being attacked by 
students, not out of patriotism.268  
Different from the situation in the abovementioned two cities, the boycott in Shantou was 
noticeably severe. In general, businessmen in Shantou tended to exclude foreign businessmen 
and, thus, were more likely to manage business matters by themselves than to import foreign 
goods through foreign agencies. Thus, the foreign presence in Shantou was less influential than 




“automatically” quit trading in Japanese goods and found substitutes from Chinese suppliers 
farther inland. However, during the boycott in Shantou, the city continued to import coal from 
Japan because local businessmen encountered difficulties finding substitute suppliers outside 
Japan. In addition, there was some speculation that a number of grocery items were Japanese 
imports that, through a change in labels, were masquerading as non-Japanese goods. In sum, the 
anti-Japanese movement in Shantou was consolidated and, according to Kondō’s prediction, the 
city had only a slim opportunity to restore its market in the near future.269      
The abovementioned facts suggest that Shantou was quite different from the treaty ports of 
Xiamen and Fuzhou regarding the personalities of native residents, the power of student unions, 
and the tendencies of merchants. Thus, the boycott in Shantou was much severer than in the 
other two locations, despite Shantou’s continued import of Japanese coal.  
We might be surprised to learn that, at least according to Kondō’s writings, the student 
unions in Shantou played an important role in Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods. Concerning 
this point, Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ recorded a detailed description of student unions’ prominent 




anti-Japanese movement in many cities, and such was decidedly the case in Shantou. Students 
used groups of music performers to promote an anti-Japanese atmosphere, kept a watchful eye 
on Japanese goods passing through customs, and checked every dock in the port city. Students 
who found suspicious goods, whether at docks or on store shelves, would sometimes hand them 
over to Chinese authorities or simply burn the confiscated goods and fine the offending 
businessmen arbitrarily. Over time, the student unions grew more and more radical, with the 
students themselves sometimes acting, in essence, like thugs.270 
Ide cited some cases exemplifying the students’ wild and violent actions. In late 1920, 
students got into a dispute with a Chinese owner of a pharmacy who had been retailing Japanese 
dyes, and the event evolved into an intense court case. During the judicial process, the pharmacy 
owner fled to Hong Kong and students burst into his Chinese lawyer’s home, forced the lawyer 
out, and paraded him through the streets as a traitor. Another case took place in the spring of 
1921: a Chinese businessman who had British citizenship was importing Hong Kong silk, which 
students confiscated on the grounds that the silk might be a Japanese import. The event wound 
up in the courts, where it was left pending for a long time. Finally, the Chinese government 
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demanded that the businessman pay a fine of 3,500 fu Ơ to the student unions. It was said that 
the student unions had asked for 35,000 fu. At about the same time, a Chinese merchant named 
Wen-kou Yang Ɉǻá imported Java sugar from Chun-yang Guo Ͽȏ̊ (1859−1935), a 
famous Chinese Indonesian entrepreneur who possessed Japanese citizenship. The student 
unions regarded the sugar as Japanese goods and fined the businessman 1,500 fu.271 
It is worth noting that the Java sugar from Chun-yang Guo was regarded by the student 
unions as Japanese goods because Guo possessed Japanese citizenship (i.e., he was a Taiwanese 
sekimin). Born in Fujian Province, Guo had travelled to Dutch Indonesia to operate a sugar 
company, eventually becoming a millionaire in the process. His company, the Hedong Company 
(ɷȭç), established factories and branch offices in Java, Surabaja, Hong Kong, and 
Shanghai. Later, he registered as Japanese, and operated a tea business in Taiwan successfully. 
He even received awards from the Dutch and Japanese Governments.272 For example, in 1928, 
the Japanese government granted Guo membership in the Order of the Sacred Treasure, Gold 
Rays with Rosette Çą̝ˇŜ̗, and praised him for having “devoted all his efforts, publicly 
or privately, to Japan on behalf of Sino-Japanese trade and diplomacy, and in response to 
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Southeast Asia’s boycott of Japanese goods. In short, he has been a superlative overseas 
entrepreneur representing Taiwan.”273 (ȅǲIĉ$̯ʌĩ]$C#ǒ%Óɽ#Ȁ2Ǩȅ
Ǩχ$ϖĠé$ĸƈ#ΏΑ#đʀÀĉœ$ʦ+Ŧ¸2Ζ
2#ʅĩ#ʀÀ2ŏɊœ!äʏ3gΏ2?a 2). 
In addition to detailing the violence of student unions in Shantou, Ide suggested that,  
 
Because of the boycott of [Japanese] goods, Chinese merchants suffered greatly, as 
did local prosperity, which was inextricably linked to domestic and international 
trade. Why did local officers permit the boycott to persist? The reasons centered on 
the frequent political turmoil, which was threatening the officers’ own positions. In 
essence, the officers and politicians alike were secretly acting in their own best 
interest when dealing with students.274   











273 Aizō Shibayama ȷŭǇ΁, Gotaiten showa no shin nihon ƳĬ¤̧ƺȑóPǾȅȪ (The great ceremony, 
Showa’s new Japan). Taikoku: Shunkan Tokyo jiji sinpōsha shikyoku Ȉ®ȭ_ȓVǾğ˼ǲŧ, Yomiuri shinbun 
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274 Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ, “Swatō no bōeki” ɲп$ώȍ (Trade in Shantou), Taiwan jihō ͗ʟȓğ, p. 78 
(December 1922). 
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Ide’s writings expressed Shantou’s political instability. Those who possessed power today might 
be unseated tomorrow. 
We might be curious to know why the student union participated so actively in such 
political movements as the boycott of Japanese goods. The organization of the General 
Conference of the Student Unions of Lingdong Union (Źȭŉˌ͋éȡ) was composed of all 
regional student unions in Shantou and its hinterlands, as well as those in the Hakka region, and 
it was largely dominated by the English-educated Christian students from the Anglo-Chinese 
School. Concerning mission students’ political psychology, Susan Rigdon suggested that the 
majority of Christian educators in China saw themselves as on a mission of “nation salvation” 
and exhibited a keen desire to train civil leaders in order to save China from chaos. By 1930, 
under the control of the Guomindang, Christian schools could no longer control their curricula, 
and the Guomindang integrated Christian schools into the National Salvation program. Under 
this circumstance, students from mission schools in China were encouraged to participate in 
political movements that declared national salvation their main objective.275  
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275 Susan Rigdon, “National Salvation: Teaching Civic Duty in China’s Christian Colleges” in Daniel H. Bays and 
Ellen Widmer eds., China’s Christian Colleges: Cross-Cultural Connections, 1900-1950. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, pp. 193-217.  
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Moreover, the abovementioned Japanese records suggest that student unions in Shantou 
were more active than those in Fuzhou and Amoy. This situation is perhaps attributable to 
Shantou’s political fluidity, the activism of Hakka politicians, and the relative inaction of British 
and Japanese consuls. The changes in Shantou’s local regimes were very complex, especially in 
the 1910s and 1920s. Local warlords and municipal governments came and went. Further, many 
Hakka revolutionaries were in control of Shantou after the 1910s and were often in conflict with 
the Shantou Chinese Chamber of Commerce. In addition, local warlords in Shantou often turned 
to British and Japanese consuls for help: Jiong-ming Chen ФʤȌ exemplifies this trend, 
insofar as he cooperated with the Japanese consul there in the early 1920s. In sum, the rivalries 
between Hakka revolutionaries and Shantou merchants, between local warlords and Shantou 
merchants, and among various consuls made it difficult for any of them to form a united front 
against the Soviet-supported Guomindang and other communist-organized anti-foreign activists 
in the mid-1920s. 
How unstable was Shantou’s political situation? Matsugorō Okabe ůϾȮZϽ, a Japanese 
teacher who taught at Tōē School in Shantou from October 1924 to March 1925 provided his 
observations on the matter. According to Okabe, the Guangdong Army under Chong-zhi Hsu  
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ΤŶȗ (1886-1965) fired on parts of Shantou in March 1925 and the Japanese Consulate in 
Shantou issued an emergency notice, warning Japanese residents to practice extreme caution. 
The emergency situation manifested itself in the form of fluctuating commodity prices. As 
Shantou appeared to be on the verge of becoming a battlefield, many residents fled to Hong 
Kong and Shanghai. Later, the Guangdong Army occupied Shantou and began plundering the 
city. Okabe wrote, “The Chinese proverb ‘The army is the thief, and the thief is the army’  
(ϝ%ϑQϑ%ϝQ) described the situation.”276  
Okabe’s recorded observations describe the Guangdong Army’s lack of military discipline 
and, specifically, the situation at Tōē School: many Chinese refugees had crowded into the 
school because the school had received permission from the Japanese Consulate in Shantou to 
provide asylum to refugees in an emergency. The entrances to the school were closed and locked, 
as passing Chinese soldiers glared at the building from the street. The Hinomaru, or the Japanese 
flag, remained perched atop the school’s roof, serving as a warning to the Chinese soldiers that 
the building was off limits. When the turmoil passed, the Chinese refugees quickly withdrew 
from the place of sanctuary, which they had praised only moments earlier. Okabe’s writings state 
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276 Matsugorō Oakbe ůϾȮZϽ, “Nanshi wo kaku (1) Sono goro no Shōgaiseki shi” Óǲ3Ǫ(1)ѣ$к$
ͻc˳ (Describing southern China, part one: Chiang Kai-Shek at that time), Taichūshū kyōiku ͗KżǷ͏, vol. 5, 
no. 2, pp. 34−35 (February 23, 1937). 
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that none of the refugees expressed their gratitude to him or to the other Japanese who had 
attended to the building during the crisis; that is, Okabe apparently observed ingratitude on the 
part of Chinese citizens.277 
Further, Okabe’s recollections describe the hardships experienced by the teachers who 
stayed at Tōē School during the crisis. According to his writings, Japanese residents in Shantou 
faced severe material conditions at the outset of the war. Sometimes the Guangdong Army would 
fire their guns indiscriminately on Shantou, and the school itself suffered damages in this way. It 
was impossible to venture out on the streets to buy anything. Sometimes the situation outside the 
school was so dangerous that the teachers had to remain sequestered in the school for a whole 
week. Although experienced teachers might not have been surprised at such periodic dangers in 
Shantou, newcomers like Okabe were astonished. Okabe recorded his overall assessment of the 
visit: “The crisis went on and on. It is not an overstatement that I went without a single peaceful 








In sum, the writings and reports of Katase, Okabe, Kondō, and Ide constitute evidence that 
Shantou’s response to the May Fourth Movement was strong, and that Japanese residents in 




5.3 Japanese Writings about Shantou’s Reaction to the May Thirtieth 
Incident 
 Tokusaburō Ida уˏƴBϽ, the head of the Osaka Shipping Company’s branch office in 
Shantou, offered this revealing commentary: 
 
The stubborn degree of anti-Japanese sentiment in Shantou was unequaled 
elsewhere in China. Once [the Chinese government] essentially authorized 
anti-Japanese activities, the end result was a movement of violence, which 
proceeded for between half a year and an entire year. It [anti-Japanese sentiment] 
would boil over every two or three years, which grew wearying for [Japanese]. Any 
kind of Japanese business that has just taken off immediately gets cut to the ground 









In the mid-1920s, an important anti-Japanese boycott occurred in China, the “May Thirtieth 
Incident” (ZBǊȾ). On May 30, 1925, a British Municipal Police officer in Shanghai gave the 
order to open fire on Chinese protesters who had gathered in Shanghai's International Settlement 
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279 Tokusaburō Ida уˏƴBϽ, “Swatō yawa” ɲпīΨ (Nighttime discussion in Shantou), Taiwan jihō ͗ʟ
ȓğ, p. 238 (July 1939).  
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to protest the actions of Japanese-owned Shanghai-based cotton factories, which had illegally 
laid off and beat up Chinese workers. The shootings sparked nation-wide anti-foreign 
demonstrations. The anti-foreign atmosphere, especially the anti-Japanese and anti-British 
movements, reached their peak during the period from July to October in 1925. Maids, rickshaw 
pullers, and boatmen called a strike, and food supplies to foreign residents stopped. Most 
Japanese residents in Shantou, including about 170 Japanese and 380 Taiwanese, went back to 
Japan or Taiwan, except for some staff at the consulate and at schools.280  
Katayose Gunji ʲŔϝ, who was born in Miyazaki Prefecture, Japan in 1897, and 
started to work at the Archives Section at the Taiwan General Government in 1921,281 
commented that “the Chinese are people who like turmoil. Without turmoil, it seems that [the 
Chinese people] wouldn’t be able to distinguish day from night. It is a nation that manages to 
maintain year-round turmoil.” Katayose named the turmoil “Shina sō” ǲϻы, Chinese-style 
turmoil. He suggested that many Chinese people tended to linger around the turmoil but failed to 
grasp the meaning and purpose of the demonstrations. Katase regarded it as a “kūsō” ̒ы, 
turmoil in vain. For example, Chinese people repeatedly distributed anti-Japan leaflets and 
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280 “Swatō jōhō” ɲпǁğ (Information about Shantou), Taiwan jihō ͗ʟȓğ, p. 13. (April 1927) 
281 Taiwan Sōtokufu shokuin roku ͗ʟ̺˱Ɠ͍öЍ (The staff listing for the Taiwan General Government), p. 
30 (1921); p. 30 (1922); p.31 (1923); p. 33 (1924); p. 31 (1925). 
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waved flags appealing for the abolishment of imperial Japan’s Twenty-One Demands on 
National Humiliation Day (May Fourth) every year, and yet many of these activists lacked even 
a rudimentary understanding of these events. In fact, a surprising number of activists regarded 
the turmoil as a festival (Ƴ̀ы) and regarded National Humiliation Day as a sanctioned 
opportunity to plunder Japanese goods.282   
Katayose further depicted the turmoil of Shantou’s response to the May Thirtieth Incident. 
According to his observations, a 10,000-person demonstration took place on June 8, 1925, and 
consisted of students, Guomindang supporters, members of sailors unions, and average citizens. 
The General Conference of the Student Unions of Lingdong Union (Źȭŉˌ͋éȡ) issued 
several appeals in the demonstration, including the following six: (1) a call for ending both the 
collection of excrement and the provision of food for Japanese and British residents in Shantou; 
(2) a call for a boycott of Japanese and British goods; (3) a call for Shantou’s ports to refuse 
harbor to Japanese and British ships; (4) a call for a general boycott of foreign paper money; (5) 
a call for a boycott of hotels and theaters run by foreigners; and (6) a call for citizen-organized 
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282 Gunji Katayose ʲŔϝ, “Saikin no chūka minkoku wo miru” ȠϦ$KͲɭċ3Μ2(Observations of 
recent events in the Republic of China), Taiwan keisatsu kyōkai zasshi ͗ʟμŗÒȡаΪ, p. 68 (August 1, 1925). 
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donations and citizen-organized militias.283  
The National Diplomacy Supporters’ Association (ċɭĩ]ƯǮȡ) in Shantou made a 
host of announcements, including the following five demands: (1) a call for the breaking off of 
economic relations with Japan and Britain; (2) a call for a citywide strike on June 15; (3) a call 
for every household’s display of a white flag with the words “Support Fellow Shanghai Martyrs! 
Overthrow British and Japanese Imperialism!” and for fines to be levied on any household not 
hanging the flag; (4) a call for strikes among workers like excrement collectors and cooks, whose 
labor typically catered to foreigners; and (5) a call for labor unions to help the abovementioned 
workers during the strike.284  
Katase’s writings vividly describe the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou in the aftermath 
of the May Thirtieth Incident. 
In September 1925, four months after the May Thirtieth Incident, Mitsumasa Kobayashi  
Ţȯǳ (1892−1962), a high-ranking police officer, visited southern China’s treaty ports, 
including Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangzhou. Kobayashi’s report published in Taiwan keisatsu 
kyōkai zasshi ͗ʟμŗÒȡаΪ (Taiwan Police Association Magazine) in February 1926, 
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paints a detailed picture of the anti-Japanese atmosphere in Shantou. Kobayashi was born in 
Tochigi Prefecture, Japan in 1892. When he was still a student at Tokyo Imperial University, he 
passed the advanced civil-office examination and worked at the Police Agency immediately after 
graduation. In 1919, he served as secretary at the Korea General Government, and two years later, 
he transferred back to the Police Agency. Kobayashi enjoyed a sterling reputation in the field of 
law enforcement, and was regarded as “a new favorite son in police circles. Clear-headed, with 
excellent ability, he has none of the taint so often attributed to police.”285 (μŗ˕ǾϮ$ś 
п͒ȌȖ":=6:=6н2$͓xǙημŗ͕$"ǿ0X
) 
In the travelogue, a passage by Kobayashi depicts Shantou port as strikingly different from 
the scene at Xiamen. When first setting eyes on Shantou port, he saw no sampans, which were 
used for disembarking both passengers and luggage. The wild port looked very lonesome, as 
only a few steamships were anchored there, including the Japanese warship Yūbari Ĩƣ, one 
Chinese steamship, and two other foreign steamships. The lonesome scene was certainly the 
result of anti-foreign activities. The travelogue then states that a coup against Sun Yat-sen had 
taken place in Shantou just several days earlier and that Shantou now was occupied by an army 
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285 “Kobayashi Mitsumasa shi ryaku reki” Ţȯǳɬ˘ɤ (A brief summary of Kobayashi Mitsumasa’s career), 
Taiwan nichi nichi shinpō ͗ʟȅȅǾğ, no. 8965, evening news 1 (April 26, 1925). 
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under Zho-lin Hong ɾњ (1872−1925) who served Jiong-ming Chen ФʤȌ to fight Sun 
Yat-sen. It seems that the boycott in Shantou became much more moderate under Hong’s (and 
Chen’s) governance and it is said that the sampan operators gradually returned to work.286 Later, 
Kobayashi boarded a small yacht belonging to the Osaka Shipping Company and because the 
passengers were still not allowed to enter Shantou through normal customs posts, Kobayashi and 
other passengers disembarked from the Asian Oil Company’s private passageway. After landing, 
Kobayashi planned to visit the Japanese consulate, but his entourage and he had no luck securing 
rickshaws, as the runners refused to pick up Japanese passengers. In the end, the Japanese group 
had to walk to the Japanese consulate in the oppressive heat and humidity.287 
After meeting with the vice consul, Kobayashi visited the Tōē School, a Japanese-financed 
school near the consulate. Because of the anti-Japanese movement, the number of students at the 
school had dropped dramatically to between 140 and 150. After noting this effect of the turmoil, 
he visited the Japanese-financed Hakuai Hospital, which was still under construction. When the 
entourage walked out to the street listlessly (probably because of the heat), a young Chinese man 
approached them and asked them something. The administrator of the hospital who had walked 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
286 Mitsumasa Kobayashi Ţȯǳ, “Nanshi no hatsutabi” Óǲ$¯Ȃ 3 (Forays into southern China, part 3), 
Taiwan keisatsu kyōkai zashi ͗ʟμŗÒȡаΪ, p. 79. (February 1, 1926) 
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out with Kobayashi answered with several sentences in Chinese. Kobayashi could not understand 
Chinese and, after the Chinese man’s departure, asked what had just transpired. The 
administrator told Kobayashi that the young man had suspected them of being Japanesea 
suspicion that the administrator had denied. Kobayashi wrote, “I wonder what he would have 
done had we admitted to being Japanese.”288 (Ĵņi$*Ƭ#>v@Ƨ?$&#) 
Later, Kobayashi tried to buy cigarettes on the street, but the vendor refused to sell them to 
him. Finally, Kobayashi went back to the Asian Oil Company complex and waited to reboard the 
ship. Most of the passengers appeared to be officials of the former government who were going 
into exile. Among them were two Chinese women. A Japanese-consulate staffer told Kobayashi 
that these two women were family members of the head of the former government’s Negotiation 
Bureau (]ʇ̿)289. They had all escaped to another consulate the previous night and were now 
seeking passage to Hong Kong, which might offer them protection. Regarding some 
heavy-looking bags placed on the deck, Kobayashi heard that they contained silver brought by 
these passengers, who intended to be as financially prepared as possible when going into exile. 
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288 Ibid., p. 80. 
289 The Negotiation Bureau was an institution affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Nationalist 
Government of the ROC or with local governments in charge of foreign affairs, affairs concerning nationals living 
abroad, customs, and entry and exit controls. In the late 1940s, Negotiation Bureaus in many places were dissolved 
and they totally disappeared by 1949. 
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Kobayashi wrote, “It is ironic that these people [Chinese officials of the former government and 
their families] put the boycott of Japanese goods and of British goods aside thoroughly, boarding 




Aboard the steamship, Kobayashi asked for some bread and beer, but the server said that the 
ship carried neither beer nor Japanese sake. Kobayashi wrote, “This has resulted from the 
boycott, which even affects the ship!” (Ǌ/[7)OEFKLȟ(@<,ÏŅ$) 
Finally, Kobayashi could eat only bread and waited for dinner. He commented, “My impressions 
of Shantou are getting worse and worse!”291 (Ŧȣ/Ą20TæĈ,@) 
Kobayashi’s writings provide us a vivid picture of the anti-Japanese (and anti-British) 
atmosphere in Shantou in the latter half of 1925. Indeed, throughout the latter half of the 1920s, 
anti-Japanese sentiments simmered. For example, On January 4, 1926, two crew members of the 
Japanese steamship Kenkon Rĕ hired four sampans in Shantou, and a conflict arose stemming 
from the payment for services. The conflict eventually resulted in physical confrontation and two 
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Chinese workers, A-ding Zheng ЃП@ and A-zao Zheng ЃПʡ suffered severely injuries. 
The action provoked Chinese anger, and on January 6, angry Chinese sampan workers initiated a 
strike targeting all Japanese steamships in Shantou. On the same day, Wen-Dong Ma шǻȭ, 
the chief negotiator for Shantou’s Negotiation Bureau sent a letter to Shantou’s Japanese consul, 
Gorō Uchida ˏZϽ, requesting the following actions: (1) detention of suspected criminals, 
(2) prompt trials of suspects charged with crimes in Shantou, (3) an apology from the Japanese 
government to the Nationalist Government and Shantou citizens, (4) compensation, (5) and 
assurances that similar incidents would not happen again.  
On January 7, the labor union of sampan workers formally accused Japanese crew members 
of violence and two hundred sampan workers petitioned the Negotiation Bureau in Shantou for 
justice, forcing the Japanese consul Uchida to accept the five requests. Later, on January 16, the 
workers in Shantou called a demonstration to protest both Japan’s dispatching of troops to 
Manchuria and the injuries sustained by the sampan workers in Shantou.292 In the following year, 
on July 7, 1927, a large-scale boycott of Japanese goods took place in Shantou and many 
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Japanese goods were confiscated.293 
In fact, anti-Japanese sentiment continued into the late 1920s. The experiences of Tairiku 
Munetō ō΂ĬХ attest to the lingering resentment. Munetō was born in Okayama Prefecture, 
Japan in 1893. He worked for the police department in Japan’s Hyogo Prefecture for several 
years. In 1924, he traveled to Taiwan, where he initially worked for the police force under the 
Taiwan General Government and, later (in 1927), transferred to the Department of Education. In 
January 1929, Munetō started off on a journey with other colleges, including the head of the 
Department of Education, Hidehiko Ishiguro ˳ќͥƨ, to southern China, where they would 
inspect the regions’ educational institutions. They visited Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou. In 
Munetō’s report, he wrote, 
When deciding to go to China, the first thing that came to my mind was the 
anti-Japanese situation. Upon arriving in China, I didn’t feel the severity of it 
[anti-Japanese situation]. However, Japanese officials and residents there [in 
Shantou] told me that the boycott was indeed significant… I did see slogans and 
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294 Tairiku Munetō ō΂ĬХ, “Nanshi ryokō no shokan” ÓǲȂΊ$Ǚǈ (The thinking of traveling southern 








Munetō’s worries reflected concerns of most Japanese travelers en route to China at that 
time.  
In May 1929, Taiwan zhi chaye ͗ʟPͩͶ (Taiwan’s tea), a periodical in colonial 
Taiwan, published a report entitled “The Current Status of Shantou’s Importation of Japanese 
Goods” noted, 
 
[Shantou’s] boycott of Japanese goods, though still active, was showing signs of 
dissipating. [Japanese and Taiwanese] merchants had waited for the storm to pass. 
From the start of the anti-Japanese movement, Shantou had been regarded as the 
most intensive site of the boycott. In fact, Shantou’s boycott was not restricted to 
Shantou. The boycotts in Vietnam and Siam, which were closely connected with 
Shantou’s economy, were intensive, as well. According to telegrams from Shantou 
yesterday and today, some wealthy merchants in Shantou recently started importing 
Japanese goods, and the overall importation of Japanese goods into the city has 
become noticeably smoother and less impeded than it was. Businessmen predicted 
that these improvements have grown visible not only in Shantou, but in Vietnam and 




295 “Shantou rihuo rukou xiaoxi” ɲпȅχáʆƿ (Information on Japanese goods entering Shantou), Taiwan 








In sum, the writings and reports of Katayose, Kobayashi, and Munetō constitute evidence 
that Shantou’s response to the May Thirtieth Movement was strong, and that Japanese travellers 




    
 Fig. 5-2 Tokusaburō Ida’s “Nighttime Discussion in Shantou.” 
 
[Illustration] The words in the red frame suggest that significant anti4Japanese!sentiment!in!Shantou!
was!unequaled!elsewhere!in!China.!(Source: Taiwan jihō, July, 1939.) 
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5.4 Japanese Writings about Shantou in the Turbulent 1930s 
In the early 1930s, Sino-Japanese relations reached a breaking point with the outbreak of 
the Manchu Incident in 1931 and the Shanghai Incident in 1932.296 
How did Japanese travelers in Shantou perceive the port city in the early 1930s? Shunsuke 
Morida Ʉˏ}c, who headed the Taiwan General Government’s Section of Hyginen depicted 
Shantou as he saw it in the early 1930s. Born in Fukuoka, Japan in1900, Morida had graduated 
from Tokyo Imperial University and then, in 1924, had traveled to Taiwan, working at the 
Bureau of Domestic Affairs and, later, at the Bureau of Police Affairs.297 In March 1932, when 
Morida was working at the Section of Hygiene, Bureau of Police Affairs, he visited branches of 
Hakuai Hospital in Fuzhou, Xiamen, Shantou, and Guangdong. In his travel report, he stated that 
the Japanese-financed Hakuai Hospitals were the targets of angry crowds of Chinese. In some 
instances, windows at the branches had been shattered by stone- throwing crowds. When Morida 
arrived in Shantou, he was surprised by the messages written in enormous letters on wall skirting 
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296 The Manchurian Incident, which occurred on September 18, 1931, was an armed conflict between the Japanese 
Kwantung Army and the Chinese Tungbei Army led by Xueliang Zhang ƣŉ͟. The military conflict raised calls 
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the coastline: “Expelling imperialism!” “Japanese Dogs.”298  
Morida wrote, 
It is said that Shantou is a unique community of 120 thousand people with a toxic 
anti-Japanese atmosphere. While I was aboard the vessel Kōdōmaru as it entered 
Shantou’s port, no single sampan appeared to unload our cargo; in fact, only a 
launch carrying customs and quarantine officials came to us. The scene was 
lonesome and unsettling.  
 
I boarded the Japanese Consulate’s launch and set off for land with the welcome of 
Mr. Nagashima, the head of the Hakuai Hospital at that time. [We] avoided landing 
at customs, instead making our way to a dock behind the Japanese Consulate. There, 












Morida’s recollections of reaching Shantou’s ports was similar to those of Kobayashi 
Mitsumasa, who had traveled to Shantou in September 1925. Both Morida and Kobayashi 
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perceived Shantou’s ports as desolate (e.g., the absence of sampans). Both Morida and 
Kobayashi avoided landing at a normal customs post, preferring the private trestle belonging to 
the Japanese consulate.   
  After depicting the experience of landing Shantou, Morida then depicted the scene inside 
Shantou city, where many Chinese soldiers were stationed. He wrote,  
I went to the Hakuai Hospital located in Waimalu ĩшϚ Soldiers were stationed 
on the roofs of tall buildings, apparently keeping a watchful eye on the foreign 
warships anchored in the port. The soldiers on the streets were armed, and most 
were slim youths, wearing uniforms like those of Taiwanese able-bodied men.300 
[The Chinese soldiers] carried guns and umbrellas on their backs, which make the 
soldiers look peculiar. I heard that Chinese soldiers’ equipment later improved, so 










300 After 1898, the third year of Japanese governance in Taiwan, the Taiwan General Government established the 
Hokō System (~ˑ´Ɣ), an auxiliary institution of the police. According to this system, every ten households 
constituted one kō (ˑ), and every ten kō constituted one ho (~). Every kō had a kōchō ˑЗ (a head of the kō), 
and every ho had a hoshō ~ɡ (a head of the ho). A sōteidan ÄU¸ (a group of able-bodied men) formed a 
subgroup of the Hokō System and comprised able-bodied men between 17 and 50 years old. The purpose of sōteidan 
was to guard against banditry and natural disasters. Chao-ju Chen Фȑĸ, Taiwan da baike quan shu ͗ʟĬ˥̈
Ȟ (Encyclopedia of Taiwan), http://taiwanpedia.culture.tw/web/content?ID=3718. 
301 Shunsuke Morida Ʉˏ}c, “Nanshi sōyūki” ÓǲȟϰΡ (Travelogue of southern China), Shinchikushū jiho 
Ǿ̚żȓğ, no. 20, p. 86 (January 4, 1939). 
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Morida depicted another episode. When he tried to buy a cigarette, the vendor—perceiving 
Morida was Japanese—refused to make the sale. Later, Morida and his entourage entered a 
Chinese restaurant for lunch, where the waitstaff grew openly sullen after noting that the 
customers were Japanese. However, one waiter at the restaurant was Taiwanese and treated the 
Japanese group kindly while serving them food.302 It is interesting to note that, regarding 
attitudes toward Japanese, there were a significant difference between Taiwanese and local 
Chinese in Shantou: the former were hospitable whereas the latter expressed antipathy, 
indicating different points of views about the presence of Japanese in Shantou. 
At the end of his stay in the city, Morida wrote, “When I left Shantou, it was engulfed in an 
anti-Japanese atmosphere. I felt it difficult to anticipate any kind of lasting peace among people.” 
303 /ĢĴţŰ/ŖŶ(@ȣCȗ@-ú&(iȥ/ťȂ/ð±,+ł8Ș
;/,+ũũƾ5 >A>*)&# 
The Sino-Japanese relations in Shantou deteriorated in May 1932 because of the occurrence 
of “Shantou Incident.” Huai-zhen Zhang ƣǏ˯ (1871−1941), the president and the chief 
editor of Shan bao ɲğ, a major local Chinese newspaper in Shantou, published an editorial 
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praising Bong-gil Yoon ťĳê (1908−1932), the Korean independence activist best known for 
orchestrating the bombing of a Japanese gathering in Shanghai on April 29, 1932. Zhang argued 
that Yoon’s activities were proof of the Korean people’s enduring nationalist spirit and that the 
Chinese people should follow Yoon’s example. By way of a memorandum, the Japanese consul 
in Shantou informed the Shantou City Government that Zhang’s activity was an insult to the 
Japanese emperor and asked the Shantou City Government to close Shan bao and arrest 
Huai-zhen Zhang immediately because he had insulted the Japanese emperor. The Shantou City 
Government refused the Japanese consul’s request.  
Several days later, twenty Japanese warships arrived in Shantou. Seven of the warships 
entered the Shantou port with uncovered cannons, clearly issuing the threat that military action 
was pending. Meanwhile, the Japanese consul issued an ultimatum, demanding that the Shantou 
City Government implement the following actions within forty-eight hours: (1) close Shan bao, 
(2) arrest Huai-Zhen Zhang and send him to a designated Japanese warship to await punishment, 
(3) compensate Japan for the expense of the warships’ unscheduled stop in Shantou, (4) ensure 
the safety of Japanese citizens in Shantou, and (5) prohibit any further public displays of 
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anti-Japanese sentiment in the city.304 
Facing such threats, the Shantou mayor Zi-xin Huang ћń went into hiding. Rui-gui 
Zhang ƣˇό (1891−1977) was the director of the Chinese army garrisoned in Shantou at that 
time. He openly supported Shan bao and Huai-Zhen Zhang. Facing Japan’s ultimatum, Rui-gui 
Zhang took the following actions: (1) he declared that Shantou City was under martial law; (2) 
he evacuated Shantou’s citizens to the suburbs, such as Chaoan, Chaoyang, and Jieyang, 
essentially turning Shantou City into a ghost town; (3) he ordered that Chinese army units 
surround Japanese citizens’ residences in Shantou, supervising their actions and prohibiting them 
from stepping outside; (4) he ordered that fortifications made from sandbags and other materials 
be built at strategic points along the coast; and (5) he ordered the port be closed. Rui-gui Zhang, 
on the one hand, diplomatically refused Japan’s ultimatum and, on the other hand, strongly 
implied that if the Japanese warships dared to open fire, the Chinese military might impose harm 
on—Shanotu’s Japanese citizens. Finally, Japan conceded and the two sides declared that the 
entire sequence of events had stemmed from a misunderstanding. The so-called Shantou Incident 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
304 Shantou shi di fang zhi bian zuan wei yuan hui ban gong shi ɲпƅĒǿΪ̸̽ľöȡϤŐ (Office of the 
editors committee of the Shantou City Gazetteer), Shantou dashiji ɲпĬVΡ (A chronicle of events in Shantou). 
Shantou: Shantou shi di fang zhi bian zuan wei yuan hui ban gong shi ɲпƅĒǿΪ̸̽ʦönϤŐ, 1988, p. 
169. 
! 239!
resolved itself peacefully.305 
Kameyuki Katayama ʲŭџЬ, a staffer in the Taiwan General Government, described the 
situation in Shantou around 1935. Born in Japan’s Kumamoto Prefecture, Katayama had worked 
at a radio station in Keelung.306 In 1935, he visited Shantou and described the port as 
captivatingly quiet. The tension in the air, however, was electric. Probably because the 
Sino-Japanese tensions at that time were explosive, Katayama and his fellow passengers did not 
disembark from their steamship until receiving some kind of confirmation that their safety could 
be ensured. Shortly, they received a telegram from a local agent at the Osaka Shipping Company 
in Shantou, stating that Japanese would be safe from harm in Shantou but that the boycott of 
Japanese goods was growing in intensity.307  
After setting foot in Shantou, Katayama wrote,  
“There were armed soldiers stationed at strategic point on the street and it looked 
like the city was under martial law. In any case, almost no Japanese were visiting the 
area. Certainly, I didn’t see any sumptuously clad ladies like those in Xiamen. The 
scene before me was that of a dead port.”308  
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In this passage, it is interesting to note that Katayama’s comparison of Shantou and Xiamen 
points to Xiamen’s far superior circumstances. Indeed, most port cities would garner a more 
favorable assessment than, as Katayama put it, a “dead port.” (ɦ$ʎ)  
In early 1936, a significant Sino-Japanese conflict occurred in Shantou. On January 21, 
1936, Susumu Kakuda ΝˏϮ, who was a member of the Japanese consulate’s security detail in 
Shantou was found dead in the street. The Japanese consul in Shantou, Harada , reported to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan that Kakuda had died from gunshot wounds and that 
Chinese anti-Japanese activists had perpetrated the murder; furthermore, Harada requested 
compensation from the Shantou mayor Yuan-he Li ȫʐó for the brutal act. However, the 
Chinese version of Kakuda’s death was starkly different from the Japanese version. According to 
Chinese sources, Kakuda had been sick for a long time and had died from natural causes. On 
January 22, the Japanese warship Yūbari Ĩƣ entered Shantou port, outfitted to open fire if the 
order came. Noting that only six staffers were in Shantou’s Japanese consulate at that time, the 
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chief of staff of the Taiwanese Army (͗ʟϝÜζЗ), Rippei Ogisu ͭɿ̕¢ (1884−1949), 
took the following actions: (1) Ogisu asked Yamada, the consul general of Xiamen (Amoy), to 
send officials to Shantou, where they would assist Japanese citizens residing in the area; (2) he 
ordered the Japanese steamships Gotake î̚ and Sanae ȇͣ to make haste for Shantou, 
where they would be ready to open fire; and (3) he asked the special investigator of the 
Guangdong Government, Zhong-hui Zhang ƣАϠ, to investigate the alleged crime and to 
arrest the criminals responsible. 
 On January 23, Ogisu had talks with Jitang Chen, the director of the Guangdong 
Government, in an effort to settle the dispute. Whether the truth of Kakuda’s death resembled the 
Japanese or Chinese version mattered little in terms of the incident’s effects on Shantou’s 
residents: both the Japanese and Chinese there grew distinctly uneasy. Under the city’s strong 
anti-Japanese atmosphere, Japanese citizens in Shantou worried about their safety; likewise, 
Chinese residents were scared that the Japanese warship would open fire on them.309 Three 
months and half after Kakuda’s death, on May 1, 1936, Japanese Consul Harada sent an 
ultimatum to the Shantou Government, requesting compensation. In response, the Guangdong 
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government accepted a compromise: they agreed to compensate Kakuda’s family in the sum of 
five thousand Chinese yuan in the name of the Cunxin Charitable Society ŅƵüĝ the largest 
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Concerning Shantou’s Sino-Japanese relations in 1936, the article “Notes on Shantou” 
written by Seijiuemon ŌkuboĬO~ʋəæ΍И a teacher at the Japanese Elementary School 
in ShantouɲпȅȪaŢŉȺ), provides us some revealing information. Ōkubo was born in 
Ibaraki Prefecture in Japan. In 1933, he worked at a public school in Taitung (in eastern Taiwan), 
and later, in 1936, he was assigned to the Japanese Elementary School in Shantou. He stayed 
there until 1940, when he returned to Taipei to fill a teaching position at an elementary school.311 
Ōkubo’s report declares that the slogan “Down with imperialism!” ęzí»]ƽ) was on 
display, in written form, on many streets throughout Shantou. In Zhongshan Park (which was 
named in memory of Sun Yat-sen), people had etched onto various surfaces not only the slogan 
“Down with imperialism!” but also the slogan “Praise the three principles of the people!” (ƣǮ
Wš]ƽ) On the front doors of Japanese residents’ homes were scrawled “Down with 
imperialism!” and “Japanese dog!” among other epithetic exclamations. Ōkubo commented, 
“ Anti-Japanese thought permeated Chinese people’s thought.”312 ĢĴĄĊ0ĀóƑ-üƫ
/ĄĊ/ŎŊ-µ2D)@/) 
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Ōkubo’s notes further declare it a pity that many native residents in Guangdong Province 
went to Japan for their studies, while anti-Japanese thought in Guangdong was practically 
feverish. On the one hand, ethnic Chinese from Guangdong were absorbing Japanese culture, and 
on the other hand, they were enthusiastically resisting Japan. From these complex, if not 
inconsistent phenomena, one can appreciate Ōkubo’s comment that “China was a mysterious 
country and the Chinese were mysterious men!” (ħȅi0<0?Ǭ/º)?ħȅi0Ǭ
/i)@<)) Ōkubo criticized Chinese people’s anti-Japanese attitudes but posed a 
question about the matter: “ Should Japanese not conduct a self-examination about their general 
attitudes toward China and Chinese?”313Ĵņi;É-¡ƙ6ŷ,) 	Ĵ
ņ/ĄĊ¬"/;/-'(ħȅ 3ħȅi-Þ@ďô-'(
Ōkubo’s writings indicate that Japanese residents of Shantou faced hardship stemming from 
the city’s anti-Japanese atmosphere. Kobayashi, an officer serving aboard the Fukkenmaru 
steamship suggested that, because anti-Japanese sentiment and activity were thriving in Shantou, 
Taiwanese sekimin would regularly pretend to be Chinese in everyday life. Only when they 




would the Taiwanese hoist the hinomaru flag (the Flag of Japan) in an opposite strategy of 
self-protection.314  
In March, 1937, some four months before the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War, a 
group of Japanese and Taiwanese students published their travelogues in Reisei љɡ, a 
publication of Taipei First Junior High School. Some of the students expressed their keen 
awareness of Shantou’s tense atmosphere. For example, Saburō Watanabe ʍϾBϽ noted that 
the entrances of many large stores in downtown Shantou were embanked with barbed wire 
nettings and fences. The explanation for these security measures was that if something untoward 
were to occur, the stores could immediately shut down to avoid looting. The blue-uniformed 
Chinese soldiers of the Guangdong Faction (Нȭʁ) kept a watchful, resentful eye on them. 
Finally, they arrived in front of the Japanese Elementary School and observed the sun-mark flag 
(i.e., the flag of Japan) waving in the breeze atop the school. 
Then, Watanabe wrote,  
 
“When I witnessed the sun-mark flag waving vigorously, I felt a surge of strength. 
When I thought of the stance being taken by this group of young fellow countrymen, 
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who had been persistently bearing on their backs Chinese people’s revilement but 










5.5 Brief Conclusion 
In this chapter, I examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 
1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937. I find substantial evidence 
that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s 
strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’ 
movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. My paper in some degree responds to Karl Gerth’s 
research about the relationship between Chinese nationalism and the culture of consumption 
prevalent during the National Products Movement from 1900 to 1937. He argues that by 
promoting the purchase of national products as opposed to foreign products, the movement 
offered people of all classes an opportunity to resist imperialism and express nationalist 
sentiments. Boycotts of foreign goods took place mainly during the period extending from 1905 
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to the 1930s, and most of the boycotts during the movement targeted Japanese products. 
Boycotts contributed to the growth and proliferation of movement organizations.316 
When we examine Japanese texts describing Shantou during the period from the 1910s to 
the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, we find substantial evidence that 
Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression of Shantou was of the city’s strident 
anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as restrictions on Japanese citizens’ 
movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. In the late 1910s and the early 1920s, many 
Japanese writings focused on Shantou’s reaction to the May Fourth Movement (1919).  
For example, Hiroshi Katase, a teacher at Shantou’s Tōē School, and Chinzō Kondō, chief 
of the Mitusi Bussan’s Amoy and Fuzhou Branch Office, depicted the severity of Shantou’s 
response. Thereafter, between the mid- and late 1920s, officials of the Taiwan General 
Government, including Gunji Katayose, Mitsumasa Kobayashi, Tairiku Munetō, separately 
testified to Shantou’s pronounced opposition to both Japanese goods and Japanese activities in 
the city. Subsequently, the Manchuria Incident and the Shanghai Incident, which occurred 
respectively in September 1931 and January 1932, further deteriorated the Sino-Japanese 
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relations in Shantou. Shunsuke Morida and Kameo Katayama, who worked in the Taiwan 
General Government, vividly described the worsening relations on the basis of their travels in the 
area.  
These and other writings expressed the intense anxiety felt by Japanese people staying in 
Shantou, a city that went through turbulent political change during this period. Shantou was 
essentially a battlefield where chaotic military conflicts among various warlords played 
themselves out in the first half of the twentieth century. Indeed, Shantou underwent much more 
political turbulence than its counterpart Amoy, another Chinese treaty port in southern China. 
Matsugorō Okabe, a teacher briefly at Shantou’s Tōē School, expressed his fear and anxiety 
about living in such a turbulent city under different warlords.           
 In sum, these Japanese writings constitute compelling evidence that neither native 
Japanese nor Taiwanese possessing Japanese citizenship could easily subsist in Shantou. These 
individuals—whether they were businessman contending with the Chinese boycott movement, 
teachers struggling to prevent the dissolution of Japanese-funded schools, or officials of the 
Taiwan General Government inspecting the city in the midst of myriad hostilities—would find it 




My dissertation has focused on a group of Japanese and Taiwanese people who lived in the 
Chinese treaty port —Shantou —during the period between 1895 and 1937. The starting time 
point (i.e., 1895) corresponds to the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, by which Japan 
acquired informal privileges in Chinese treaty ports. The ending time point (i.e., 1937) 
corresponds to the decline that Shantou’s Japanese community experienced owing to the 
outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War on July 7, 1937. Given the tense Sino-Japanese 
relationships that accompanied these open military hostilities, many Japanese who had resided in 
Shantou fled to Hong Kong, to Taiwan, and even back to the Japanese homeland. These 
Shantou-based Japanese and Taiwanese people, including merchants, teachers, officials of the 
Taiwan General Government, and officials of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, were 
cross-boundary people: they traversed geographical, national, and ethnic frontiers, migrating 
from either the Japanese homeland or colonial Taiwan to their new homelandShantou. By 
examining the activities of these cross-boundary people, I have explored the networks 
connecting the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and Shantou treaty port to one another; and 
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in this way, I have contributed to a new understanding of Japanese imperial expansion in East 
Asia.  
For the conceptual framework of this dissertation, I drew inspiration from a group of 
scholars. First of all, I was inspired by Peter Duus, Ramon Myers, and Mark Peattie, who remind 
us that we should consider both the formal empire (the colonies) and the informal empire (the 
Chinese treaty ports) of Japan to understand Japan’s influence on wider East Asia and the 
importance of the connection between Japan’s formal and informal empires in East Asia. These 
scholars have suggested that Japan was interested in China in terms of trade rather than territory 
and that, thus, Japan’s informal empire in China enabled Japan to acquire economic benefits 
while tamping down on the costs of formal colonization.317 Second, I was inspired by Ann 
Stoler, Carole McGranahan, and Peter Perdue, who argued that we should turn our attention to 
imperial actors—to “people on the fringes of empires as well as at their centers, to designated 
subjects as well as colonial administrators, to those with companion and countervailing 
motivations to empire and to those who reside at the categorical edges of the imperial.”318 In 
other words, we should turn our attention to peripheral people and the colonized. 
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Inspired by the abovementioned scholars and their studies, my dissertation focuses on, first, 
the connection between Japan’s informal empire in China (in this case, the Shantou treaty port) 
and Japan’s formal empire (in this case, Taiwan) in terms of commercial activities, educational 
activities, and the perceptions of Shantou articulated in Japanese travel writings published in 
Taiwan; second, the dissertation illustrates the ambiguous, complex interactions of Japanese, 
Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou by exploring the Japan−China co-investment Dadong 
Ice-making Company. In order to clarify the two abovementioned issues, I have examined a 
great many Japanese sources, including official records of the Taiwan General Government, 
commercial and diplomatic reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan, major 
newspapers and periodicals in colonial Taiwan, and travel writings. In previous research 
concerning Japanese imperial expansion in East Asia, we seldom see studies exploring imperial 
Japanese influence on Shantou, and thus, my dissertation delineates imperial Japanese history 





1. The Commercial and Educational Network among the Japanese Homeland, 
Colonial Taiwan, and Shantou Treaty Port  
Concerning the network of commerce in these circumstances, the early twentieth century 
saw Japan establish closer commercial relations with Shantou. Shantou was an important market 
for both Japanese and Taiwanese goods, including coal, seafood, molasses, and alcohol. The 
Japanese and Taiwanese goods served not only Shantou’s local needs but also those of other 
Chinese cities and of various regions in Southeast Asia. In Shantou, three major Japanese 
companies (the Mitsui Company, Taiwan Bank, and the Osaka Shipping Company) received a 
certain degree of governmental sponsorship; however, beyond them was a group of 
medium-sized companies that, without much public-sector assistance, successfully established 
their trade in Shantou. Moreover, Taiwanese merchants who established tea shops, textile 
companies, mining companies, pharmacies, and groceries played a crucial role in Shantou’s 
business circles. In examining these Japanese and Taiwanese companies and merchants, I have 
argued that a cross-boundary commercial network emerged among the Japanese homeland, 
colonial Taiwan, and Shantou treaty port. 
 
! 253!
Concerning educational networks and activities, I have focused on the Tōē School in 
Shantou (ɲпȭʝňȺ) and a group of Japanese and Taiwanese teachers whom the Taiwan 
General Government assigned to teaching positions in Shantou. It is clear that the Taiwan 
General Government was the main organization responsible for the connection between colonial 
Taiwan and Shantou in the field of education. In addition to assigning teachers and financing 
schools, the Taiwan General Government published teachers’ reports and travel writings in 
periodicals, such as Taiwan kyōiku ͗ʟǷ͏. By means of these periodicals, people in the field 
of education in colonial Taiwan attained information about Shantou. To varying degrees, readers 
in Taiwan shared Japanese teachers’ perceptions of Shantou, including perceptions of Chinese 
schools’ status in Shantou, of Western-based schools in Shantou, and of Japanese teachers’ 
self-examination stemming from Japan’s management of education in Shantou. These 
cross-boundary travelers at Shantou’s Tōē School reflect the significant transnational 
connections among the Japanese homeland, colonial Taiwan, and the treaty port of Shantou.  
Concerning travel writings, I have examined relevant Japanese texts describing Shantou 
during the period from the 1910s to the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War in July 1937, 
and it is obvious from these texts that Japanese travelers and residents’ most striking impression 
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of Shantou was of the city’s strident anti-Japanese climate, which would take such forms as 
restrictions on Japanese citizens’ movements and boycotts on Japanese goods. These Japanese 
writings constitute compelling evidence that neither native Japanese nor Taiwanese possessing 
Japanese citizenship could easily subsist in Shantou. These individuals—whether they were 
businessman contending with the Chinese boycott movement, teachers struggling to prevent the 
dissolution of Japan-funded schools, or officials of the Taiwan General Government inspecting 
the city in the midst of myriad hostilities—preserved or fled in the face of mounting hostilities.     
2. The Ambiguity and Complexity of the Interactions among Japanese, 
Taiwanese, and local Chinese in Shantou Treaty Port 
The social position and the legal status of Taiwanese sekimin in the Japanese empire’s 
hierarchy constitute an interesting issue that reaps great insights upon close examination. Barbara 
Brooks argued that colonial citizenship, which spanned multiple imperial fields, serves as a way 
for historians to explore the issue of identity in the Japanese empire. Meanwhile, imperial 
Japan’s policies concerning ethnicity and nationality demonstrate the different positions of 
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colonized peoples (e.g., Taiwanese and Koreans) within the empire.319 Some Japanese and 
Taiwanese scholars have demonstrated that Japan’s passport-control policies for Taiwanese 
subjects differed substantively from those for Japanese subjects. Moreover, Taiwanese sekimin 
who stayed in China didn’t enjoy exactly the same rights as Japanese who stayed in China.320 In 
this sense, although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects during the Japanese colonial period in 
Taiwan, Taiwanese were ultimately “sekimin” unable to benefit from the same set of rights as 
“Japanese” who hailed from the Japanese homeland. My dissertation explores the cooperation 
and competition, the conflict and compromise among Shantou’s Taiwanese sekimin merchants, 
local Chinese merchants, and the Japanese imperial consulate in Shantou by examining the 
Sino-Japanese co-investment Dadong Ice-making Company in Shantou, as previously 
mentioned.  
The story of the Dadong Ice-making Company brings to light several interesting issues. First, 
although Taiwanese were Japanese subjects, it was not necessarily the case that Japanese 
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authorities overseas would protect these Taiwanese. On some occasions, the Japanese authority 
was the origin of conflicts and obstacles besetting Taiwanese interests in China. An example of 
these marginalizing tendencies can be found in the actions undertaken by Shantou’s Japanese 
Consul Kumakichi Befu ±Ɠʭê, who chose to protect the interests of a “real Japanese” 
individual, Riichirō Taenaka ĹK²?Ͻ, by expelling Taiwanese shareholders from China.  
Second, the case of the Dadong Ice-making Company emphasizes the important role that 
nationality (ĉ̡) played in business activities in the treaty port of Shantou. In the initial stage of 
the company’s operations, Consul Befu’s oppressive actions resulted in the Dadong Ice-making 
Company’s decision to register as a Chinese company by identifying Zi-bin Zheng Ѓńƪ as 
its registered owner. Later, in 1933, Zheng’s own strategic maneuvering led the company to 
register with the Japanese consulate in Shantou as a Japanese company, which afforded the 
company a degree of Japanese protection. In other words, both Japanese and Chinese nationals 
protected the Dadong Ice-making Company’s interests at different times. By way of example, the 
Taiwanese sekimin Chang-sheng Chen ФЗˌ renounced his Japanese nationality and 
registered as Chinese to avoid the stream of obstacles erected by Consul Befu. This action by 
Chen was welcomed by the Republican Government of China, which regarded the 
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transformation as a kind of expansion of power. In Chen’s case, his Chinese nationality protected 
his interests in Shantou. Both the Dadong Ice-making Company and Chang-sheng Chen 
exemplify the importance of nationality to Taiwanese interests in Shantou.  
Third, the dispute between Taiwanese and Chinese shareholders in 1933 manifested the 
ambivalence of Taiwanese who lived in China. Taiwanese who lived in Shantou had similar 
languages, ethnic backgrounds, and customs, and cooperated with each other in business and in 
local civic matters. However, the situation of Taiwanese was strongly influenced by the local 
atmosphere, that is, by anti-Japanese sentiment. As I have explored in Chapter Five, many 
Japanese travelers, like Kiwata Ide [«ŇóĮ, a revenue officer in the Taiwan General 
Government, have suggested that Shantou was the site of the most pronounced anti-Japanese 
atmosphere in China. In this sense, we can speculate that when anti-Japanese movements were 
active in Shantou, Taiwanese found themselves personally in very real danger and found that 
their businesses would often experience significant financial losses. Therefore, how Taiwanese 
sojourners in Shantou protected themselves and their interests in an atmosphere of pronounced 
anti-Japanese sentiment is an issue of great importance here. 
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In conclusion, I have conducted a trans-national and cross-area study, combining theories 
and materials from across the board, and in this effort, I have provided a platform for dialogue 
among researchers in the fields of imperial Japanese history, colonial Taiwanese history, and 
local Chinese studies of Shantou. 
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